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ABSTRACT 
 
Since the domestic deregulation of the U.S. airline industry in 1978, impacts to domestic 
stakeholders, including airlines, airports, labor and consumers, have been well-studied.  International air 
transportation, however, has remained principally regulated by bilateral agreements between 
governments.  Recent global movement towards international deregulation, including the U.S.-EU Open 
Skies agreement which took effect March 30th 2008, has revived the debate over the effects of regulatory 
liberalization in aviation.  Our research contributes to the debate over regulatory liberalization with an 
analysis of its impacts in the broader transatlantic market.   
 
In this thesis we evaluate how competition in transatlantic aviation markets has evolved over the 
last decade and how regulatory liberalization has impacted service levels and competition in specific U.S. 
and European markets.  In addition, we explore the extent to which various market characteristics impact 
transatlantic service levels.  This research is conducted in four parts: (1) a stakeholder analysis, (2) a 
competition and market analysis of transatlantic aviation, (3) a review of the policy impacts since 1990, 
and (4) an econometric market analysis. 
 
In our stakeholder analysis, we find that increased competition is brought about by loosened 
restrictions on airline networks and by strengthening carriers financially through the availability of 
foreign capital and opportunities for cross-border mergers.  Our market analysis reveals that, in aggregate 
since 2000, transatlantic markets have seen an increase in number of competitors.  In addition, U.S. 
carriers have gained a disproportionate share of new transatlantic service, leveraging the network effects 
of flying from their hubs.  Further, we discover that although European gateways are highly concentrated 
to the largest four hubs, overall U.S. gateways are more concentrated than those of Europe, where a 
greater proportion of traffic is fed through smaller gateways. 
 
 In our analysis of Open Skies between European countries and the U.S., we find that the 
agreements have resulted in both increases and decreases in service levels in recent decades.  Of the 22 
European countries with U.S. Open Skies agreements in place by 2007, only seven demonstrated overall 
increases in service levels while six demonstrated overall reductions.  Five countries saw no significant 
change and the remaining four have yet to receive direct transatlantic service, supporting our hypothesis 
that liberalization alone does not oblige service level increases.  We discuss the extent to which antitrust 
immunized alliances in deregulated markets have led to the benefits often credited to liberalization.  Our 
econometric analysis confirms the hypothesis that Open Skies demonstrates no statistically significant 
correlation to transatlantic service levels.  Instead, total economic activity of a city or country and its 
status as a major carrier hub is the dominant explanatory factor of service levels. 
 
Thesis Supervisor: Dr.Peter Belobaba 
Title: Principal Research Scientist of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
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You can’t be a real country unless you have a beer and an airline. 
 
         -Frank Zappa 
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Chapter 1 
 
1  
Introduction 
 
 
Since its domestic deregulation in 1978, the U.S. airline industry has seen many changes.  Several 
carriers have come and gone, while others have been acquired by or merged with competitors.  Some 
hubs have grown while others have been downsized or closed altogether.  A number of large and small 
cities have received new domestic and international service, while some others have lost service.  In this 
age of globalization, the once heavily regulated international aviation market is increasingly being 
liberalized.  This represents a movement from the status quo that has proven contentious among air 
transportation stakeholders.  Our research contributes to the debate over regulatory liberalization with an 
analysis of its effects in the transatlantic market.1 
Historically, air service agreements between nations have been negotiated by governments.  A 
nation’s air transportation rights have often been granted or restricted as a foreign policy tool and an 
economic vehicle seeking to protect national interests.  International routes, city pairs, frequencies, fares 
and operating carriers have been determined by the governments negotiating a given bilateral agreement.  
Significant research of deregulation’s impact on airfares and service has been conducted.  Studies have 
consistently found that since deregulation, fares have declined overall, most communities have more 
commercial air service than they did under regulation, and the rate of accidents has continued its historic 
decline (GAO, 1996).  As U.S. airlines focus increasingly on expanding their international networks in 
response to the globalizing marketplace, many have sought the same operational freedoms internationally 
that they now enjoy domestically. 
As strong trading partners and historic allies, the United States and European nations have led 
efforts to liberalize their transatlantic aviation market.  Since 1992, 34 European nations have signed 
“Open Skies” agreements with the U.S. which allow any number of airlines unlimited rights to serve any 
city pairs between the two countries without any restrictions on capacity, code sharing or fares.2  
However, as discussed in this thesis, even Open Skies bilaterals contain operational and financial 
restrictions.  This thesis explores the specific impacts of Open Skies agreements between European 
                                                 
 
1 In our research, we use the term “transatlantic” to refer to the air transportation market between the United States 
and Europe.  The latter includes both European Union member states and those not covered by EU aviation 
agreements. 
2 Fares proposed by a flag carrier of either country remain unregulated unless both nations explicitly oppose them. 
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countries and the U.S.  We explore how much of the change in transatlantic air service levels has 
historically been driven by liberalization itself, versus other natural phenomena like population increases, 
GDP growth, globalization or tourism. 
 
1.1 Thesis Objective and Structure 
 
The main objective of this thesis is to provide a framework for the ongoing debate over regulatory 
liberalization and to explore the specific impact that liberalization has had on transatlantic air 
transportation.  In particular, the goal is to evaluate changes in service levels following the signing of 
Open Skies agreements and to develop a model that identifies any correlation between the existence of an 
Open Skies agreement and transatlantic service levels to a particular market.  Furthermore, the evolution 
of transatlantic competition and the utilization of hubs as gateways are investigated in order to shed light 
on the future of transatlantic aviation under continued regulatory liberalization. 
The thesis is divided into six chapters.  This chapter summarizes the current regulatory 
environment and the debate surrounding the U.S.-EU agreement.  It is separated into four sections.  The 
first contains a summary of objectives and approach to our research.  The second lays out the history 
which gave the U.S. its current air transportation policies.  The third outlines the EU-U.S. Open Skies 
agreement and frames the debate over further liberalization.  Lastly, a few important definitions are 
reviewed. 
Chapter 2 provides a detailed stakeholder analysis in conjunction with a summary of the issues 
most often cited in the debate over liberalized foreign ownership, a condition for a permanent Open Skies 
agreement between the U.S. and EU.  We discuss the merits of each issue from the lens of individual 
stakeholders and conclude by presenting vehicles for legislative change. 
Chapter 3 evaluates the transatlantic aviation market in terms of competition and market service 
levels over the last decade.  U.S. carrier performance in the transatlantic market is evaluated relative to 
their non-U.S. counterparts.  Transatlantic service levels of several U.S. and European markets are 
described to highlight significant changes in the previous decade and the role that transatlantic gateways 
have played. 
Chapter 4 explores service levels following specific policy events.  An emphasis is given to 
individual Open Skies agreements, but the impacts of alliances and antitrust immunity are also discussed.  
We discuss transatlantic service levels country by country and draw conclusions about the overall effects 
of Open Skies. 
In Chapter 5 we present an econometric analysis that seeks to explain transatlantic service levels 
for U.S. and European cities.  After reviewing the literature in the field of air transportation econometric 
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analysis, we describe a number of market characteristics and perform a series of regressions to explore the 
explanatory power of each factor. 
Chapter 6 presents a summary of our research findings and contrasts our results with other 
studies.  We then discuss the limitations of the analysis and suggest topics for future research. 
 
1.2 The U.S. Air Transportation Regulatory Environment 
 
Air transportation is critical to a nation’s economy, providing an incentive for governments to 
safeguard their industry players and keep them thriving.  In the U.S., the commercial aviation sector 
drives, directly and indirectly, approximately 5.8% of total domestic output and 5.0% of Americans’ 
personal earnings (Campbell-Hill, 2006).  Additionally, air transportation generates nearly 9% of 
domestic jobs, over one million direct and another ten million indirect and induced.  As a result of its 
economic dependence upon air transportation, the U.S. government continues to regulate the industry – 
even more so than other industries regarded as essential to the national interest including power, 
telecommunications, automotive, aerospace/defense and banking.  Table 1 summarizes the major events 
that have defined the regulatory environment in which U.S. airlines operate. 
What specifically is regulated?  The foundation of airline regulation is the premise that unfettered 
access to a nation’s markets and infrastructure should be limited to airlines of that nation.  An airline only 
qualifies as a “national carrier” if it fulfills citizenship requirements established by legislation.  The 
primary requirement is a restriction on foreign ownership.  Any carrier that is not a national carrier but 
may operate within another country is commonly referred to as a “foreign carrier.”  National carriers have 
full access to domestic markets whereas foreign carriers are restricted to operating within the bilateral 
agreements established between its home country and that in which it flies. 
In the U.S., only airlines granted a fitness certificate by the Department of Transportation (DOT) 
and operating certificate by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) are allowed to operate domestic 
flights (8th and 9th freedom), described in further detail in Section 1.4.  To be granted an FAA operating 
certificate, an airline must be a U.S. citizen corporation, which is defined as: 
 
A corporation organized under the laws of the United States of which the president and at least 
two-thirds of the board of directors and other managing officers are citizens of the United States, which is 
under the actual control of citizens of the United States, and in which at least 75 percent of the voting 
interest (read corporate stock with voting rights) is owned or controlled by persons that are citizens of the 
United States.  
Source: 49 USC § 40102(a)(15) 
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Table 1: Timeline of Significant Events in the U.S. Air Transportation Regulatory Environment 
 
Therefore, only U.S. citizen-controlled airlines are allowed full, unrestricted access to U.S. air 
transportation markets.  Foreign carriers, on the other hand, have traditionally been limited by bilateral 
agreements that specify which city pairs they can serve, often with restrictions on capacity, frequency and 
fares.  Foreign ownership restrictions are meant to ensure that airlines which serve the domestic market 
consider the national interest.  However some, such as former U.S. Labor Secretary Robert Reich, suggest 
that the implicit assumption behind foreign ownership restrictions is the “questionable belief” that local 
owners are more likely than foreign owners to consider the national interest or to serve local stakeholder 
interests (Carney and Dostaler, 2006).  Chapter 2 presents a stakeholder analysis in the debate over the 
relaxation of foreign ownership caps. 
Traditional bilateral agreements are increasingly being replaced by Open Skies agreements in 
which airlines are granted virtually unrestricted access to another nation’s international air transportation 
markets.  A study by InterVISTAS (2006) estimated that countries that have liberalized their air 
Year Event and Impact on Air Transportation Regulations 
1919 Paris Convention establishes exclusive sovereignty of a state over its airspace.  Nations are given the right to favor their airlines in connection with the carriage of persons and goods for hire. 
1926 Air Commerce Act acknowledges the potential for air commerce.  U.S. citizens must own >50% of any individual aircraft for it to be registered in the U.S. 
1938 The Civil Aeronautics Act centralizes safety and commercial regulation of air transportation.  It requires that U.S. citizens own or control at least 75% of the voting interests of U.S. airlines, a regulation which remains 70 years later. 
1944 
The U.S. convenes the Chicago Convention, where five “freedoms of the air” are established.  The Convention 
prohibits scheduled international air service over or into territory without the permission of its sovereign State.  This 
effectively begins the use of bilateral agreements. 
1946, 
1977 
The Bermuda/Bermuda II Treaties establish bilateral rights for air travel between the U.S. and UK.  The restrictive 
bilateral becomes the blueprint for most subsequent air service agreements. 
1977 The Air Cargo Deregulation Act is passed, clearing the way for the deregulation throughout the air transportation industry over the next few years.  FedEx credits its existence to its rapid expansion made possible by deregulation. 
1978 
The Airline Deregulation Act is signed by President Carter.  This begins the domestic liberalization of market 
entry/exit, pricing and competition, and is phased in over several years until the Civil Aeronautics Board is dissolved in 
the mid-1980’s. 
1979 
President Carter signs the International Air Transportation Competition Act which aims at reducing barriers to 
entry into new international markets.  As a protection, the Act authorizes the President to take quick action against a 
foreign government that engages in discriminatory or anticompetitive practices against American carriers. 
1970s-
2000s 
Various attempts at foreign buyouts of (or mergers with) U.S. airlines.  Many result in divestiture after U.S. failure to 
approve (Nanda, 2002).  The DOT establishes the practice of evaluating proposals on a case-by-case basis. 
1991 The Secretary of Transportation proposes allowing an increase of foreign ownership of U.S. airlines to 49% voting stock.  The proposal was made in response to heavy losses suffered by U.S. airlines in 1990-1991. 
2003-
2006 
The Bush Administration proposes raising the 25% cap to 49%.  After the proposal fails to gain Congressional support, 
a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking seeks to redefine “actual control” but meets strong opposition in Congress.  In May 
2006, DOT issues a Supplemental NPRM addressing Congressional concerns, but it is later withdrawn under continued 
opposition. 
March, 
2008 
Stage 1 of U.S.-EU Open Skies begins; Stage 2 negotiations begin in May 2008.  EU officials make relaxed foreign 
ownership a prerequisite for continuing with a permanent agreement.  This comes at a time when a weak U.S. aviation 
industry is prompting bankruptcies and consolidation among its major players. 
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transportation markets experienced growth in air service of 12% to 50% or more.  They estimated that the 
full liberalization (as opposed to simply Open Skies) of the U.S.-UK market alone would produce a 29% 
increase in traffic and generate 117,000 new jobs.  The incremental GDP impact, according to the report, 
would be roughly $7.8 billion. 
The largest Open Skies agreement to date, signed by EU and U.S. officials in April 2007, is 
expected to bring about tremendous change to the industry.  As a prerequisite to a permanent agreement, 
the Europeans have made liberalized foreign ownership a focal issue in the upcoming 2nd Stage 
agreement.  As a result, the debate over further liberalization of the U.S. airline industry has extended 
beyond regulation of frequency, capacity and fares to the actual ownership and control of U.S. airlines.  
The two issues can no longer be de-coupled. 
 Proponents of further liberalization between the U.S. and EU often cite the benefits that earlier 
Open Skies agreements between the two have afforded.  In our research we attempt to demonstrate two 
points: 
1) Liberalization takes many forms, and it is not clear that the demonstrated benefits of one 
form of deregulation can be used to predict the effects of other forms.  For example, even if it 
were accepted that U.S. domestic regulation since 1978 and individual Open Skies agreements 
were beneficial in aggregate, it cannot necessarily be concluded that changing foreign ownership 
laws would provide additional benefit.  Nor can the opposite argument be made. 
2) While some Open Skies agreements have led to increases in service levels and/or 
competition, there are others that have been followed by decreases in service or 
competition.  The impacts of liberalization depend on many factors not inherently common to all 
cases, and are therefore best evaluated on a case-by-case basis.  Additionally, the costs of 
regulation (operating inefficiencies, opportunity costs, etc.) should be weighed against any 
service gains in determining net utility to individual stakeholders. 
 
1.3 Framing the Issue: EU-U.S. Open Skies 
 
On April 30, 2007, EU and U.S. officials signed a 1st Stage Open Skies accord which allows EU 
airlines to operate direct flights between the U.S. and any EU country (and some others) and grants U.S. 
airlines the reciprocal right, plus the ability to fly between city-pairs in different EU countries.  The new 
opportunities resulting from the 1st Stage U.S.-EU Open Skies agreement are summarized as follows: 
• Grants full “5th freedom” rights to all U.S. and EU carriers (both cargo and passenger).  For example, 
United Airlines may fly from Washington Dulles to Paris and onward to Athens carrying Paris-
Athens local traffic. 
 20 
• U.S. and EU carriers are able to codeshare on flights to previously-restricted nations (e.g. Greece, 
Spain), allowing airlines to offer new routings and service to new markets. 
• Elimination of the nationality clause allows EU airlines to restructure or consolidate into cross-border 
entities without jeopardizing their right to fly to the U.S.  For example, Air France and KLM could 
merge their dual-hub operations to achieve economies of scale without losing their rights into the U.S. 
(although their traffic rights to other countries may be jeopardized). 
• EU airlines are able to offer transatlantic services from any location in the EU as a result of 
elimination of the nationality clause.  This allows any U.S. or EU carrier to compete in any U.S.-EU 
market.  For example, AF-KLM began (and subsequently discontinued) nonstop service between Los 
Angeles and London Heathrow, which previously was limited to four carriers – two British and two 
American.  Similarly, Lufthansa could choose to offer nonstop service between Miami and Barcelona 
with no connection to Germany. 
• U.S. regulators will consider foreign requests to hold larger shares of non-voting equity, including 
combinations in which the total of voting and non-voting equity exceeds 50% (U.S. DOC, 2007). 
 
Many studies predict enormous economic growth impacts resulting from full deregulation under a 
so-called “Open Aviation Area” (OAA).  One of the most referenced reports, The Brattle Group’s (2002) 
assessment of “The Economic Impact of an EU–U.S. Open Aviation Area” was commissioned by the 
EC’s Directorate-General Energy and Transport.  Brattle was asked to “analyze the effects of complete 
U.S.-EU aviation liberalization,” specifically the economic effects on airline costs and output and the 
resulting effects on consumer welfare and aviation employment.  In the report, Brattle estimates that the 
potential cost savings to the airline industry from greater productive efficiency are about €2.9 billion 
($3.8b) annually, or 4.2% of total costs.  A majority of those savings would come from intra-EU 
operations.  Furthermore, Brattle estimates that fare decreases associated with these cost savings would 
result in up to €370 million ($481m) in added consumer welfare due to the increase in passenger traffic. 
The Brattle Group also identified annual passenger traffic increases of 9% to 24%, or 4.1 to 11 
million passengers, on transatlantic routes resulting from the complete elimination of commercial 
regulations (Brattle, 2002).  In aggregate, they suggest that liberalization would result in an annual 
increase of over €5 billion ($6.5b) in consumer surplus.  The report then concludes that a U.S.-EU OAA 
would not jeopardize national security, labor or aviation safety but that the issues that arise as a result of it 
“would challenge regulators.”  
Booz Allen Hamilton’s (2007) follow-up report maintained the Brattle Group approach but used 
updated (and reduced) forecasts for transatlantic traffic and applied a more conservative approach to 
calculating consumer surplus.  The report identifies opportunity for 26 million additional passengers over 
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five years, translating to a consumer surplus of €6.4 to €12 billion ($8.3 to $15.6b).  Additionally, Booz 
Allen Hamilton (BAH) estimates that 72,000 jobs will be created in the EU and U.S. and that cargo 
tonnage would grow 1-2% in the same period.  In terms of traffic and consumer surplus, BAH forecasts 
lower, albeit still significant, impacts from movement to a U.S.-EU OAA. 
Proponents of the Open Skies agreement (and further liberalization) often cite the benefits 
identified by Brattle and BAH, despite differences between the Open Skies agreement and an OAA, as 
identified in Table 2.  The benefits that result from the Stage 1 U.S.-EU Open Skies agreement will be 
less than those calculated by Brattle or BAH in an OAA, where foreign ownership/control and full 
cabotage rights are allowed. 
 
Table 2: Summary of Restrictions in Traditional Bilaterals, Open Skies Agreements and OAAs 
 
 
Source: Civil Aviation Authority (2006) 
 
Because the foreign ownership issue had not been resolved when U.S. and EU officials signed the 
1st Stage agreement, EU officials made it clear that liberalized foreign ownership remains a primary 
objective for a permanent agreement.  By agreement within the European Council, individual EU 
countries could demand suspension of certain rights granted by the Open Skies agreement should U.S. 
officials not agree by 2012 to allow increased foreign investment in U.S. airlines. 
The premise for their demand is reciprocity of the EU’s 49% ownership cap.  However, it is clear 
that access to the U.S. domestic market, which comprises one third of global traffic, is valuable as both a 
standalone market and international hub-feeder.  Since cabotage rights are only granted to U.S. citizen-
controlled airlines, the U.S. market provides little benefit to foreign airlines that lack effective control of 
operational decisions (including network planning).  In other words, the EU’s rationale reflects that of 
increased control rather than equity. 
In the next section we define terms used throughout this thesis and distinguish between equity 
ownership and control.  In Chapter 2 we return to the stakeholder analysis of EU-U.S. Open Skies. 
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1.4 Definitions 
 
Service Levels 
 The term “service level” can be used to describe a number of measures in air transportation, from 
service quality (seat pitch, delays, concessions, etc.) to the number of itinerary options a passenger can 
choose from.  In this thesis, transatlantic service levels for a particular city refer to the: 
1) number of transatlantic destinations offered 
2) number of transatlantic departures performed 
3) number of carriers providing transatlantic service 
4) number of transatlantic passengers flown to or from a given city 
The term is therefore not a quantitative indicator of any above metric but is instead used to describe 
aggregate change over time or differences between cities. 
 
Origin-Destination (O-D) Market 
 An O-D market includes all potential travelers per period wishing to travel from all points served 
by origin airport A to all points served by destination airport B.  Although sometimes used to describe 
one-way demand, we generally refer to an O-D market as round-trip.  Example: BOS (Boston Logan) to 
LHR (London Heathrow). 
 
City Pair 
 An O-D market in which the origin and destination are cities rather than airport catchment areas. 
Example: New York City to London (where both are served by multiple airports). 
 
Stage Length 
 Stage length is the distance flown by an aircraft between two points.  For a nonstop market, the 
stage length is equal to the total distance between the origin and destination. 
 
Available Seat Miles (ASMs) 
 Available seat miles are a measure of airline capacity, weighted by distance.  For a given flight, 
the number of ASMs is equal to the number of aircraft seats multiplied by the number of miles flown, 
regardless of how many seats are occupied.  It is commonly used to compare the allocation of capacity 
across different airlines and markets. 
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Seat-Departures 
 Seat-departures are an alternative measure of airline capacity, not weighted by distance.  It is 
equal to the total number of seats departed over a given time period.  For a 250-seat aircraft performing 
one round-trip, the carrier performed 500 seat-departures.  This metric is commonly used to compare 
capacity across airlines when one wishes to avoid assigning value to the distance of flight segments. 
 
Revenue Passenger Miles (RPMs) 
 Revenue passenger miles are a measure of the output sold by an airline.  One RPM is equal to one 
revenue-generating passenger transported one mile.  Total RPMs can be calculated as the total number of 
enplanements multiplied by the average stage length.  RPMs are used to compare traffic share across 
different airlines and over time. 
 
Average Load Factor (ALF) 
 Average Load Factor is the percentage of an airline’s capacity that is sold.  For a given flight, the 
load factor is equal to the total number of passengers divided by the total number of seats.  Across a 
system, the average load factor is equal to total RPMs divided by total ASMs.  ALF is not an indicator of 
profitability, but rather of an airline’s ability to fill seats with passengers, irrespective of revenue quality. 
 
Yield 
 Yield is a common measure of the revenue quality of a particular flight leg, market or network.  It 
is defined as the revenue generated by an airline divided by its RPMs.  Yield measures the revenue 
generated by a passenger flown by one mile, or the revenue per unit of output sold. 
 
Freedoms of the Sky 
In 1944, delegates from 52 nations met in Chicago to develop a multilateral treaty securing each 
nation’s rights over its airspace.  These “freedoms of the sky” are the fundamental building blocks of air 
transportation regulation and each subject to specific conditions, such as establishing the frequency of 
flights or airport usage.  There are five basic freedoms that are recognized (although not necessarily 
granted) by virtually all countries.  Freedoms 6 and 7 are less common, and typically only negotiated 
between stalwart trading partners.  Freedoms 8 and 9 are only now entering into Air Service Agreements 
(ASAs), but they are still rare. 
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Table 3: Freedoms of the Sky 
1st freedom The right to fly over another nation’s territory without landing (overflight) 
2nd freedom The right to land in a foreign country for non-traffic reasons, such as maintenance or refueling, 
without picking up or setting down revenue traffic 
3rd freedom The right to carry traffic (people or cargo) from own State A to treaty partner State B 
4th freedom The right to carry traffic (people or cargo) from treaty partner State B to own State A 
5th freedom The right to carry traffic between two foreign countries with services starting or ending in own 
State A (i.e. “beyond rights”) 
6th freedom The right to carry traffic between two foreign countries via State A.  Combines two sets of 3rd and 
4th freedom rights as so it is rarely specified explicitly in Air Service Agreements 
7th freedom The right to operate stand-alone services between two foreign states which lie entirely outside A 
8th freedom The right to carry traffic between two points within a foreign state on a service originating or 
terminating in State A (i.e. consecutive or fill-up cabotage).  Example: Alitalia picks up 
passengers in Atlanta and drops them off in Boston en route to Milan (currently not allowed) 
9th freedom The right to carry traffic between two points within a foreign state with no requirement to 
originate or terminate in State A (i.e. pure or full cabotage).  Example: German-based Air Berlin 
flies nonstop between London and Manchester without any connection to Germany 
 
USA
USA
Country
B
1st - Overflight only
2nd - Non-traffic landing rights
3rd - Deplane traffic
4th - Enplane traffic
Country 
C
5th - Foreign traffic with U.S. routing
6th - Foreign traffic operated 
(“washed”) through U.S.  
Generally prohibited.
7th - Foreign traffic without U.S. routing
Cabotage – Intra-country foreign 
traffic. Always prohibited.International Freedoms defined in terms of a US 
carrier’s rights regarding Countries B & C.
 
Figure 1: Freedoms of International Air Transportation (Source: Michael Francesconi, UPS) 
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Equity Ownership versus Control 
Foreign equity and control of U.S. airlines are differentiated under U.S. law.  Although foreign 
investment in U.S. airlines is capped at 25% of voting stock, foreign investors are currently allowed to 
own up to 49% of equity stake in airlines provided that the airline is under the “actual control” of U.S. 
citizens and that the CEO is a U.S. citizen.  The DOT uses several methods to test for “actual control” 
(U.S. DOT 2003), including: 
• Supermajority or disproportionate voting rights 
• Negative control/power to veto 
• Buyout clauses 
• Significant Contracts 
• Credit agreements/debt 
• Family ties between foreigners and U.S. officers 
 
Other nations have experimented with variable voting rights in which no equity cap is placed on 
the sale of shares but where the total fraction of controlling (i.e. voting) stake remains fixed.  Canada, for 
example, has capped the foreign controlling stake of its airlines at 25% but places no limit on the number 
of shares foreign investors can own.  Foreign investors currently own 75% of Air Canada’s holding 
company, ACE, but they have been issued Class A pro-rated shares which, by design, total no more than 
25% of the voting stake in Air Canada.  Foreigners can buy as many airline shares as they’d like without 
ever controlling more than 25% of the voting rights of a Canadian airline. 
According to Clive Beddoe, Chief Executive at WestJet, the structure “doesn’t make any 
difference to the value of the stock.  It’s very rare that shareholders need to vote on any contentious issue” 
(Knibb, 2007).  Therefore the average shareholder places little value on the voting rights of stock, and 
since Class A and Class B shares trade at the same price, the market has not established a price premium 
for voting rights. 
However, other studies have found price premiums emerge as an impact of barriers to foreign 
investment.  Bailey, Chung and Kang (1999), for example, find that when foreign ownership limits have 
been reached, “foreigners begin to trade local equities among themselves at a premium.”  They find that 
foreigners “often pay premiums of 20, 50 or even 100% above otherwise identical security available only 
to locals.” 
In January 2008, German carrier Lufthansa purchased a 19% stake in JFK-based carrier JetBlue.  
While executives from both carriers have indicated that collaboration is likely, Lufthansa has yet to 
exercise control over JetBlue’s operations.  This investment provides evidence that EU airlines do not 
need complete liberalization to invest in U.S. airlines. 
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But as we stated earlier, without control of operational decisions, route networks cannot be 
shaped, and there is no benefit to international carriers that could not otherwise be afforded through 
alliances or equity ownership.  We therefore assume for this analysis that a controlling, as opposed to 
equity, stake is ultimately desired by foreign investors.   
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Chapter 2 
 
2  
Stakeholder Analysis and Literature Review 
 
 
This chapter is separated into two sections.  The first contains a summary of the stakeholders and 
issues that are considered in this research.  Stakeholders with the most direct impacts resulting from 
regulatory liberalization and those most vocal in the debate are highlighted.  Stakeholders without 
mention are by no means unaffected by regulations in air transportation, but restrictions of time and space 
require a limit in scope. 
 The second section is a literature review of academic, industry and journalistic works as well as a 
summary of takeaways from the various stakeholder surveys conducted for this research.  The works cited 
range from the theory of regulation to analyses of specific impacts to today’s stakeholders.  Similarly, the 
stakeholder reviews range from opinion editorials and anonymous executive opinions to formal positions 
of industry players. 
 
2.1 Overview of the Regulatory Liberalization Debate 
 
Although the easing of operational restrictions associated with Open Skies has been widely 
supported, the frameworks by which freedoms are granted have proven more contentious.  Most recently, 
the debate over U.S.-EU Open Skies intensified when the European Commission requested that, in 
addition to negotiating operational freedoms, the U.S. ease its foreign ownership requirement.  The U.S. 
began restricting ownership of airlines in the 1930’s for four primary reasons.  First, Congress wanted to 
protect the then-fledgling U.S. airline industry.  Second, U.S. officials were concerned about allowing 
foreign aircraft access to U.S. airspace.  Third, international air service was regulated under bilateral 
agreements as a tool for foreign policy.  Finally, the military relied (and continues to rely) on civilian 
airlines to supplement its airlift capacity, much like it does with sea-going vessels. 
While protectionism increased following the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, attempts to 
deregulate the industry began immediately after the restrictive Bermuda II treaty was signed in 1977.  By 
1978, President Carter had signed the Airline Deregulation Act to reduce the role of government in air 
transportation and allow for new entrants and increased competition to provide price and service benefits 
to consumers in U.S. domestic markets. 
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While the momentum domestically has clearly been towards liberalization, the U.S. remains 
among the most ownership-restricted aviation markets in the world (see Table 4).  Chang and Williams 
(2001) summarize nationality clauses and the current regulations around the world and assess “the 
prospects for change in ownership rules under multilateral and plurilateral proposals.”  They explain that 
governments have traditionally designated, set up, and regulated their own airlines as a means of 
safeguarding their sovereignties and controlling foreign relations with trade partners. 
 
Table 4: Status of Foreign Ownership Restrictions in Select Countries 
Country Status of Foreign Ownership Restriction 
Australia 49% for international (25% single); 100% for domestic3 
Brazil 20% of voting equity 
Canada 25% of voting equity (15% single)4 
Chile Principal place of business only 
China 35% 
Colombia 40% 
European Union 49% 
India 26% for Air India, 49% for privately owned domestic 
carriers, 74% for charter and cargo 
Indonesia Substantial ownership and effective control 
Israel 34% 
Japan 33.33% 
Kenya 49% 
Korea 50% 
Malaysia 45% for Malaysia Airlines (20% single), 30% other 
Mauritius 40% 
New Zealand 49% for international; 100% for domestic 
Peru 49% 
Philippines 40% 
Singapore None 
Taiwan 33.33% 
Thailand 30% 
United States 25% of voting equity; one-third of board at maximum; 
cannot be Chairman of Board 
Adapted from Hsu and Chang (2005) 
 
 
Easing of ownership rules, according to Chang and Williams, is often accompanied by a 
loosening of other market restrictions.  The authors point out that the recent increase in foreign 
investment in airlines reflects the growing globalization of the industry.  They hold that “restrictive 
foreign ownership rules clearly no longer satisfy the demands of today’s marketplace” and that “removing 
                                                 
 
3 The Australian government released a policy paper on December 1st, 2008 that proposes lifting the foreign 
ownership limit for single entities to 49%. 
4 As of February 2009, the Canadian government was debating a proposal to increase ownership limits to 49%.  The 
proposal, which is supported by Air Canada, is backed by both the Conservative Party and the Liberal Party. 
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the nationality clauses in bilateral air service agreements (ASA’s) is a vital step towards achieving a truly 
competitive global airline industry.” 
Some argue that current regulations are required to maintain the strong safety record of U.S. 
carriers and that removing barriers of ownership would hinder the U.S.’ competitive position, hurt labor, 
and jeopardize national security.  Our stakeholder analysis attempts to characterize the economic and 
security implications of the issues that are most often cited by stakeholders in the debate over regulatory 
liberalization. 
 
2.2 Issues in Regulatory Liberalization 
 
It is commonly acknowledged by industry experts that increased foreign ownership and reduced 
operational regulations will increase competition, but they disagree on whether the resulting impacts are 
positive or negative.  Costs and benefits are often proportioned unevenly across stakeholders in the 
market, and government officials feel it is their obligation to ensure that their constituency does not face a 
disproportionate burden.  Many arguments against changes to the status quo are economically motivated.  
Others are more intangible in nature, attributed to impacts that are not quantifiable.  For example, some 
fear that weaknesses in a nation’s civil aviation industry, often associated with the “rapid progress of 
technology and continuous changes and innovations, has become a mirror reflecting the general standard 
of [national] society” (Gertler, 1994). 
Opponents of regulatory liberalization, particularly an increased foreign ownership cap, argue 
that it will pose a risk to national security, reduce aviation safety, and hurt aviation labor. In order to 
frame our stakeholder analysis, these issues are discussed in further detail below and a summary is 
provided in Table 5.  We then present a detailed stakeholder analysis, incorporating takeaways from our 
stakeholder interviews. 
 
Table 5: Issues in the Debate Over Foreign Ownership Liberalization 
Issue Point of Contention 
Domestic Competition Will liberalized foreign ownership change the competitive landscape?  Would any such change benefit or hurt U.S. consumers? 
National Security Does foreign stake mean foreign control?  Will the Civil Reserve Air Fleet become ineffective under increased foreign ownership? 
Employment Will increased foreign ownership put U.S. jobs at risk or affect the labor-management balance of power? 
Safety Does either foreign stake or foreign control imply lower safety standards?  Would oversight of additional regulatory standards burden the FAA? 
International Competition Will relaxing ownership laws increase international competition?  Will U.S. airlines be able to compete without changes to the domestic industry structure? 
National Prestige & Political 
Intangibles 
Will increased foreign presence hurt the U.S. position as a world leader?  Will it present a risk of 
aviation system disruption? 
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Domestic Competition 
Some U.S. government officials have recently raised the concern that consolidation prompted by 
increased competition will hurt, rather than help, consumers by reducing choice and increasing fares 
(Oberstar, 2008).  However by definition, restricting the natural evolution of airlines, including 
consolidation, is itself a form of regulation.  While consolidation has the potential for reductions in 
service, recent bankruptcy filings by U.S. carriers underscore the effects of high commodity prices and 
fragile capital markets.  Consolidation can occur in many ways:  consolidation through liquidation of 
airlines; consolidation through continued capacity reductions; or consolidation through merger and 
acquisition activity.  Based on current proposals, capacity cuts may be minimized under a scenario of 
consolidation through merger and acquisition activity.  Maximizing access to U.S. air transportation 
markets is most important for consumers and the U.S. market has proven time and time again that if 
prices are perceived to be too high, then a competitor will exploit that opportunity. 
One clear benefit of reduced ownership regulations is that airlines will gain access to additional 
capital,5 and economic theory tells us that the average cost of capital will decrease as its supply increases.  
Access to foreign capital, paired with strong leadership and responsible business plans, would strengthen 
U.S. airlines financially while enhancing their competitive position by retiring debt, consolidating, 
improving services and avoiding bankruptcy.  In addition, diversifying investor risk profiles allows U.S. 
airlines with weaker credit ratings to seek capital.  However, it may also be true that limiting the pool of 
capital encourages stronger, less risky business plans.  If we assume the quality and number of business 
plans remain constant, additional capital may favor weaker plans. 
A secondary benefit is that foreign airline investors impact the culture of acquired airlines, 
encouraging them to adopt best practices.  If the infusion of capital and management best practices 
strengthens U.S. carriers financially and operationally, regulatory liberalization will increase competition 
domestically. 
 
International Competition 
Whether through elimination of the nationality clause or by expanding the number of airlines to 
which rights are granted, liberalization is likely to increase international competition.  Under an OAA, the 
most liberalized regime, competition is increased by both allowing a greater number of foreign carriers to 
compete and strengthening domestic carriers through capital infusion. 
                                                 
 
5 While current airline ownership laws in the U.S. restrict foreign ownership of voting equity, the argument holds for 
debtors as well.  Debtors seek a level of control in their investments that would raise concern with regulators.  As 
Carney and Dostaler (2006) point out, “Banks typically demand ‘insider status’ to monitor executive 
decisionmaking.” 
 31 
Some critics of liberalization point to the adverse effects of increased foreign presence on U.S. 
carriers and the flying public, namely that changes in the competitive landscape will hurt consumers.  
Some even suggest that an increased foreign carrier presence in the U.S. will reduce the number of 
carriers flying the U.S. flag around the world and would quickly hurt national prestige. 
In response, others have highlighted the unlikelihood of a flood of new competition resulting 
from further liberalization.  They point to the noticeably low levels of new service that resulted from the 
Stage 1 EU-U.S. Open Skies agreement.  Airlines’ hesitance to enter new markets following the 
agreement highlights the risk-aversion to strong competition that carriers face even domestically.  For 
example, U.S. carriers are currently able to fly between virtually any city pair within the U.S., and EU 
carriers can do the same within EU boundaries.  However, we have yet to see Continental schedule direct 
service between Delta’s Atlanta hub and American’s Dallas hub, or between US Airways’ Charlotte hub 
and nearby Greenville.  Similarly, Lufthansa has yet to operate direct service between BA’s London 
Heathrow and AF-KLM’s Paris CDG, or between Alitalia’s Naples and Milan strongholds.  The reason is 
generally not that these O-D pairs are unprofitable, but instead that airlines maintain domains of control 
where even the strongest competitors hesitate to enter.  This control arises from the operational flexibility, 
larger local market share, and economies of scale that hubs provide. 
Although U.S. carriers compete intensely, they are careful to focus their resources where least 
likely to become victims of overwhelming competitive response.  The reality of competition is that 
players can price compete in every market until neither is profitable, but the social value of preserving 
many weak competitors is arguably lower than that of multiple competitive carriers. 
Under a more liberalized regime, U.S. carriers are forced to compete internationally with strong 
network carriers on service while maintaining cost competitiveness with low-cost carriers.  Their ability 
to further collaborate (and even merge) with foreign carriers might enable them to realize economies of 
scale and operational synergies for their increasingly global networks. 
 
Impacts on Passengers 
When discussing the impact of regulatory liberalization on the U.S. consumer, it is important to 
recognize that benefits to consumers as measured by fares, service levels (schedules, frequencies, 
destinations, quality of service) and safety, can be improved through increased competition, whether 
foreign or domestic. 
Impacts on fares and safety are discussed in later sections, so here we address service levels.  For 
the latter, Mazzeo (2003) demonstrates that increased competition is correlated with better on-time 
performance, which according to the author is the most common category of customer complaints 
regarding service quality.  Other studies, including Douglas & Miller (1974), Rupp, Owens & Plumly 
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(2003) and Lee & Luengo-Prado (2003) support the hypothesis that increased competition is positively 
correlated with service quality. 
Increased competition forces carriers to improve the efficiency of their operations and to improve 
services to capture greater market share of their largely commoditized product.  A liberalized regulatory 
environment in which U.S. carriers face direct competition from international carriers with high service 
ratings would likely result in improved levels of service for U.S. travelers.  A stronger domestic industry 
with access to cheaper capital allows U.S. airlines to invest in new services, products and aircraft while 
enabling competitive returns for shareholders. 
 
Military Airlift 
U.S. airlines volunteer to assist the Department of Defense (DoD) with supplemental airlift 
capacity in emergencies through the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program.  In return, these carriers 
are granted preferred access to U.S. government peacetime airlift contracts worth over $2 billion per year 
in revenue (Bolkcom, 2006).  In the past, DoD officials have raised concerns that foreign investors might 
discourage continued participation in CRAF or increase the likelihood of a carrier defaulting on its 
promise in times of need. 
The concern is based on the fact that the U.S. government has more legal leverage over U.S. 
carriers than foreign carriers.  It is true that the government could revoke the operating certificate of a 
non-compliant CRAF carrier, seize the needed aircraft and call up the carrier’s reservist pilots to fly them.  
But truth be told, a U.S. airline with minority stake foreign ownership remains a U.S. airline and must 
operate according to U.S. law.  While there is a viable concern that an airline could re-flag its 
international operations overseas to substitute lower-wage pilots (thus disqualifying those pilots from 
CRAF), there are legal means to prevent this.  And if all else fails, the President has the authority under 
the Exon-Florio amendment to the Defense Production Act to block any transaction that poses a threat to 
national security. 
Although the DoD concurs with the DOT’s protections of CRAF, supporting the NPRM (U.S. 
DOT, 2006), Congressional officials still cite national security as a major concern.  They often allude to 
the prohibitively expensive alternative to CRAF, having the DoD maintain the airlift capacity organically.  
A RAND study found that replacing CRAF’s major theater capability of CRAF would cost about $3 
billion annually (Gebman, 1994).   
But some believe that “the government would save money if it paid U.S. carriers to participate in 
CRAF and then opened the government travel market to all qualified carriers” (Robyn et al., 2005).  They 
are referring to the Fly America program, which provides incentive to U.S. carriers to participate in 
CRAF.  Enacted in 1974 as part of the International Air Transportation Fair Competitive Practices Act, 
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Fly America requires federal employees and their dependents, consultants, contractors, grantees, and 
others performing U.S. Government-financed foreign air travel to travel by U.S. flag carriers except 
where travel by foreign carrier is a matter of necessity (i.e. U.S. carrier service or codeshare is not 
available). 
It is not clear that the government would even need to go that far.  Not a single airline executive 
we interviewed indicated that they would withdraw from CRAF if Fly America were abolished.  As one 
legacy airline executive put it, “CRAF is lucrative for us, and it would remain that way even without Fly 
America revenue.”  While provisions must certainly be put in place to ensure national security needs are 
met, the obstacle can be overcome. 
 
Labor 
Labor groups often cite the concern that increased foreign investment could put jobs at risk.  The 
risk is particularly high for those U.S. pilots and crew on international routes who could easily be 
replaced by foreign, lower-wage crews.  Labor unions fear that regulatory liberalization “would tend to 
eliminate international flying by U.S. carriers” which is the “most remunerative, and therefore the most 
desired, flying performed by pilots” (Woerth, 2006).  The concern here is rooted in the fact that pilots in 
the EU15 earn about 15% less than their American counterparts, and that the disparity in wages with the 
12 states that have since joined the EU is even greater (Robyn et. al, 2005).  However, U.S. carriers are 
not able to replace U.S. flight crews for their domestic operations, which account for over 70% of total 
U.S. airline revenue (MIT ADP, 2008).  Therefore pilots and crews maintain significant bargaining 
leverage to prevent carriers from shipping the most senior (i.e. desired) jobs overseas.  That, of course, 
assumes that domestic job losses are not significant enough to depreciate labor’s bargaining power. 
Others believe that additional investment in U.S. airlines would strengthen the industry and 
stimulate domestic aviation employment.  An airline’s ability to acquire capital during times of financial 
difficulty would allow them to retire debt, consolidate services, and to enhance their competitive position 
rather than resorting to drastic cost-cutting measures.  Labor concessions are less likely in the 
environment where cash shortages can be met, in the short term, by infusion of additional capital.  A 
sustainable, financially viable U.S. aviation industry can moderate the impact of the historical cyclicality 
of the U.S. industry, providing greater stability for employees. 
Still others take the view that changes in foreign ownership laws would not affect labor at all.  
The U.S. DOT, for example, has indicated that “due to existing collective bargaining agreements and 
other regulatory requirements governing U.S. airlines and their employees, the administration’s proposal 
would not affect the rights of labor or the obligation of airlines with respect to labor” (Hecker, 2003).  
Either way it is important to cushion labor against possible losses resulting from regulatory liberalization.  
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Such protections should be built with cooperation from airlines and their labor unions.  A stronger 
industry would benefit labor, but we have yet to see labor support for foreign ownership relaxation.  
Opposition to change in the status quo has been a consequence of uncertainty in the effects of policy 
change. 
 
Safety 
Some labor groups and Congressional officials have warned that regulatory liberalization could 
hurt aviation safety by (1) increasing competition that prompts spending cuts including those related to 
safety and by (2) increasing the FAA’s oversight burden of carriers subject to different regulatory regimes 
(in the case of cabotage).  In response to the first concern, we are reminded that U.S. airline deregulation 
prompted similar concerns in the late 1970s, however numerous studies have shown that deregulation had 
little or no adverse impact on safety (Bier, 2003 and GAO, 1996).  In fact, airline safety as measured by 
death risk improved from 1 in 2.6 million to 1 in over 10 million following deregulation in 1978 (Barnett 
and Higgins, 1989). 
The second concern would require an adjustment of regulations to ensure that the inevitable 
globalization of aviation improves, rather than hurts, aviation safety. Currently, EU carriers operating 
inside of the U.S. remain the regulatory responsibility of EU authorities.  Under an OAA, Congress may 
impose direct FAA oversight for all aircraft operating in the U.S.  Some officials are concerned that 
oversight of multiple regulatory standards would burden the FAA.  However, this could be avoided if the 
FAA were to maintain its Bilateral Aviation Safety Agreements with any OAA partner and require that 
the FAA’s safety standards be applied to foreign carriers.  And if all else fails, the U.S. government has 
the authority to revoke the certificates of those foreign carriers and crews operating in the U.S. that fall 
short of safety requirements.  As with concerns over national security, provisions can be put in place to 
ensure safety standards are met in a fully liberalized environment. 
 
2.3 Stakeholder Analysis 
 
Changes in legislation are generally contentious because it is difficult to build consensus for 
movement away from the status quo.  In the United States, legislation is a product of elected officials that 
are accountable to constituents who seldom comprise a single viewpoint on a given issue.  Legislation 
governing air transportation is no different, and in many respects more complex because it reflects a 
unique constituent makeup.  Millions of Americans travel by air, and they are spread throughout every 
congressional district. 
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Travelers’ interests are relatively simple to model – they are interested in low fares, safe and 
high-quality service, and an expansive network.  Contention over legislation arises because the various air 
transportation stakeholders disagree on what action will generate the best balance of fares, safety, service 
quality and offerings.  Table 6 summarizes the stakeholders that are considered in this research.  Note that 
our analysis highlights those stakeholders with the most direct impacts resulting from regulatory 
liberalization or those most vocal in the debate.  The following subsections present various stakeholder 
perspectives ranging from opinion editorials and anonymous executive opinions to formal positions of 
industry players. 
 
Table 6: Major Stakeholders in the Debate Over Regulatory Liberalization 
Stakeholder Interests 
U.S. Airlines Have traditionally welcomed access to new markets & capital, although relaxed foreign ownership has not been unanimously supported 
Foreign Airlines Generally welcome exchange of market access and the ability to consolidate with U.S. counterparts to build stronger global networks, although there are notable exceptions 
U.S. and International Airports Welcome greater access to a wider array of destinations, including a larger volume of international flights 
Dept. of Transportation/ 
Federal Aviation 
Administration 
Have led increasing efforts to relax restrictions 
Department of Defense Has historically been concerned about reduced airlift capacity under CRAF, but has supported DOT’s liberalization attempts since 2003 
Labor Unions Concerned about the impact of liberalization on U.S. airline jobs 
Foreign Investors Welcome opportunity to new investment opportunities 
International Civil Aviation 
Organization Has led increasing support for the relaxation of restrictive bilateral agreements 
Organization for Economic  
Cooperation and Development 
Supports economic cooperation and development between nations as well as regulatory 
liberalization, but has played a reduced role in the debate since the late 1990’s 
International Air Transport 
Association 
International trade organization supports the economic growth (and strength) of its members, 
officially supports regulatory liberalization 
European Commission Has made liberalized foreign ownership a prerequisite for a 2nd stage Open Skies agreement 
U.S. Congress Serves multiple constituencies but has traditionally opposed increased foreign control of U.S. airlines 
U.S. Travelers Will bear most of the consequences and benefits from increased foreign ownership, including changes to fares, levels of service, safety, and quality of service 
 
 
Airlines 
From an operational standpoint, airlines in aggregate stand to benefit from regulatory 
liberalization, although some will certainly fare better than others.  One impact of increased competition 
paired with reduced regulations may be the reduction of government handouts or bankruptcy protections 
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to weaker players in a strong industry.6  Handouts are a barrier to entry, an anticompetitive practice of 
making weak players stronger and limiting new entrants’ ability to take their place.  The opportunity for 
stronger players to buy out weaker ones (including their labor and capital assets) saves the taxpayer 
dollars (Dempsey, 2003) and fortifies U.S. carriers in an increasingly competitive global industry. 
As we made the argument that foreign ownership and operational liberalization (i.e. Open Skies) 
cannot be decoupled, we must also address the effects of the latter.  As Continental, Delta, Northwest, and 
US Airways begin new transatlantic service into London Heathrow, British Airways stands to lose some 
of its high-yield traffic.  For a 10-20% fall in premium fares and 2-5% for leisure fares, BA could lose 
£120-260 million in profit, as estimated by ABN Amro in a July 2005 report.  Yet BA, which ABN-Amro 
estimates makes 70% of its profits from the restricted transatlantic markets, has responded by identifying 
new profit opportunities afforded by the U.S.-EU deal.  BA’s OpenSkies subsidiary began operating 
nonstop service in June 2008 between New York and both Paris and Amsterdam. 
In the rapidly changing airline industry, carriers must be quick to adapt to new regulatory and 
competitive landscapes in order to maintain profitability.  The U.S.-EU Open Skies agreement has already 
prompted transformations from the industry’s leaders, including attempts at consolidation, service 
improvements to attract high-yield traffic, and changes to route networks.  Some executives we 
interviewed indicated that dollars previously spent petitioning the DOT for frequency allocations and 
lobbying foreign governments for liberalized access will instead be spent on maintaining competitiveness.   
Apart from a few airlines concerned that recent liberalization events grant competitive advantages 
to a few players, the industry has collectively welcomed access to new markets and capital.  In June, 
2003, the Air Transport Association’s (ATA) Board of Directors voted unanimously to support the DOT 
proposal for increased foreign ownership of U.S. airlines to 49%.  A majority of the executives 
interviewed stated that while airlines do not necessarily have a need for access to global capital, bringing 
U.S. foreign investment regulations in line with those elsewhere would remain a prerequisite for 
international deregulation, of great importance to U.S. carriers faced with limited growth prospects in the 
domestic market. 
In recent years, U.S. carriers have increasingly focused on international service.  In aggregate, 
U.S. legacy carriers increased their international available seat miles (ASMs) relative to total capacity 
from 29.6% in 2002 to 37.7% in 2007 (MIT ADP, 2008).  As a percentage of total ASMs, all six U.S. 
legacy carriers have moved or added a larger portion of capacity to international service relative to 
                                                 
 
6 Note that economic recessions or the demand downturn following 9/11 are industry-wide and therefore 
government assistance is defensible to prevent systematic collapse of service. 
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domestic service since 2002, as seen in Figure 2.7  Given fleet limitations, the LCC sector will likely 
continue to seek out codeshare agreements to leverage international revenue opportunities in the short-
term.  As the trend towards international service continues, airlines recognize that liberalization is 
essential to maintaining growth in the transatlantic and transpacific markets. 
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Figure 2: Growth in U.S. Legacy Carrier International Service Since 2002 
(Source: MIT Airline Data Project and U.S. DOT Form 41, Schedule T2 via Bureau of Transportation Statistics) 
                                                 
 
7 ASMs summed over all flights operated each year. 
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Alliances, Partnership and Mergers 
Although arguably an extension of airlines, alliances represent important stakeholders certain to 
be impacted by regulatory liberalization.  Many experts forecast that some of the biggest long-term 
changes resulting from the U.S.-EU Open Skies will be to alliances.  Alliances have been used as a 
market-derived solution to foreign ownership restrictions and have proven that increasing integration 
among international carriers can lead to benefits for the consumer (GAO, 1995).  The U.S. DOT is 
responsible for granting global partners antitrust immunity, which enables its members to cooperate in 
fare setting, capacity planning, and direct revenue or profit sharing.  A U.S. DOT (2000) report found that 
strong traffic growth was coincident with receipt of antitrust immunity, even for those alliance partners 
already code-sharing. 
However, the U.S. DOT only grants antitrust immunity to carriers in nations which have an Open 
Skies agreement in place with the U.S.  Under the new U.S.-EU Open Skies agreement, many new airline 
partnerships will be eligible for immunity, further strengthening these global alliances.  Yet consolidation 
of airlines may result in airlines switching alliances, such as Continental’s recent decision to switch from 
SkyTeam to Star Alliance in October 2009.  Furthermore, the Delta-Northwest merger is a testament to 
the role that existing alliances and immunized partnerships will play in the future makeup of the industry. 
Because of the ability to grant antitrust immunities that were previously infeasible without Open 
Skies agreements, the DOT will be in a position to authorize new global strategic partnerships.  A study 
by a U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) economist suggests that capacity expansions associated with Open 
Skies are primarily due to expansion by immunized carriers on routes between their hubs (Whalen, 2005).  
The study predicts an increase in output for immunized alliances of 51-88% and of code-sharing by 22-
45% as compared to traditional interline services.  Whalen also predicts a 14-22% fare reduction for 
interline itineraries under immunized alliances and a 5-10% reduction for codeshare itineraries. 
 
Airports 
One airport executive asserted to us that “airlines serve the public to make money, whereas 
airports make money to serve the public.”  In other words, although airports are rational actors who seek 
profitability, the role of airport managers is to develop the greatest number of service options for the 
public.  Airlines are responsible for maintaining the profitability of that service through operational 
decisionmaking, yield management, and promotion.  Since most airports (particularly non-hubs) pursue 
international carriers, there are few airports that would not welcome additional carriers that are granted 
access as a result of Open Skies.  As another airport manager said, “the number of service options is the 
most important factor for airports.” 
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In November 2003, ACI-Europe published a position paper in support of the “full liberalization 
of the air transport industry.”  The paper highlighted twenty points in support of market determination of 
prices, code-sharing agreements, ground handling rights and eight other contentious issues.  Most notably, 
however, ACI held that issues related to the granting of cabotage rights to EU carriers within the U.S. 
“should not in itself hold up a final agreement” for an OAA. 
Some airports stand to gain more than others as a result of liberalization.  Airports with high 
volumes of Fly America traffic, such as Washington Dulles (IAD), see these restrictions on government 
personnel travel as a major barrier to international carriers scheduling service to IAD.  Currently, foreign 
airlines can only carry U.S. government traffic through a codeshare with a U.S. partner or under a few 
exceptional circumstances.  Since Fly America limits the number of options government personnel and 
contractors can shop for, some project that the program raises the cost of travel to U.S. government 
personnel (Robyn et. al, 2005).  Some airports have joined others who question the necessity of Fly 
America. 
Other airports, such as those who serve as hubs for weaker carriers, are less excited about the 
long-term prospects of liberalization.  European flag carrier hubs such as Athens or Vienna are the most 
likely target for new competition after the skies are open – they have strong O-D traffic and their hub 
carriers may be less capable of a strong competitive response.  Such airports may see a loss in number of 
operations if their primary operator is absorbed by other carriers with little incentive to maintain the hub’s 
original size. 
 
U.S. Department of Defense 
Modifying its 1992 position, the DoD supported the DOT in its 2003 attempt to liberalize foreign 
ownership.  A report from the Institute for Defense Analyses (Graham, 2003) supported the DoD position 
that it could “effectively manage the CRAF program to meet national security requirements, even if the 
U.S. government were to raise the current ceiling on foreign ownership and control.”  The group 
suggested that the DoD build a risk-management framework to assess proposed changes in international 
regulatory regimes, with the two key risk management provisions being: 
 
1. Eligibility criteria that ensure participating airlines can reliably meet their CRAF commitments, 
independent of their ownership. 
2. Criteria for national security reviews of individual airline applications to increase foreign 
ownership shares beyond the current 25% ceiling.  Such reviews could be done under the 
authority of current airline fitness reviews, or under the authority of the Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the United States. 
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Yet some in Congress still cite national security as their biggest concern with raising the foreign 
ownership cap.  According to Rep. Peter DeFazio (D-OR), “during the Gulf War an EU member didn’t 
supply [the U.S.] with a type of carrier we needed when we ran out because they didn’t support the war” 
(Grassi, 2006).  The DOT’s Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (SNPRM) addressed the issue 
by ensuring that all decisions that could impact national security would remain under the control of U.S. 
citizens.  The DoD is satisfied with increasing the foreign ownership cap provided that the proper 
provisions are in place.  And this should be of no surprise, since the DoD allows the maritime equivalent 
of CRAF, the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA), to include foreign-owned carriers. 
 
European Commission 
The EC has historically been the strongest proponent for liberalization of regulations governing 
transatlantic flights.  In response to the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee’s move to 
tighten the ‘actual control’ provisions of the foreign ownership statutes, Jacques Barrot, the European 
transport commissioner, stressed that Congress’ actions could “dangerously impair” the ability to enter 
into “a meaningful dialogue” during second stage negotiations between the U.S. and EU (Done and 
Cameron, 2007). 
The EC sponsored both the Brattle Group and Booz Allen Hamilton studies that forecast 
optimistic growth in the transatlantic markets over the five years following the start of a liberalized 
regulatory regime.  These, as well as other often-cited reports, were initiated to garner support for a full 
OAA between the EU and U.S.  However, in light of the opposition that the DOT faced in increasing the 
ownership cap to 49%, EU officials agreed to a 1st Stage agreement, but have insisted that the 2nd Stage 
address liberalized foreign control.  By agreement within the European Council, individual EU countries 
could demand suspension of certain rights granted by the Open Skies agreement if U.S. officials do not 
agree by 2012 to allow increased foreign investment in U.S. airlines. 
Again, since cabotage rights are only granted to U.S.-incorporated airlines, the U.S. market 
provides little benefit to foreign airlines without effective control of operational decisions (including 
network planning).  In other words, the EU’s rationale reflects that of increased control rather than equity. 
 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
Kenneth J Button, former head of aviation policy at OECD, published a 1998 study for CATO’s 
Center for Trade Policy Studies in which he suggests that opening U.S. skies would inject capital and 
competition into the U.S. aviation market, providing the ultimate “free-market check on predatory pricing 
and domestic price collusion” and would therefore “negate any arguments for imposing federal price 
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regulations and antitrust sanctions.”  Research sponsored by OECD holds that Congress should repeal all 
laws that restrict foreign participation in the U.S. air transportation market and that keeping the markets 
closed weakens the U.S. negotiating position abroad.  Button points to the continued growth of alliances 
as proof that airlines have a desire to collaborate to achieve cost efficiencies and capture greater market 
share, which alliances only enable them to do to a degree (Button, 1998). 
In a 2001 study, OECD concluded that air transport reforms aimed at liberalizing entry and prices 
result in “significant benefits for all categories of travelers” and that the simultaneous liberalization of 
domestic and international markets “encourages network optimization and cost-efficiency while reducing 
price-cost margins” (Gönenç and Nicoletti, 2001). 
 
Labor Unions 
Some believe that liberalized regulations would allow foreign carriers to direct U.S. carriers in 
ways that maximize their own economic objectives no matter what the cost to U.S. labor.  Edward 
Wytkind, President of the Transportation Trades Department of the AFL-CIO, paints the picture of a 
European airline that has its newly acquired U.S. carrier feed traffic to its international flights rather than 
competing more broadly in the U.S. market or developing international services itself.  Furthermore, 
Wytkind contents that foreign airlines with control over the maintenance decisions of a U.S. partner may 
ship work overseas to repair stations that fail to meet the high safety and security standards of the U.S. 
and EU (Wytkind, 2007). 
In a letter dated September 20, 2006, six labor union leaders confronted Secretary-Designate 
Mary Peters on the DOT’s NPRM, which they claimed gives companies “yet another tool to seek out and 
utilize the lowest cost labor available.”  They highlight that “airlines…could transfer pilot and flight 
attendant work to foreign partners” and that “air carriers have already pursued aggressive plans to 
outsource as much aircraft maintenance work as possible to overseas contractors” (Woerth et. al, 2006). 
One concern of the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) is that the EU has yet to resolve its labor 
law issue, namely that all 27 member states have their own labor laws whereas the U.S. has one.  
Increasing foreign ownership would allow investors to move pilot and flight attendant domiciles to the 
most cost-effective labor zone (Bailey, 2003).  The concern is that carriers would re-flag their 
transatlantic operations to lower cost EU countries, much like the “flags of convenience” prevalent in the 
maritime industry. 
The counterargument is that we have yet to see a relevant airline case in the U.S. involving labor 
substitution or any indication that a U.S. carrier would have the desire or ability to re-flag its operations.  
And as discussed in Section 2.2, labor unions exercise significant leverage over management decisions 
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and since U.S. carriers cannot replace U.S. flight crews for their domestic operations, labor maintains 
significant bargaining power to prevent carriers from shipping jobs overseas. 
The EU itself can be used as a case study demonstrating the ability of any nation to protect its 
own labor against direct or indirect wage substitution.  While the EU as a whole has moved towards an 
OAA in recent years, member states are increasingly building protections into their operating laws.  
France, for example, requires that any carrier maintaining a hub in France or operating full cabotage 
flights within French borders must obey French labor laws.8  U.S. pilots have often been able to negotiate 
similar protections, without the aid of government regulation, against the risks that alliances and cross-
border mergers have created. 
Labor unions are best equipped to negotiate protections specific to their circumstances.  
Lawmakers must work to incorporate protections that address labor’s concerns and be careful not to 
interpret their concerns as a blanket justification for protectionism. 
 
U.S. Travelers 
As the end-user of the air transportation system, U.S. travelers bear most of the consequences and 
benefits from regulatory liberalization.  Despite varying levels of enthusiasm for domestic deregulation in 
1978, “nearly all economists agree…that deregulation [improves] consumer welfare” (Borenstein, 1992).  
However, the debate continues over what these consequences and benefits of international deregulation 
will be – the most frequently cited changes are to fares, service levels and safety.  The latter was covered 
in previous sections, so here we discuss fares and service levels. 
American travelers might typically view the U.S.-EU Open Skies agreement as an opportunity for 
their cities to receive nonstop service to Europe.  However, it has yet to be determined what the specific 
impact on networks and service levels will be.  One certainty is that reduced regulation allows for 
increased competition with the removal of barriers to entry into (or expansion of) particular markets. 
One concern is that secondary and tertiary domestic market coverage may be reduced as airlines 
are forced to focus on their most profitable segments.  This, however, is based on the assumption that 
capital resources are increasingly limited.  According to the executives we interviewed, if a market is 
profitable enough to meet an airline’s cost of capital, the capital is available to serve it.  Carriers that have 
the ability to seek cheap capital and leverage cost-cutting synergies are better equipped to serve smaller 
markets, provided that they produce positive returns. 
According to Boeing, as of 2004 there remained an additional 114 city pairs between the U.S. and 
EU that could support non-stop services with a 250-seat aircraft (GAO, 2004).  However, an increase in 
                                                 
 
8 French Décret No. 2006-1425, November 21, 2006 
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new entrants and services may be damped by the effects of consolidation, competitor domains and slot 
restrictions.  All three phenomena limit a carrier’s ability or willingness to add capacity to new city-pairs, 
especially where it requires cannibalization of other profitable service. 
Fares have the potential to be lower as competition increases.  GAO (1996) found that fifteen 
years after deregulation, the average fare per passenger mile, adjusted for inflation, declined 9% for 
small-community airports, 11% for medium-sized community airports and 8% for large community 
airports.  According to Alfred Kahn, who chaired the CAB during the transition to deregulation, 
deregulated fares have been 10-18% lower, on average, than they would have been under the previous 
regulatory environment (Kahn, 1988).  Both sources note that safety and service levels increased over the 
same period. 
However, some U.S. officials fear that fares would rise if the number of network carriers in the 
U.S. decreases, and that the goal of preserving competition can be met by preserving competitors.  This 
fear is based on the assumption that a larger number of competitors is always better for the consumer.  
But well-known cases such as UPS and FedEx, Coke and Pepsi, or Boeing and Airbus demonstrate that as 
few as two players can meet the service needs of the entire market and compete even more fiercely than a 
palette of six or more. 
Since 2000, all six major U.S. carriers have engaged in consolidation talks with other domestic 
carriers.  Airline executives have made clear their intentions to expand their networks and find cost 
synergies that would strengthen their competitive positions in the global marketplace.  In April 2008, the 
first of the legacy mergers, between Delta and Northwest, was signed.  The two airlines have since 
cleared all major regulatory hurdles and have begun integrating their operations.  For months however, it 
was unclear whether regulators, backed by vocal opposition from Congress, would ultimately approve the 
merger.  Those in Congress who oppose consolidation are also those who oppose changes in foreign 
ownership.  They often cite lost service to secondary markets as a major concern of consolidation.  
However, their argument presupposes that leisure and business travelers prefer increased frequency 
choices to lower fares brought about by increased competition.  It assumes that those in secondary or 
tertiary markets are unwilling to drive 100 miles to avoid a natural price premium of hundreds of dollars.  
American and European low-cost carriers (LCCs) are proving otherwise. 
Overall, the question is whether regulatory behavior that limits consolidation, international 
collaboration and the natural life-cycle of the industry actually preserves competition. 
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2.4 Stakeholders and the Policy Debate 
 
In debates over which policies equitably distribute the benefits and costs of change, stakeholders 
seldom agree and are therefore forced to compromise on issues.  In the case where stakeholders do not 
even agree what the impacts of a given policy change will be, resolution over the debate becomes 
exceedingly difficult.  In this debate over regulatory liberalization in air transportation, many studies have 
produced evidence suggesting that national security, employment and safety will not be harmed if the 
appropriate policy safeguards are used.  In addition, there is consensus that competition will increase both 
at home and abroad.  Why then, is there still debate over the appropriate policy? 
The issue here is that movement away from the status quo into uncharted territory requires 
overwhelming evidence in support of change.  In this particular case, historical precedent plays an 
important role in garnering support for the issue.  In addition, the increasing attention paid to the issue by 
government, industry and academia brings the issue into the public domain, which then provides 
additional pressure to change legislation.  At no time since deregulation have so many called for change 
in the industry, including lawmakers.  Congressional officials are responsible to their constituencies, so 
over the long-term policies will change in favor of the electorate.  
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Figure 3: Levels of Stakeholder Interest and Influence in the Debate Over Regulatory Liberalization 
 
Figure 3 plots the stakeholders with the most direct impact and/or influence in the debate.  The 
vertical axis represents the level of interest that a given stakeholder has in the issue, which is correlated to 
the level of impact regulatory liberalization will have on that stakeholder.  The horizontal axis describes 
 45 
the level of influence that a stakeholder has over regulatory change, either through lobbying or direct 
legislation.  
Since regulations are products of government, we can expect U.S. government agencies to bear 
the greatest influence in change, although the lobbying power of airlines and labor unions certainly plays 
an influential role in the debate.  International organizations tend to have a lower aggregated interest (and 
influence over U.S. regulations) because it is often difficult to reach consensus across national borders. 
 
2.4.1 Vehicles for Legislative Change 
 
As Nanda (2002) concludes, foreign investment laws are governed by statute and hence any 
change to the rule could only be made through legislative action.  While the U.S. DOT has attempted to 
revise the interpretation of existing statues to meet the demands of globalization, Congress has blocked its 
attempts on numerous occasions. 
In a 2003 whitepaper, Havel (2003) suggests that airline citizenship tests be replaced by a new 
“corporate affinity test” which separates commercial control by a foreign investor from regulatory control 
by the U.S. government.  He develops a framework for deregulation which keeps safety and security 
issues in public hands.  While a novel approach to addressing issues of safety and security, this policy 
alternative still requires movement from the status quo for the entire commercial aviation industry. 
Some have suggested that regulatory liberalization be tested on a subset of the industry.  The 
International Air Cargo Association (TIACA) and ACI support the rapid liberalization of cargo traffic 
(TIACA, 2003).  Furlan (2005) forecasts some expected benefits should the industry liberalize ownership 
regulations.  He recommends that air cargo be used as the “natural starting point for the process and 
should lead liberalization efforts,” as should agreements between the U.S. and EU as comparable 
economic powers.  Zhang and Zhang (2002) contend, however, that liberalizing the air cargo sector 
separately may be difficult because of the “distinctive inter-linkage of passenger and air cargo business” 
in some parts of the world. 
As part of the U.S.-EU Open Skies Stage 2 negotiations, the DOT could attempt to focus its 
liberalization efforts on cargo carriers to generate additional evidence that liberalization is not harmful to 
national security, safety or employment.  Alternatively, the DOT could push for piecewise liberalization 
that grants ownership freedoms to carriers with primarily domestic operations, such as some American 
LCCs.  The Australian government has led the movement towards liberalization with its understated 
realization that benefits to the people of Australia can come from any shade of currency. 
If not from the lessons of other nations, U.S. policymakers can reflect on other American 
industries with similar labor and security concerns as well as issues of national pride.  The movement 
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towards deregulation in auto manufacturing, banking, passenger and freight rail and utilities reflects the 
changing needs of the global marketplace.  Rod Eddington, former Chief Executive of British Airways, 
once pointed out the irony that airlines, which are enablers of globalization in virtually every industry, 
themselves remain “stuck in a time warp of bilateral agreements” (Eddington, 2003). 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Pathway to Liberalization 
 (Source: Civil Aviation Authority, 2006) 
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No matter what the legislative vehicle, it is possible to incorporate protections against threats to 
national security, safety, overburdens of regulatory oversight, and disproportionate impacts to labor.  The 
Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) included a “Pathway to Liberalization” (Figure 4) in its 2006 report on 
Ownership and Control Liberalization.  The pathway includes checks to ensure that compliance with 
domestic regulations is met and that liberalization is limited to those nations willing to grant reciprocity.  
This is required to ensure that U.S. carriers are granted the same rights as their international competitors.  
The CAA’s methodology fails to address issues of labor and national security, but it provides a 
framework within which policy can be shaped. 
 
2.5 Policy Conclusions 
 
On March 30th 2008, the U.S.-EU markets opened up to increased competition.  As a result, U.S. 
carriers are preparing to face stronger competition from the EU.  As globalization continues, the air 
transportation industry becomes less of a domestic business.  The networks are global and regulations are 
beginning to adapt to reflect that.  As we will see in Chapter 4, service level changes immediately 
following the removal of restrictions represent inefficiencies and lost opportunities that result from 
regulation.  Markets are better equipped than any regulatory regime in dictating how service industries 
should adapt to change.  And the evolution of an industry dictated by market forces, by definition, 
includes elements of popular interests, those which provide the greatest economic benefit and social 
welfare with the least deadweight loss. 
In this chapter we have seen that, apart from uncovering operational inefficiencies, regulatory 
liberalization could grant U.S. carriers access to cheap capital to retire debt, consolidate, and invest in 
their product, enhancing their competitive position globally.  Further immunization, joint ventures and 
cross-border consolidation allow carriers to develop their global networks to better serve the traveling 
public.  Expanded global networks from financially stronger carriers will better connect U.S. businesses 
to the world while delivering economic synergies for investors. 
Numerous studies have shown that, with the appropriate legislative safeguards, removing 
regulations generates a social benefit that far outweighs its cost.  In the next Chapter, we will explore 
recent trends in competition between U.S. carriers and their European counterparts.  We will see that U.S. 
carriers have gained a disproportionate share of transatlantic service, based primarily around their hub 
operations.  In Chapter 4, we analyze the specific impacts that liberalization events have had upon 
transatlantic service levels.  Both of these chapters support the conclusion that liberalization is necessary 
to uncover operating inefficiencies and leverage growth opportunities.  We will also see, however, that 
liberalization alone is not sufficient in guaranteeing increased service levels.  
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Chapter 3 
 
3  
Analysis of Transatlantic Markets and Competition 
 
 
In this chapter we evaluate transatlantic competition since 2000 and highlight market changes that 
have occurred over the same period.  The goal is to identify trends in competition and market service 
levels to then evaluate in the context of policy changes over the same period.  We first explore American 
and European cities and their respective levels of service.  Next, we investigate aggregate competition 
between U.S. and non-U.S. carriers.  We then discuss the increasing reliance on hubs as a focal point of 
transatlantic route networks. 
The primary data source for the analyses presented in the next three chapters is the Air Carrier 
Statistics database, also known as the T-100 data bank, of the U.S. Department of Transportation.  The 
database contains all international nonstop segment data for certificated U.S. air carriers and foreign 
carriers having at least one point of service in the U.S. or one of its territories.  Flights with both origin 
and destination in a foreign country are not included.  Data is reported monthly and includes carrier, 
origin city and airport, destination city and airport, aircraft type and service class for transported 
passengers, freight and mail, available capacity, scheduled departures, departures performed, aircraft 
hours, and load factor.  International flight data is released by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics’ 
Office of Airline Information on a six month delay. 
In July 2007, there were 30 U.S. cities and 52 European cities with transatlantic service.9  
Although a number of cities have gained or lost service since 2000, this ratio has remained virtually 
constant throughout.  In our analysis we use three points in time to identify trends and evaluate changes: 
2000, 2004 and 2007.  For most metrics, we use data from July of each year since summer tends to 
experience peaks in traffic and number of seasonal destinations across the Atlantic.  July 2000 reflects the 
period prior to the demand downturn following the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001.  By July 
2004 much of the demand downturn and subsequent capacity cuts had recovered to pre-9/11 levels.  We 
use July 2007 as our third time point in order to avoid the sudden effects on capacity and traveler 
behavior as a result of skyrocketing oil prices in 2008.  In July 2007, oil was still priced below $80 per 
barrel and airlines, although still affected, were able to maintain status quo service levels. 
                                                 
 
9 Here we consider only scheduled commercial passenger service (as opposed to cargo-only or charter service) that 
is offered a minimum of four times per month (i.e. weekly). 
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3.1 Cities and Destinations 
 
In July 2000, 29 U.S. cities had nonstop service to at least one European city.  By July 2007, that 
number grew to 30.  These cities are listed in Table 7.  Note here that multi-airport systems within a 
Combined Statistical Area (CSA) are listed as one city.  For our analysis, Ft. Lauderdale is considered to 
be part of the Miami market, Sanford part of the Orlando market, Oakland part of the San Francisco 
market and Baltimore part of the Washington, DC market.  In addition, Newark Liberty International 
(EWR) and John F. Kennedy International (JFK) together comprise the New York City market. 
 
Table 7: U.S. Cities with Direct Transatlantic Service, 2000-2007 
U.S. Metropolitan Area CSA Population 200710 2000 Destinations 2004 2007 
Anchorage, AK 359,180 2 1 1 
Atlanta, GA 5,626,400 15 15 23 
Boston, MA 7,476,689 13 12 15 
Charlotte, NC 2,277,074 3 3 3 
Chicago, IL 9,745,165 22 20 20 
Cincinnati, OH 2,176,749 4 5 5 
Cleveland, OH 2,896,968 1 1 1 
Dallas/Ft.Worth, TX 6,498,410 4 4 4 
Denver, CO 2,998,878 1 2 3 
Detroit, MI 5,405,918 7 5 6 
Fairbanks, AK 51,926 0 1 1 
Ft. Myers, FL 623,724 2 2 2 
Hartford, CT 1,306,151 0 0 1 
Houston, TX 5,729,027 4 5 4 
Las Vegas, NV 1,880,449 2 2 4 
Los Angeles, CA 17,755,322 10 9 9 
Memphis, TN 1,280,533 1 1 1 
Miami, FL 5,413,212 12 9 9 
Minneapolis/St. Paul, MN 3,538,781 3 3 3 
New York, NY 21,961,994 41 38 51 
Orlando, FL 2,693,552 4 6 7 
Philadelphia, PA 6,385,461 7 11 19 
Phoenix, AZ 4,179,427 1 1 1 
Pittsburgh, PA 2,446,703 3 2 0 
Portland, OR 2,159,720 0 1 1 
Raleigh/Durham, NC 1,635,974 1 1 1 
San Francisco, CA 7,264,887 7 5 6 
San Juan, PR11 2,509,007 3 1 1 
                                                 
 
10 U.S. Census Bureau 
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Seattle, WA 4,038,741 4 4 4 
St. Louis, MO 2,866,517 2 0 0 
Tampa, FL 2,697,731 2 1 1 
Washington, DC 8,241,912 12 14 13 
 
By July 2004, Fairbanks AK and Portland OR had both gained transatlantic service to Frankfurt.  
Portland’s daily FRA service was provided by Lufthansa and Fairbanks’ weekly service was offered 
seasonally by German holiday carrier Condor Flugdienst.  However, St. Louis MO had lost both its 
London and Paris daily service operated by Trans World Airlines (TWA).    This loss happened shortly 
after 2001, when TWA was acquired by American Airlines, which subsequently downsized the hub 
operation at St. Louis.  Over this period, seven cities saw an increase in transatlantic destinations whereas 
thirteen saw reductions. 
By July 2007, Hartford CT had gained nonstop daily service to Amsterdam offered by Northwest 
Airlines.12  However, Pittsburgh PA had lost its daily nonstop flights to Frankfurt, London and Paris, all 
previously operated by US Airways.  These losses occurred after Pittsburgh lost its US Airways hub 
status in 2004 following an operating fee dispute between the airport authority and the carrier.  Over this 
period, nine U.S. cities saw an increase in transatlantic destinations whereas only three saw reductions. 
Since 2000, fifteen European cities have gained their first transatlantic service while seven have 
lost all transatlantic service.  Of the fifteen that have seen new service, seven received service from U.S. 
carriers.  Of the seven that have lost all transatlantic service, only one was a result of a U.S. carrier pulling 
out of that market (Delta in Lyon).  Furthermore, since 1990 an additional six European cities have lost all 
transatlantic service.  They are Nantes, Bordeaux and Lille (in France), Zagreb and Dubrovnik (in 
Croatia) and Luxembourg (in Luxembourg).  None of these cities were served by U.S. carriers. 
 
Table 8: European Cities with Direct Transatlantic Service, 2000-2007 
European City13 Urban Area Population14 2000 Destinations 2004 2007 
Amsterdam, Netherlands 6,579,720 15 16 17 
Athens, Greece 3,829,018 3 1 3 
Barcelona, Spain 4,959,864 2 2 3 
European City Urban Area Population 2000 Destinations 2004 2007 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
11 Puerto Rico is included since U.S. territories are covered by U.S. aviation bilateral agreements. 
12 This service was cancelled by NWA in October 2008 citing high fuel costs and decreased demand.  In December, 
NWA announced it would restore the transatlantic service beginning June 2009. 
13 Note here that multi-airport systems within an urban area are listed as one city.  For our analysis, London is 
composed of Heathrow (LHR), Gatwick (LGW), Stansted (STN) and Luton (LTN) airports.  Paris is composed of 
both Charles de Gaulle (CDG) and Orly (ORY) airports. 
14 2008 World Gazetteer data from Eurostat. 2007 data not available. 
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Belfast, United Kingdom 645,536 0 0 2 
Belgrade, Serbia and Montenegro 1,766,534 0 1 0 
Berlin, Germany 4,040,690 0 0 1 
Birmingham, United Kingdom 3,704,574 2 1 1 
Bologna, Italy 385,813 0 0 1 
Bristol, United Kingdom 551,066 0 0 1 
Brussels, Belgium 2,175,008 6 4 6 
Bucharest, Romania 2,192,372 1 0 1 
Budapest, Hungary 2,578,731 1 1 1 
Connaught, Ireland 503,083 0 0 2 
Copenhagen, Denmark 2,387,192 3 4 5 
Dublin, Ireland 1,058,265 5 6 6 
Dusseldorf, Germany 11,817,132 7 6 8 
Edinburgh, United Kingdom 1,250,000 0 1 2 
Frankfurt, Germany 3,133,739 20 22 20 
Geneva, Switzerland 470,000 1 1 1 
Glasgow, United Kingdom 1,633,187 2 3 4 
Hamburg, Germany 3,266,896 0 0 1 
Helsinki, Finland 1,262,805 1 1 1 
Istanbul, Turkey 13,179,865 3 2 2 
Kiev, Ukraine 2,989,638 1 1 1 
Koeln/Bonn (Cologne), Germany 11,817,132 0 0 1 
Krakow, Poland 756,757 2 2 2 
Lisbon, Portugal 2,634,878 2 1 2 
Liverpool, United Kingdom 5,019,446 0 0 1 
London, United Kingdom 13,063,441 25 24 23 
Lyon, France 1,798,395 1 0 0 
Madrid, Spain 6,270,551 7 6 8 
Malaga, Spain 561,250 0 1 0 
Manchester, United Kingdom 5,019,446 5 8 7 
Milan, Italy 4,308,403 8 6 6 
Moscow, Russia (European) 14,744,150 4 4 4 
Munich, Germany 2,312,477 7 10 12 
Naples, Italy 3,817,076 0 0 1 
Nice, France 915,000 1 1 1 
Oslo, Norway 568,809 1 1 1 
Palermo, Italy 1,000,820 0 0 1 
Paris, France 11,818,503 16 13 14 
Pisa, Italy 90,482 0 0 1 
Porto, Portugal 1,299,713 1 0 1 
Prague, Czech Republic 1,406,142 1 1 2 
Reykjavik, Iceland 201,000 4 5 5 
Riga, Latvia 727,578 0 0 1 
European City Urban Area Population 2000 Destinations 2004 2007 
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Rome, Italy 3,858,111 6 7 7 
Rzeszow, Poland 740,000 0 0 1 
Santiago De Compostela, Spain 92,919 1 0 0 
Satu Mare, Romania 130,059 1 0 0 
Shannon, Ireland 9,222 6 6 5 
Stockholm, Sweden 1,964,805 2 2 3 
Stuttgart, Germany 2,334,683 1 1 1 
Terceira, Portugal 54,996 1 0 0 
Timisoara, Romania 359,132 1 0 0 
Venice, Italy 297,743 1 1 3 
Vienna, Austria 2,113,619 3 2 4 
Warsaw, Poland 2,251,474 2 2 2 
Zurich, Switzerland 1,025,499 10 8 10 
 
So, in aggregate, U.S. carriers’ presence in Europe has increased since 2000 despite service losses 
in thirteen European cities.  Figure 5 and Figure 6 confirm that U.S. carriers have in fact gained a 
disproportionate share of new service between the U.S. and Europe. 
In 2000, 43 European cities were connected nonstop to the U.S.  Non-U.S. carriers served over 
90% of those destinations, whereas U.S. carriers only served 60%.  In 2007, the number of European 
destinations had grown by 20% to 52.  However, both U.S. and non-U.S. carriers now serve 80% of those 
destinations.   
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Figure 5: Number of Nonstop Transatlantic Destinations Served from U.S. 
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Figure 6: Number of Nonstop City Pairs Served from U.S. 
  
The story is similar if we look at the number of nonstop city pairs served between the U.S. and 
Europe.  In 2000, 193 city pairs had scheduled passenger transatlantic service at least once per week.  Just 
over half were served by U.S. carriers whereas over three-quarters were served by non-U.S. carriers.  In 
2007, the number of city pairs had grown by 14% to 220.  But by 2007 U.S. carriers served 60% of those 
city pairs and non-U.S. carriers served 65%. 
U.S. carriers have therefore gained a disproportionate share of transatlantic service since 2000.  In 
other words, much of the transatlantic service gains have come from U.S. carriers while service losses 
have generally occurred at the expense of European carriers. 
 
3.2 Departures, Enplanements, Load Factors and Aircraft Size 
 
 We now turn our competitive analysis to traditional airline metrics that include the number of 
departures performed, total enplanements, average load factor and aircraft size.  Although the 
performance of individual carriers may be interesting, here we focus on aggregate competitiveness of 
U.S. and non-U.S. carriers since bilateral agreements are established between nations rather than for 
specific carriers.  The goal again is to understand the change in makeup of transatlantic services and to 
find trends that correlate (or fail to correlate) with policy events. 
 Figure 7 breaks out the number of transatlantic departures performed by U.S. and non-U.S. 
carriers in July of 2000, 2004 and 2007.  The first thing to note is that the total number of monthly 
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departures has increased by 13.5% from 11,258 to 12,779.  This is in line with the 14% increase in city 
pairs over the same period, indicating that on average the number of departures per city pair has not 
changed drastically.  Most importantly, perhaps, is that a 46%/54% departure share between U.S/non-U.S 
carriers in 2000 is now a 50%/50% split. 
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Figure 7: Number of Transatlantic Departures from U.S. 
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Figure 8: Number of Transatlantic Enplanements from U.S. 
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However, non-U.S. carriers continue to enplane nearly 27% more transatlantic passengers than 
U.S. carriers, as seen in Figure 8.  In July 2007, non-U.S. carriers enplaned 56% of 2,539,000 passengers 
with U.S. carriers enplaning the remaining 44%.  Although U.S. carriers have grown their total number of 
transatlantic departures and enplanements since 2004 at over twice the rate of their non-U.S. counterparts, 
the aggregate share of enplanements is still significantly lower.   
Since the number of departures is identical, yet the number of passengers carried by non-U.S. 
carriers is 27% higher, U.S. carriers enplane fewer passengers per departure.  This difference is either a 
result of lower average load factors (ALF) or smaller aircraft, or a combination of the two.  Figure 9 
clearly shows that ALFs are not the issue as U.S. and non-U.S. carriers had ALFs within one percentage 
point of each other.  In fact, load factors have converged between the two groups since 2000. 
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Figure 9: Transatlantic Average Load Factors, 2000-2007 
  
 
The difference is therefore likely a function of the total capacity per departure (i.e. aircraft size).  
If we look first at total capacity as measured by seat-departures15, Figure 10 shows that non-U.S. carriers 
perform 25% more seat-departures than their U.S. counterparts.  U.S. carriers have only 44% of the total 
transatlantic capacity of 3,185,000 monthly seat-departures. 
                                                 
 
15 Note that here we use seat-departures rather than available seat miles (ASM) in order to avoid weighting by the 
stage length of individual flights.  
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Figure 10: Number of Transatlantic Seat-Departures from U.S. 
 
 Figure 11 confirms our theory and shows that, on average, U.S. carriers carry 52 fewer seats per 
aircraft than their non-U.S. counterparts for transatlantic service.  This reflects a 6% reduction in average 
aircraft size for both U.S. and non-U.S. carriers since 2000.  It is worth noting that the overall trend has 
been towards smaller aircraft as larger markets become saturated and carriers compete on frequency 
share.  One interesting phenomenon to watch is whether carriers with long-range fleets composed of 
smaller aircraft find it more feasible to add service as thinner transatlantic markets seek nonstop service. 
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Figure 11: Average Aircraft Size for Transatlantic Service, 2000-2007 
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 We have seen that, although U.S. carriers have gained a disproportionate share of transatlantic 
destinations and departures, they continue to enplane fewer passengers than non-U.S. carriers.  This is a 
result of lower capacity per departure, or smaller average aircraft size.  As our analysis does not consider 
fares, yields or operating costs, we will not explore the profitability of U.S. carriers relative to non-U.S. 
carriers.  However, we can assume that in an unregulated environment, carriers will fly routes that are 
profitable to them.  We can therefore proceed with the assumption that any gains in transatlantic service 
following deregulation policy events are to the benefit of the operating carriers. 
 
3.3 Competition Across Transatlantic Markets 
 
 Before we turn our attention to the role that regulatory liberalization has had on transatlantic 
service levels, we first analyze levels of competition in individual nonstop markets.  Although in 
aggregate transatlantic service levels have increased since 1990, not all communities have gained equally.  
We therefore explore market competition across city pairs, summarized in Figure 12. 
 
59
20
127
142
31
71
0
50
100
150
N
um
be
r o
f N
on
st
op
 M
ar
ke
ts
Reduction in Number of
Competitors
No Change in Number of
Competitors
Increase in Number of Competitors
2000 to 2004
2004 to 2007
 
Figure 12: Aggregate Change in Transatlantic Market Competition, 2000-2007 
 
 From Figure 12, we see that in aggregate since 2004 market competition, as measured by number 
of competitors providing direct service, has been increasing.  Between 2000 and 2004, 27% of city pairs 
saw a reduction in the number of carriers providing service.  Between 2004 and 2007, that number 
dropped to 9%.  Similarly, between 2000 and 2004, 14% of city pairs saw an increase in the number of 
competitors.  Between 2004 and 2007, that number increased to 30%.   
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Figure 13: Detailed Change in Transatlantic Market Competition, 2000-2007 
 
Figure 13 further breaks down the number of competitors gained or lost.  As we might expect, the 
vast majority of changes in competition came from the addition or loss of one carrier.  Also interesting to 
note is that of the 24 city pairs that were connected in 2004 but not in 2000, five returned to no service in 
2007.  Of the 48 city pairs that were connected in 2007 but not in 2004, six already had that service in 
2000 (but lost it temporarily).  These routes reflect the restoration of service that followed the capacity 
reductions post-9/11. 
 Table 9 lists the city pairs that saw an addition or reduction of more than one competitor between 
either 2000-2004 or 2004-2007.16  These are the city pairs for which one would have guessed that nonstop 
capacity either clearly outpaced or failed to meet demand.  One indicator we would use to reflect a 
mismatch of capacity and demand is load factor.  Although by itself not an indicator of yields or 
profitability of a route, high load factors provide an indication that a market’s demand was sufficient for a 
given capacity.  It is interesting to note that none of the listed city pairs that lost two or three competitors 
had average load factors below 74%. 
Of the 59 city pairs that saw a reduction in service between 2000 and 2004, 57 had ALFs over 
65% and 31 had ALFs over 80%.  Similarly, of the 20 city pairs that saw a reduction in service between 
2004 and 2007, 17 had ALFs over 65% and 10 had ALFs over 80%.  Domestically, these would be 
                                                 
 
16 Again, here we consider only those carriers providing scheduled commercial passenger service at least once 
weekly. 
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considered desirable load factors.  Although they don’t tell us everything about the profitability of the 
route, flights with high load factors are often discontinued because (1) high competition drives yields 
down and that (2) there are alternative routes where a carrier’s scarce resources are more profitable.  This 
perhaps provides one additional indicator that transatlantic competition has been increasing in aggregate 
since 2000. 
 
Table 9: City Pairs with Gain or Loss of Multiple Competitors Between 2000-2004 or 2004-2007 
U.S. City European City 2000 # Carriers 
2004 # 
Carriers 
2007 # 
Carriers 
Change 
00-04 
Change 
04-07 
2000 
ALF 
2004 
ALF 
2007 
ALF 
Chicago, IL Manchester, UK 1 3 3 2 0 86.28% 77.05% 73.28% 
Chicago, IL Shannon, Ireland 3 1 2 -2 1 78.64% 86.44% 70.95% 
Los Angeles, CA Paris, France 4 2 2 -2 0 75.69% 86.05% 89.05% 
New York, NY Amsterdam, Netherlands 6 3 3 -3 0 75.60% 83.09% 78.34% 
New York, NY Frankfurt, Germany 6 4 4 -2 0 74.93% 75.93% 76.03% 
New York, NY Shannon, Ireland 4 2 3 -2 1 90.46% 91.96% 83.68% 
San Juan, PR Frankfurt, Germany 2 0 0 -2 0 82.26% 0.00% 0.00% 
New York, NY Berlin, Germany 0 0 2 0 2 0.00% 0.00% 71.21% 
New York, NY London, UK 8 7 10 -1 3 74.56% 76.32% 70.40% 
New York, NY Stockholm, Sweden 2 1 3 -1 2 87.58% 78.54% 85.70% 
Orlando, FL Glasgow, UK 0 0 2 0 2 0.00% 0.00% 86.10% 
  
3.4 Transatlantic Gateways 
  
 As discussed earlier, in 2007 there were 30 U.S. cities and 52 European cities with transatlantic 
service.  Nineteen of these cities (three in the U.S., sixteen in Europe) have received their first 
transatlantic service since 2000.  However, fifteen cities (two in the U.S., thirteen in Europe) have lost all 
transatlantic service over the same period.  Figure 14 maps those cities which have gained transatlantic 
service and Figure 15 those which have lost it. 
 Looking quickly at these maps would suggest that the U.S. has fared better than Europe, having 
lost only two transatlantic gateways to Europe’s thirteen.  But in reality, this means that when traveling to 
the U.S., the 10 million people surrounding these thirteen gateways have no choice but to purchase a 
ticket through a European carrier and connect within Europe.  Similarly, the only way for an American to 
get to Lyon or Luxembourg is to connect in Europe.  Although the reverse holds true for Europeans 
wishing to fly to St. Louis or Pittsburgh, the fact remains that a lost transatlantic gateway in Europe 
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means that U.S. passengers have no choice but to connect in Europe.  And because more gateways have 
been lost in Europe, it is the airlines that operate the major European hubs that have gained more than 
others. 
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Figure 14: Cities Which Gained First Direct Transatlantic Service Since 2000 
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Figure 15: Cities Which Lost All Direct Transatlantic Service Since 2000 
 62 
 The largest of these European transatlantic hubs are those operated by the Big-3 European 
carriers: Air France-KLM, Lufthansa-Swiss and British Airways.  Table 10 summarizes the so-called 
“Big-3 hubs.” 
Table 10: Big-3 European Carrier Hubs 
Big-3 European 
Carrier Transatlantic Hubs 
2007 U.S. 
Destinations 
2007 # of 
Transatlantic 
Carriers 
Alliance 
Air France-KLM Paris, France  Amsterdam, Netherlands 
14 
17 
10 
8 SkyTeam 
British Airways London, United Kingdom 23 14 Oneworld 
Lufthansa-Swiss 
Frankfurt, Germany 
Munich, Germany 
Zurich, Switzeland 
20 
12 
10 
10 
6 
8 
 
Star Alliance 
 
 The existence of alliances explains the large number of carriers providing transatlantic service to 
each of the Big-3 hubs.  The Big-3 European carriers are aligned to the three major alliances – Star 
Alliance, SkyTeam and Oneworld.  Alliance partners exchange passengers at their major hubs, and so 
carriers leverage the network effect by flying into these hubs.  The equivalent Big-6 U.S. carrier hubs are 
listed in Table 11. 
Table 11: Big-6 American Carrier Hubs 
Big-6 American 
Carrier Transatlantic Hubs 
2007 Europe
Destinations 
2007 # of 
Transatlantic 
Carriers 
Alliance 
American Airlines 
Dallas/Ft. Worth, TX 
Chicago, IL 
Miami, FL 
4 
20 
9 
3 
19 
10 
oneworld 
Continental Airlines 
Houston, TX 
New York City (EWR) 
Cleveland, OH 
4 
51 
1 
6 
38 
1 
SkyTeam17 
Delta Air Lines 
Atlanta, GA 
Cincinnati, OH 
New York City (JFK) 
23 
5 
51 
5 
1 
38 
SkyTeam 
Northwest Airlines 
Minneapolis, MN 
Detroit, MI 
Memphis, TN 
3 
6 
1 
2 
4 
1 
SkyTeam 
United Airlines 
Chicago, IL 
Washington, DC 
Denver, CO 
San Francisco, CA 
20 
13 
3 
6 
19 
12 
2 
7 
Star Alliance 
US Airways 
Phoenix, PA 
Philadelphia, PA 
Charlotte, NC 
1 
19 
3 
1 
4 
2 
Star Alliance 
                                                 
 
17 In June 2008, Continental announced plans to join Star Alliance effective October 2009. 
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These hub cities will prove significant in the econometric market analysis presented in Chapter 5.  
However, it is worth comparing here the concentration of transatlantic gateways in the U.S. and Europe.  
Table 12 presents the top ten U.S. and European gateway cities by number of passengers. 
 
Table 12: Ten Largest U.S. and European Transatlantic Gateway Cities 
Rank U.S. Gateways 
Passengers
Enplaned 
 Rank European Gateways 
Passengers 
Enplaned 
1 New York 834,257  1 London 671,737 
2 Chicago 268,499  2 Frankfurt 318,166 
3 Washington 187,254  3 Paris 296,504 
4 Los Angeles 170,604  4 Amsterdam 216,422 
5 Atlanta 168,633  5 Rome 90,450 
6 Boston 135,704  6 Munich 84,957 
7 Philadelphia 128,538  7 Madrid 82,016 
8 San Francisco 105,358  8 Dublin 69,780 
9 Miami 92,884  9 Zurich 63,344 
10 Detroit 87,950  10 Manchester 61,903 
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Figure 16: U.S. and European Gateway Share of Transatlantic Passengers and Departures 
 
The top ten U.S. gateways account for 86% of all transatlantic passenger enplanements and 87% 
of all transatlantic departures.  The top ten European gateways, on the other hand, account for only 77% 
of transatlantic passengers and 74% of transatlantic departures, as seen in Figure 16.  Although European 
gateways are highly concentrated to the largest four hubs, overall U.S. gateways are more concentrated 
than those of Europe, where a greater proportion of traffic is fed through the smaller gateways.  In fact if 
we ignore the top four gateways in both the U.S. and Europe, the spread (or standard deviation) of 
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passengers enplaned in July 2007 at the remaining 48 European gateways is less than half that of the 
remaining 26 U.S. gateways.18  This indicates that passengers are more evenly spread across the 
remaining 48 European gateways than the remaining 26 U.S. gateways. 
Part of this difference is that in Europe, historically, it was very much the responsibility of the 
national government to preserve a “flag carrier” not only to provide air transportation to its residents, but 
also to represent the nation’s interests abroad.19  What we see in the list of top ten European gateways are 
the hub airports of nine major European carriers.  But what is perhaps more telling are the carriers whose 
hubs represent the remaining 26% share of departures.  Here are the hub cities of other national carriers, 
including Austrian, SAS, Brussels Airlines, Icelandair, Olympic, Turkish Airways, Tarom, LOT Polish 
Airlines, Czech Airlines, Aeroflot, Finnair, TAP Portugal and Air Malta, all with incentive (and in a few 
cases, government assistance) to serve major international centers like New York. 
Conversely, the list of top ten U.S. gateways already includes hub cities of all six legacy U.S. 
carriers.  There are no other U.S. carriers with transatlantic capabilities, so there are fewer forces 
fragmenting the U.S. gateways than those in Europe. 
 The data demonstrates a clear reliance on hubs as transatlantic gateways in both the U.S. and 
Europe.  However the lower concentration of passengers and departures from the largest gateways in 
Europe is a function of historical precedent whereby over one dozen other flag carriers have drawn a 
considerable share of service away from the largest European gateways. 
 It is also worth noting that of the U.S.’ 30 transatlantic gateways, there are four served only by 
U.S. carriers, but ten served only by non-U.S. carriers.  All ten are served by European carriers flying to 
one of their hub or focus cities.  In Europe, there are ten cities served only by European carriers and 
thirteen served only by U.S. carriers.  Again, in this case, all thirteen are flown to the carriers’ hub or 
focus cities.  This is yet another indication that U.S. and foreign carriers alike seek to leverage network 
effects by flying from their hubs.  We will explore this notion further in Chapter 5. 
 In this chapter we have summarized the transatlantic competitive landscape since 2000 and 
described the service levels of U.S. and European markets.  We have seen that a majority of transatlantic 
service lost in Europe has come from European carriers stopping service and that losses in the U.S. have 
come from American carriers stopping service.  Since 2000, U.S. carriers have gained a disproportionate 
share of transatlantic departures, destinations and passengers.  This has occurred through the addition of 
new service from major U.S. gateways.  The next step is to understand whether liberalization policy 
events have driven this new service. 
                                                 
 
18 The standard deviation of the passengers enplaned at remaining 48 European gateways is 24,308.  The standard 
deviation of the smaller 26 U.S. gateways is 48,788. 
19 This phenomenon is being alluded to in the opening quotation of this thesis on Page 5. 
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Chapter 4 
 
4  
Policy Impacts on Transatlantic Service Levels 
 
 
In this chapter we explore the impacts of individual policy events since 1990 on transatlantic 
service levels.  Emphasis is placed on Open Skies agreements between the U.S. and individual European 
countries, but the impacts of alliances and antitrust immunity are also discussed.  The goal is to identify 
trends in service levels following European-U.S. policy events to aid in understanding the impacts of 
continued liberalization. 
We first review the Open Skies Agreements in place between the U.S. and European counties.  
We then explore aggregate service level changes following each of these agreements.  We briefly discuss 
the impacts of antitrust immunity and partnerships, particularly the extent to which alliances in 
deregulated markets have led to the benefits often credited to liberalization.  We highlight studies that 
have demonstrated the service level increases and fare reductions that leverage the required linkage 
between alliances and liberalization.  We then summarize the overall conclusions of the impact of Open 
Skies on transatlantic service levels. 
 
4.1 Open Skies Agreements 
 
An Open Skies agreement is a bilateral air service agreement established by the governments of 
two nations.20  These agreements are more liberal than traditional bilaterals in that they reduce 
government regulation of air services.  Open Skies agreements with the U.S. allow air carriers of the U.S. 
and the foreign signatory to make unregulated decisions about routes, capacity, and pricing.  They provide 
additional flexibility for airlines and their alliance partners by allowing for unlimited access to points in 
the signatory countries, unlimited access to intermediate and beyond points, and unrestricted codesharing 
rights. 
It is also important to note that the U.S. DOT only grants antitrust immunity to partner carriers of 
Open Skies signatories.  Therefore any benefits that come as a result of joint ventures – profit-sharing 
collaborations formed by immunized partners – rely upon the existence of an Open Skies agreement.  
                                                 
 
20 In the case of the European Union, the term nation can also be used to refer to the political and economic union. 
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These benefits are further discussed in Section 4.3.  The U.S. Department of State’s Office of Aviation 
Negotiations establishes the key provisions of an Open Skies agreement as follows:21 
 
Table 13: Key Provisions of an Open Skies Agreement Established by State Department 
Condition Description 
Free Market 
Competition 
No restrictions on international route rights; number of designated airlines; capacity; 
frequencies; or types of aircraft. 
Pricing Determined 
by Market Forces 
A fare can be disallowed only if both governments concur -- "double-disapproval pricing" -- 
and only for certain, specified reasons intended to ensure competition. 
Fair and Equal 
Opportunity to 
Compete 
For example: 
• All carriers -- designated and non-designated -- of both countries may establish sales 
offices in the other country, and convert earnings and remit them in hard currency 
promptly and without restrictions. Designated carriers are free to provide their own 
ground-handling services -- "self handling" -- or choose among competing providers. 
Airlines and cargo consolidators may arrange ground transport of air cargo and are 
guaranteed access to customs services. 
• User charges are non-discriminatory and based on costs. 
Cooperative 
Marketing 
Arrangements 
Designated airlines may enter into code-sharing or leasing arrangements with airlines of 
either country, or with those of third countries, subject to usual regulations. An optional 
provision authorizes code-sharing between airlines and surface transportation companies. 
Provisions for 
Dispute Settlement 
and Consultation 
Model text includes procedures for resolving differences that arise under the agreement. 
Liberal Charter 
Arrangements Carriers may choose to operate under the charter regulations of either country. 
Safety and Security Each government agrees to observe high standards of aviation safety and security, and to render assistance to the other in certain circumstances. 
Optional 7th Freedom 
All-Cargo Rights 
Provides authority for an airline of one country to operate all-cargo services between the 
other country and a third country, via flights that are not linked to its homeland. 
 
The U.S. has signed Open Skies agreements with 94 countries (see complete list in Appendix I).  
Over one third of these agreements are with European countries.  This is yet another indication of the 
leadership both regions have demonstrated in liberalizing their aviation markets, particularly with one 
another.  The 34 European countries which have negotiated Open Skies agreements with the U.S., and the 
date of their signing, are listed in Table 14. 22 
The U.S. Department of State, which is responsible for negotiating Open Skies agreements, 
believes that these steps toward liberalization “lead to expanded demand for international aviation service 
and create new business for international air carriers” and that they “promote increased travel and trade, 
productivity, high-quality job opportunities and economic growth…by reducing government interference  
                                                 
 
21 Open Skies Agreement Fact Sheet, Office of Aviation Negotiations.  Bureau of Economic, Energy and Business 
Affairs, U.S. Department of State.  June 1, 2006. 
22 Open Skies Partners, updated November 25, 2008.  Released by the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of 
Economic, Energy and Business Affairs. 
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Table 14: European Countries with U.S. Open Skies Agreements as of 11/2008 
Chronological Rank 
Open Skies with U.S. Country 
Covered by EU-
U.S. Open Skies 
Date 
Signed 
All-Cargo 
7th’s 
1 Netherlands Yes 10/14/1992 No 
2 Belgium Yes 3/1/1995 No 
3 Finland Yes 3/24/1995 No 
4 Denmark Yes 4/26/1995 No 
5 Norway No 4/26/1995 No 
6 Sweden Yes 4/26/1995 No 
7 Luxembourg Yes 6/6/1995 Yes 
8 Austria Yes 6/14/1995 No 
9 Iceland No 6/14/1995 Yes 
10 Switzerland No 6/15/1995 No 
11 Czech Republic Yes 12/8/1995 Yes 
12 Germany Yes 2/29/1996 Yes 
31 Romania Yes 7/15/1998 No 
32 Italy Yes 11/11/1998 No 
37 Portugal Yes 12/22/1999 Yes 
38 Slovak Republic Yes 1/7/2000 Yes 
42 Turkey No 3/22/2000 No 
47 Malta Yes 10/12/2000 Yes 
50 Poland Yes 5/31/2001 Yes 
53 France Yes 10/19/2001 Yes 
60 Albania No 9/24/2003 Yes 
72 Bosnia and Herzegovina No 11/22/2005 Yes 
78 Bulgaria Yes 4/30/2007 Yes 
79 Cyprus Yes 4/30/2007 Yes 
80 Estonia Yes 4/30/2007 Yes 
81 Greece Yes 4/30/2007 Yes 
82 Hungary Yes 4/30/2007 Yes 
83 Ireland Yes 4/30/2007 Yes 
84 Latvia Yes 4/30/2007 Yes 
85 Lithuania Yes 4/30/2007 Yes 
86 Slovenia Yes 4/30/2007 Yes 
87 Spain Yes 4/30/2007 Yes 
88 United Kingdom Yes 4/30/2007 Yes 
91 Croatia No 3/13/2008 Yes 
 
 
in the commercial decisions of air carriers, freeing them to provide affordable, convenient and efficient 
air service for consumers.”21 
As we presented in Chapter 2, a number of studies conclude that Open Skies agreements lead to 
benefits, primarily the economic benefit derived from increased traffic levels.  The results of these studies 
are often cited by proponents of liberalization to argue in favor of further deregulation.  Given our 
emphasis on transatlantic service, we explore the specific changes that resulted from liberalization in the 
34 countries listed above.  Our findings, presented in the next section, are that the impacts of Open Skies 
are less conclusive than those held by previous studies.  The discrepancies are discussed in Chapter 5. 
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4.2 Changes Following Individual Agreements 
 
As described in Chapter 1, we define transatlantic “service levels” between two countries to be 
composed of four metrics: passenger enplanements, number of city pairs, total departures and the number 
of carriers providing transatlantic service.  The latter is one indicator of the level of competition in the 
market.  Most studies have considered traffic growth as the most robust indicator of the “benefits” of 
Open Skies.  However, it is also important to consider whether certain communities have lost transatlantic 
service (i.e. reduction in city pairs).  We also evaluate whether liberalization does, as proponents predict, 
result in an increase in the number of competitors by reducing the barriers to entry into a given market. 
For each of the European Open Skies signatories listed above, we evaluate the changes in these 
metrics following the signing of the agreement.  Again here, the primary data source is the Air Carrier 
Statistics database, also known as the T-100 data bank, of the U.S. Department of Transportation.  The 
database contains all international nonstop segment data for certificated U.S. air carriers and foreign 
carriers having at least one point of service in the U.S. or one of its territories.  Carriers are required to 
report to the DOT their monthly “segment data” which comprise statistics for each individual segment 
they fly into or out of the U.S.  In the subsequent analysis, we employ passenger segment data, which 
includes all O-D traffic onboard a particular segment.  For example, traffic reported between Boston and 
London includes not only Boston-London local passengers but all passengers on board that originate 
“behind” Boston or terminate “beyond” London.  These passengers comprise varying fractions of the total 
traffic and do not reflect demand in the Boston-London local market.  Due to limitations in data, our 
analysis considers segment traffic rather than O-D traffic.  This will tend to inflate demand (and service 
levels) to or from cities with substantial connecting traffic.  We believe that traffic alone is a difficult 
measure to determine causation from Open Skies because we expect a natural growth in traffic year over 
year, regardless of other service level changes.  Therefore equal emphasis is placed on number of city 
pairs, departures and carriers. 
Throughout our discussion we will consider two hypotheses made by previous studies.  The first, 
articulated by the Brattle Group (2002), is that “a firm may gain a long-term competitive advantage if it is 
the first either to enter a market or to significantly expand its market presence.”  Brattle suggests that 
first-mover and network advantages likely account for high traffic increases to the Netherlands, relative to 
other EU member states.  This hypothesis would suggest that the increases following liberalization events 
dampen as time progresses.  The second hypothesis, presented by Booz Allen Hamilton (2007) suggests 
that “liberalizing air transport markets has a positive effect in the five years following the signing of an 
Open Skies agreement.”  Beyond the initial five years, Booz Allen expects the growth rate to return to its 
long-term equilibrium, but at a higher output. 
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As a result, our analysis evaluates changes in four service level measures in the five years prior 
and post the signing of an Open Skies agreement with the U.S.23  For the number of departures and 
passenger enplanements, annualized growth rates are averaged over the five-year period before and after 
the agreement.  For number of city pairs and competitors, the absolute number is averaged over the same 
periods.  The pre- and post-agreement values are compared to gain insight into the impact of Open Skies.  
We perform a statistical significance test to determine whether a significant change in service levels 
occurred following the signing of an Open Skies agreement.  Given the small size of each of our samples 
(five data points prior- and five post-agreement) and that the data fails to conform to a specific 
distribution (e.g. normal, triangular, etc.), we must employ a nonparametric test.  We perform the 
Wilcoxon Rank Sum test which is well-suited for two-sample problems with independent samples, 
described below. 
 
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test 
The Wilcoxon Rank Sum test is a nonparametric alternative to the two-sample t-test and is 
particularly well-suited for smaller sample sizes.  It compares two distributions to assess whether one has 
systematically larger values than the other based solely on a rank of the observations from the two 
samples.  In order to demonstrate, let us use an example from our transatlantic data set.  Suppose that we 
have samples of observations from two populations A and B, where A is number of Sweden’s transatlantic 
city pairs in the five years prior to an agreement and B is the number of city pairs in the five years post 
agreement.  Respectively, A and B contain nA and nB observations, in this case five apiece.  Since Sweden 
signed its agreement with the U.S. in April 1995, the number of city pairs in 1990-1994 comprise our first 
sample A, and 1995-1999 comprise our sample B.  The mean number of city pairs was 2.2 in period A and 
2.0 in period B, summarized in the following table: 
 
Table 15: Sample Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test (Sweden Data) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
   Average 2.2 Average 2.0    
 
One may initially make the observation that Sweden saw a drop in service levels following the 
signing of its Open Skies agreement with the U.S.  However, we must instead determine whether Sweden 
experienced a statistically significant drop in service levels over the period.  We wish to test the null 
hypothesis H0 that A = B, or that the distribution of measurements is the same in our two samples.  In 
                                                 
 
23 Since T-100 data is only available beginning 1990, the Netherlands is limited to pre-agreement data spanning 
three years – July 1990 through 1992. 
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order to test H0 we rank our ten observations and assign them values from 1 to 10, assigning tied values 
the average of their ranks.  The Wilcoxon test statistic wA is obtained by summing the ranks of group A. 
We compare wA to the random variable W representing the distribution of a rank sum, which depends on 
the two sample sizes nA and nB (from a Wilcoxon Rank Sum Table, see Appendix III).  Since we have no 
strong prior reason for expecting a shift in a particular direction, we employ a two-sided alternative test.  
Our two samples have systematically different distributions (null hypothesis rejected) when our P-value 
for the test is:  
 
(H1: A ≠ B) P-value = 2 * pr (W ≤ wA)  if wA represents the small rank sum (lower tail) 
P-value = 2 * pr (W ≥ wA)  if wA represents the larger rank sum (upper tail) 
 
As is standard with the parametric t-test, a confidence interval of 95% is an appropriate threshold 
of statistical significance.   We calculate the confidence interval for each of the four service level metrics 
of the 22 European countries with Open Skies agreements in place with the U.S. by 2007.  We define an 
increase in service levels to be conclusive if, of those service metrics experiencing a statistically 
significant change, a majority increased following the signing of Open Skies.  Similarly, a decrease is 
conclusive if a majority of statistically significant changes were negative. 
The results of our Open Skies analysis are summarized in Table 16.  Of the 22 countries with 
U.S. Open Skies agreements in place by 2007, only seven demonstrated overall increases in service 
levels while six demonstrated overall reductions.  The four countries which signed Open Skies treaties 
with the U.S. but have not received service support the hypothesis that liberalization alone does not oblige 
service level increases. 
Because we are using a 5-year period beyond the agreement to evaluate changes in service levels, 
late signers of Open Skies with the U.S. were evaluated using a post-agreement period which included the 
effects of 9/11.  It is very difficult to separate out the effects of 9/11, so a consistent approach was 
applied.  With new Open Skies agreements recently signed, future research will contribute additional data 
points to those presented here to better assess the impact of Open Skies. 
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Table 16: Results of Open Skies Analysis of 22 European Countries 
Country Date Signed 
City 
Pairs Departures 
Passengers 
Enplaned Competitors 
Overall Change 
Following Open 
Skies? 
Netherlands1 10/14/1992 ▲ ▼ ▲ ▲ Increase 
Belgium 3/1/1995 ▲ ▬ ▲ ▬ Increase 
Finland 3/24/1995 ▬ ▬ ▼ ▼ Decrease 
Denmark 4/26/1995 ▼ ▬ ▬ ▼ Decrease 
Norway 4/26/1995 ▬ ▬ ▬ ▼ Decrease 
Sweden 4/26/1995 ▬ ▬ ▲ ▼ Inconclusive 
Luxembourg 6/6/1995 ▬ ▬ ▬ ▬ Inconclusive 
Austria 6/14/1995 ▬ ▬ ▲ ▬ Increase 
Iceland 6/14/1995 ▲ ▲ ▲ ▬ Increase 
Switzerland 6/15/1995 ▲ ▲ ▬ ▲ Increase 
Czech Republic 12/8/1995 ▬ ▼ ▼ ▬ Decrease 
Germany 2/29/1996 ▲ ▬ ▬ ▬ Increase 
Romania 7/15/1998 ▬ ▬ ▬ ▬ Inconclusive 
Italy 11/11/1998 ▲ ▬ ▬ ▬ Increase 
Portugal 12/22/1999 ▬ ▬ ▬ ▬ Inconclusive 
Slovak Republic2 1/7/2000 ▬ ▬ ▬ ▬ No Service 
Turkey 3/22/2000 ▬ ▬ ▼ ▬ Decrease 
Malta2 10/12/2000 ▬ ▬ ▬ ▬ No Service 
Poland 5/31/2001 ▬ ▬ ▬ ▬ Inconclusive 
France 10/19/2001 ▼ ▼ ▬ ▼ Decrease 
Albania2 9/24/2003 ▬ ▬ ▬ ▬ No Service 
Bosnia & Herzegovina2 11/22/2005 ▬ ▬ ▬ ▬ No Service 
1 Wilcoxon Rank Sum test could not be performed on the Netherlands due to a lack of available data prior to 1990 
2 Country had no service after signing of agreement 
▬ Indicates no statistically significant change 
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The Netherlands (Open Skies agreement signed October 1992) 
Figure 17: U.S.-Netherlands Transatlantic Service Levels, 1990-2007 
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Service Level 5-Year Pre Avg. 5-Year Post Avg. Service Changes 
# of City Pairs 9.67 11.20 Increase 
# of Competitors 7.67 9.00 Increase 
Departures Annual Growth Rate 11.08% 10.20% Decrease 
Enplanements Annual Growth Rate 5.55% 13.69% Increase 
 
The Netherlands is most often used to cite the benefits of air transportation liberalization.  The Brattle 
Group hypothesizes that the Netherlands captured the largest proportion of new traffic stimulated by 
liberalization by leveraging the first-mover advantage.  Indeed after the signing of Open Skies with the U.S., the 
number of city pairs between the two nations increased beyond 1991 levels and has since exceeded pre-
agreement levels.  Since Amsterdam is the Netherlands’ only transatlantic gateway, all of these city pair 
additions represent new U.S. destinations being served nonstop to AMS.  The number of departures and 
enplanements rose steadily following the signing of the agreement.  However, even this oft-cited benefactor of 
liberalization saw a reduction in the rate of growth in departures following the signing of its agreement. 
Conclusion: An overall increase in service levels. 
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Belgium (Open Skies agreement signed March 1995) 
Figure 18: U.S.-Belgium Transatlantic Service Levels, 1990-2007 
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Service Level 5-Year Pre Avg. 5-Year Post Avg. Change 95% Significant 
# of City Pairs 4.40 7.20 Increase Yes 
# of Competitors 5.60 5.60 None -- 
Departures AGR 2.60% 9.91% Increase No 
Enplanements AGR -3.09% 15.48% Increase Yes 
 
Belgium, the second Open Skies signatory and the Netherland’s immediate neighbor to the south, saw 
increases in most service levels in the five years following its agreement with the U.S.  The number of city pairs 
reached a historic peak in 1998, and the number of competitors peaked in 1999.  By 2002, much of these service 
gains fell to pre-Open Skies levels, largely due to the collapse of Belgium’s flag carrier SABENA and the 
demand downturn following 9/11.  In addition, Belgium faced strong competition from neighbor Open Skies 
signatory the Netherlands, who enjoyed the “first mover” advantage.  Still, in the five years following the 
signing of its agreement with the U.S., Belgium experienced overall gains in service. 
 
Conclusion: During initial five years, an overall increase in service levels. 
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Finland (Open Skies agreement signed March 1995) 
Figure 19: U.S.-Finland Transatlantic Service Levels, 1990-2007 
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Service Level 5-Year Pre Avg. 5-Year Post Avg. Change 95% Significant 
# of City Pairs 2.20 2.20 None -- 
# of Competitors 2.00 1.20 Decrease Yes 
Departures AGR 9.93% -7.02% Decrease No 
Enplanements AGR 12.96% -5.73% Decrease Yes 
 
Finland, the third Open Skies signatory with the U.S., saw immediate drops in service levels after 
signing its agreement in 1995.  By 2000, Finland had lost two-thirds of its city pairs, half of its transatlantic 
competitors, and over half of its U.S. departures and enplanements.  Since 1995, no U.S. carrier has provided 
service to Finland.  The trend in enplanements has continued to drop since the signing of Open Skies in 1995. 
 
Conclusion: An overall reduction in service levels. 
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Denmark (Open Skies agreement signed April 1995) 
Figure 20: U.S.-Denmark Transatlantic Service Levels, 1990-2007 
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Service Level 5-Year Pre Avg. 5-Year Post Avg. Change 95% Significant 
# of City Pairs 4.80 3.00 Decrease Yes 
# of Competitors 3.60 1.60 Decrease Yes 
Departures AGR 0.04% -6.29% Decrease No 
Enplanements AGR -3.45% -8.72% Decrease No 
 
Denmark experienced a drop in transatlantic service levels in the five years following its Open Skies 
agreement with the U.S., although it has since been able to recover to near pre-Open Skies levels.  Between 
1995 and 2000, Denmark reached a historic low of three city pairs with the U.S.  Between 1998 and 2005, 
Denmark had lost all U.S. carrier service and was served only by SAS (as compared to five competitors in 
1992).  July departures reached a low of 122 in 2000, and in 2007 had not yet reached pre-Open Skies levels.  
July enplanements reached a ten-year minimum in 1999 and only reached pre-Open Skies levels in 2007, twelve 
years after the agreement’s signing. 
 
Conclusion: During first five years of agreement, an overall reduction in service levels. 
 76 
Norway (Open Skies agreement signed April 1995) 
Figure 21: U.S.-Norway Transatlantic Service Levels, 1990-2007 
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Service Level 5-Year Pre Avg. 5-Year Post Avg. Change 95% Significant 
# of City Pairs 1.00 1.20 Increase No 
# of Competitors 2.00 1.20 Decrease Yes 
Departures AGR 0.90% -0.11% Decrease No 
Enplanements AGR -2.52% 15.24% Increase No 
 
Following the signing of its U.S. Open Skies agreement in 1995, Norway experienced a one-year (1999) 
upward spike in service levels as a result of Northwest Airlines’ short-lived service between Minneapolis and 
Oslo.  Since 1990, however, Norway has seen an aggregate reduction in monthly departures and transatlantic 
competitors.  Prior to its Open Skies agreement, Norway was served by both a U.S. carrier and SAS.  Since 
2000, however, at most only one carrier has provided service to Oslo, the only Norwegian city with transatlantic 
service.  Since 2004, Continental Airlines has provided the only direct service between the U.S. and Norway 
with one flight per day out of its Newark hub.   
 
Conclusion: An overall decrease in service levels. 
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Sweden (Open Skies agreement signed April 1995) 
Figure 22: U.S.-Sweden Transatlantic Service Levels, 1990-2007 
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Service Level 5-Year Pre Avg. 5-Year Post Avg. Change 95% Significant 
# of City Pairs 2.20 2.00 Decrease No 
# of Competitors 3.40 2.40 Decrease Yes 
Departures AGR 1.14% 9.67% Increase No 
Enplanements AGR 1.73% 9.16% Increase Yes 
 
Sweden maintained high levels of transatlantic service in the early 1990’s, but saw subsequent drops 
until 1995 when its Open Skies agreement was signed with the U.S.  Since 1995, Sweden’s transatlantic service 
levels experienced increases over the first five years, followed by decreases below pre-Open Skies levels by 
2004. July departures experienced historic lows in 1995-1997, the first three years following the signing of Open 
Skies.  During the period from 2002-2004, a historic low one carrier served Sweden from the U.S. compared to 
four prior to Open Skies.  Since 2004, service levels have recovered and most recently have exceeded pre-Open 
Skies levels.  However, the historic highs and lows in the first five years of the agreement make the Swedish 
case study of the impacts of Open Skies at best inconclusive. 
Conclusion: Increase in enplanements but decrease in number of competitors - inconclusive. 
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Luxembourg (Open Skies agreement signed June 1995) 
Figure 23: U.S.-Luxembourg Transatlantic Service Levels, 1990-2007 
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Service Level 5-Year Pre Avg. 5-Year Post Avg. Service Changes 
# of City Pairs 0.20 0.20 No Change 
# of Competitors 0.20 0.20 No Change 
Departures Annual Growth Rate -- -- Insufficient Data 
Enplanements Annual Growth Rate -- -- Insufficient Data 
 
Luxembourg had no transatlantic service in the years leading up to its Open Skies agreement with the 
U.S. in 1995.  After a short-lived service to Newark in 1999, Luxair canceled its transatlantic service and 
returned Luxembourg to pre-Open Skies service levels.  Despite the signing of an Open Skies agreement, 
service levels have not increased beyond pre-agreement levels. 
 
Conclusion: No substantial increase in service levels after signing of agreement - inconclusive. 
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Austria (Open Skies agreement signed June 1995) 
Figure 24: U.S.-Austria Transatlantic Service Levels, 1990-2007 
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Service Level 5-Year Pre Avg. 5-Year Post Avg. Change 95% Significant 
# of City Pairs 1.40 2.00 Increase No 
# of Competitors 2.80 2.00 Decrease No 
Departures AGR 2.45% 24.04% Increase No 
Enplanements AGR 4.38% 25.76% Increase Yes 
 
Austria experienced increases in city pairs and growth rates of departures and enplanements following 
the signing of its Open Skies agreement in 1995.  Beyond the first five years of the agreement, however, the 
number of competitors providing transatlantic service to Austria dropped from pre-agreement levels to only one 
carrier (Austrian Airlines) over seven years.  Austria represents a net increase in service levels following Open 
Skies, but the drop in number of competitors dampens the gains. 
 
Conclusion: An overall increase in service levels. 
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Iceland (Open Skies agreement signed June 1995) 
Figure 25: U.S.-Iceland Transatlantic Service Levels, 1990-2007 
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Service Level 5-Year Pre Avg. 5-Year Post Avg. Change 95% Significant 
# of City Pairs 2.40 4.00 Increase Yes 
# of Competitors 1.00 1.00 None -- 
Departures AGR 6.16% 12.41% Increase Yes 
Enplanements AGR 5.72% 13.89% Increase Yes 
 
Iceland experienced an increase in the number of city pairs and growth rates of departures and 
enplanements since 1995.  All of this growth has come from Icelandair, the only carrier to provide direct 
transatlantic service to Reykjavik.  A study of the fare impacts of Open Skies in Iceland would shed light on the 
impacts of limited competition on U.S.-Iceland service. 
 
Conclusion: Overall growth following liberalization with the U.S. 
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Switzerland (Open Skies agreement signed June 1995) 
Figure 26: U.S.-Switzerland Transatlantic Service Levels, 1990-2007 
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Service Level 5-Year Pre Avg. 5-Year Post Avg. Change 95% Significant 
# of City Pairs 7.60 9.60 Increase Yes 
# of Competitors 3.60 5.20 Increase Yes 
Departures AGR 3.83% 6.88% Increase Yes 
Enplanements AGR 2.55% 6.47% Increase No 
 
Switzerland has seen a steady increase in transatlantic service levels since 1995, although growth was 
already apparent in the years leading up to the agreement.  The number of city pairs has grown slowly whereas 
the level of competition has increased significantly since before its Open Skies agreement with the U.S.  Growth 
rates in departures and enplanements increased following the agreement. 
 
Conclusion: Overall steady growth since signing Open Skies with the U.S. 
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Czech Republic (Open Skies agreement signed December 1995) 
Figure 27: U.S.-Czech Republic Transatlantic Service Levels, 1990-2007 
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0
1
2
3
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
U.S. Destinations Czech Republic Destinations Total City Pairs
Monthly Departures (July) - U.S. to Czech Republic
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
N
um
be
r o
f D
ep
ar
tu
re
s
Number of Carriers Serving U.S. – Czech Republic
0
1
2
3
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
U.S. Carriers Non-U.S. Carriers
Monthly Enplanements (July) - U.S. to Czech Republic
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
9,000
10,000
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Pa
ss
en
ge
r E
np
la
ne
m
en
ts
 
Service Level 5-Year Pre Avg. 5-Year Post Avg. Change 95% Significant 
# of City Pairs 1.60 1.00 Decrease No 
# of Competitors 1.00 1.00 None -- 
Departures AGR 19.61% 0.00% Decrease Yes 
Enplanements AGR 22.46% 0.06% Decrease Yes 
 
In the first five years following the signing of Open Skies with the U.S., the Czech Republic saw a drop 
in transatlantic service levels.  The number of city pairs dropped from two to one while the number of 
competitors remained fixed at one.  The number of departures remained constant at 31 and total passenger 
enplanements dropped steadily by 15% through 1999, recovering to pre-Open Skies levels in 2000.  Despite 
steady growth since 2002, which perhaps would not have been possible without Open Skies, the data indicates 
that the Czech Republic experienced a reduction in service levels in the five years following its Open Skies 
agreement. 
 
Conclusion: During first five years of agreement, an overall reduction in service levels. 
 83 
Germany (Open Skies agreement signed February 1996) 
Figure 28: U.S.-Germany Transatlantic Service Levels, 1990-2007 
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Service Level 5-Year Pre Avg. 5-Year Post Avg. Change 95% Significant 
# of City Pairs 29.20 35.20 Increase Yes 
# of Competitors 13.40 14.20 Increase No 
Departures AGR 1.69% 4.08% Increase No 
Enplanements AGR 1.88% 6.26% Increase No 
 
Germany is often used to cite the benefits of air transportation liberalization.  Indeed, following the 
signing of its Open Skies agreement with the U.S. in 1996, the number of city pairs (28 in 1995) steadily 
increased (44 in 2007).  Similarly, the number of July departures and enplanements rose steadily from 1996 
onwards with the exception of the three years following 9/11 in which overall transatlantic demand levels saw a 
decline.  However, beyond the first five years of the agreement, the total number of transatlantic competitors 
remained the same as pre-agreement levels (14).  It is interesting to note that the number of transatlantic 
competitors in Germany has yet to reach pre-Open Skies levels. 
 
Conclusion: An overall increase in service levels during the first five years of the agreement. 
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Romania (Open Skies agreement signed July 1998) 
Figure 29: U.S.-Romania Transatlantic Service Levels, 1990-2007 
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Service Level 5-Year Pre Avg. 5-Year Post Avg. Change 95% Significant 
# of City Pairs 2.40 2.60 Increase No 
# of Competitors 1.00 1.00 None -- 
Departures AGR 18.69% 1.75% Decrease No 
Enplanements AGR 26.40% 0.33% Decrease No 
 
When Romania signed its Open Skies agreement with the U.S. in 1998, it was experiencing historic 
high levels of transatlantic enplanements and city pairs.  During the first five years of the agreement, Romania 
saw half of its city pairs eliminated, and its number of departures and enplanements dropped to pre-agreement 
levels.  By 2004, all transatlantic service to Romania had been lost and has since been restored in a limited 
capacity by U.S. carrier Delta Air Lines from its JFK hub.  However, in the first five years following the 
agreement, the data is not conclusive. 
 
Conclusion: Inconclusive due to lack of statistically significant indicators. 
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Italy (Open Skies agreement signed November 1998) 
Figure 30: U.S.-Italy Transatlantic Service Levels, 1990-2007 
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Service Level 5-Year Pre Avg. 5-Year Post Avg. Change 95% Significant 
# of City Pairs 9.20 13.00 Increase Yes 
# of Competitors 6.20 7.80 Increase No 
Departures AGR 3.93% -0.90% Decrease No 
Enplanements AGR 1.35% 0.82% Decrease No 
 
In the first five years after signing an Open Skies agreement with the U.S., Italy saw an increase in city 
pairs and carriers providing transatlantic service, but a reduction in the growth rates of departures and 
enplanements.  Furthermore, the effects of 9/11 dampen the gains of Open Skies since it is a price-elastic 
tourism destination heavily affected by demand downturns. 
 
Conclusion: During the first five years, an overall increase in transatlantic service levels. 
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Portugal (Open Skies agreement signed December 1999) 
Figure 31: U.S.-Portugal Transatlantic Service Levels, 1990-2007 
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Service Level 5-Year Pre Avg. 5-Year Post Avg. Change 95% Significant 
# of City Pairs 2.00 1.60 Decrease No 
# of Competitors 2.80 2.20 Decrease No 
Departures AGR 4.85% -8.51% Decrease No 
Enplanements AGR 0.41% -3.88% Decrease No 
 
Portugal saw a statistically insignificant reduction in all four service level measures in the first five 
years after signing its Open Skies agreement with the U.S.  Portugal had dropped to four city pairs before Open 
Skies following prior losses.  In the first five years of the agreement, the number of city pairs dropped to one, 
the lowest level since 1990.  Portugal also experienced an immediate drop in number of competitors during the 
first five years of Open Skies, again to historic lows.  The total number of competitors has yet to reach the pre-
Open Skies peak of four.  Both the number of transatlantic departures and enplanements dropped immediately 
following Open Skies and only began to recover in 2005, six years after the agreement was signed. 
 
Conclusion: Lack of statistically significant change renders this case inconclusive. 
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Slovak Republic (Open Skies agreement signed January 2000) 
 
Service Level 5-Year Pre Avg. 5-Year Post Avg. Service Changes 
# of City Pairs 0.00 0.00 No Service 
# of Competitors 0.00 0.00 No Service 
Departures Annual Growth Rate -- -- Insufficient Data 
Enplanements Annual Growth Rate -- -- Insufficient Data 
 
The Slovak Republic had no transatlantic service in the years leading up to its Open Skies agreement 
with the U.S. in 2000.  Despite the signing of an Open Skies agreement, no service has been added to date. 
 
Conclusion: No addition of service after signing of agreement. 
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Turkey (Open Skies agreement signed March 2000) 
Figure 32: U.S.-Turkey Transatlantic Service Levels, 1990-2007 
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Service Level 5-Year Pre Avg. 5-Year Post Avg. Change 95% Significant 
# of City Pairs 2.00 2.40 Increase No 
# of Competitors 1.60 2.00 Increase No 
Departures AGR 35.61% -2.54% Decrease No 
Enplanements AGR 33.51% 0.14% Decrease Yes 
 
In the first five years after signing an Open Skies agreement with the U.S., Turkey saw an increase in 
city pairs and carriers providing transatlantic service but a reduction in the growth rates of departures and 
enplanements.  The number of transatlantic departures reached its peak in 1999 and, since entering into the 
agreement, has yet to return to that level.  Transatlantic enplanements reached their peak in 2000, but have yet to 
return to pre-agreement levels, seven years after the agreement was signed.  However only the reduction in 
enplanements demonstrates statistical significance, rendering this case an overall reduction. 
 
Conclusion: An overall reduction in service levels. 
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Malta (Open Skies agreement signed October 2000) 
Figure 33: U.S.-Malta Transatlantic Service Levels, 1990-2007 
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Service Level 5-Year Pre Avg. 5-Year Post Avg. Change 95% Significant 
# of City Pairs 0.20 0.00 Decrease No 
# of Competitors 0.20 0.00 Decrease No 
Departures AGR -- -- -- -- 
Enplanements AGR -- -- -- -- 
 
 
Malta had no transatlantic service in the years leading up to its Open Skies agreement with the U.S. in 
2000.  After a short-lived weekly service to JFK in 1997, Balkan Bulgarian Airlines canceled its transatlantic 
service and returned Malta to pre-Open Skies levels.  Despite the signing of an Open Skies agreement, service 
levels never reached pre-agreement levels. 
 
Conclusion: No addition of service to Malta after signing of agreement. 
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Poland (Open Skies agreement signed May 2001) 
Figure 34: U.S.-Poland Transatlantic Service Levels, 1990-2007 
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Service Level 5-Year Pre Avg. 5-Year Post Avg. Change 95% Significant 
# of City Pairs 3.20 4.00 Increase No 
# of Competitors 1.20 1.00 Decrease No 
Departures AGR 5.80% 4.58% Decrease No 
Enplanements AGR 5.70% 2.86% Decrease No 
 
Poland signed an Open Skies agreement with the U.S. immediately prior to the attacks of 9/11.  
Transatlantic demand subsequently dropped, and Poland’s upward trend in transatlantic service indeed slowed.  
In the first five years of the agreement, the number of city pairs increased without statistical significance.  Yet 
over this period, the number of transatlantic competitors, monthly departures and enplanements dropped without 
significance. 
 
Conclusion: No statistically significant change in service levels - inconclusive. 
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France (Open Skies agreement signed October 2001) 
Figure 35: U.S.-France Transatlantic Service Levels, 1990-2007 
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Service Level 5-Year Pre Avg. 5-Year Post Avg. Change 95% Significant 
# of City Pairs 16.40 14.40 Decrease Yes 
# of Competitors 10.00 8.80 Decrease Yes 
Departures AGR 8.62% -0.73% Decrease Yes 
Enplanements AGR 10.70% 1.77% Decrease No 
 
France signed its Open Skies agreement with the U.S. immediately following the attacks of 9/11.  
France saw a reduction in transatlantic service levels in the first five years of its agreement.  Although during 
this period France exceeded pre-agreement enplanement levels, the number of city pairs, competitors, and 
departures all declined.  Therefore it appears as if the growth in passengers enplaned is largely due to Air 
France’s expansion of Charles de Gaulle as a global hub (versus local Paris traffic).  Indeed, between July 2001 
July and 2007, Air France carried 30,000 additional passengers to CDG.  The relevance of this increase in hub 
traffic will be further discussed in the next chapter. 
 
Conclusion: An overall decrease in service levels during the first five years of its agreement. 
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Albania (Open Skies agreement signed September 2003) 
 
Service Level 5-Year Pre Avg. 5-Year Post Avg. Service Changes 
# of City Pairs 0.00 0.00 No Service 
# of Competitors 0.00 0.00 No Service 
Departures Annual Growth Rate -- -- Insufficient Data 
Enplanements Annual Growth Rate -- -- Insufficient Data 
 
Albania had no transatlantic service in the years leading up to its Open Skies agreement with the U.S. in 
2003.  Despite the signing of an Open Skies agreement, no service has been added to date. 
 
Conclusion: No addition of service after signing of agreement. 
 
 
 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Open Skies agreement signed November 2005) 
 
Service Level 5-Year Pre Avg. 5-Year Post Avg. Service Changes 
# of City Pairs 0.00 0.00 No Service 
# of Competitors 0.00 0.00 No Service 
Departures Annual Growth Rate -- -- Insufficient Data 
Enplanements Annual Growth Rate -- -- Insufficient Data 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina had no transatlantic service in the years leading up to its Open Skies agreement 
with the U.S. in 2005.  Despite the signing of an Open Skies agreement, no service has been added to date. 
 
Conclusion: No addition of service after signing of agreement. 
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Croatia and the remaining European Union member nations: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Spain, United Kingdom 
(EU-U.S. Open Skies agreement signed April 2007, Croatia signed March 2008) 
 
Croatia last had transatlantic service in 1991, when Pan American World Airways provided weekly 
service to Zagreb from JFK.  Since 1991, no carrier has provided service between Croatia and the U.S.  Despite 
the signing of an Open Skies agreement, no carrier has announced direct service to Croatia. 
 
Conclusion: No planned service to Croatia since signing of agreement. 
 
In April 2007, EU and U.S. officials signed an Open Skies accord, which would apply provisionally to 
the eleven member nations that did not already have an Open Skies agreement in place with the U.S.: Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Spain and the United Kingdom.  
According to OAG data, only Ireland and Spain have seen more than a 5% increase in the number of 
transatlantic departures scheduled.  The United Kingdom has seen an increase in departures scheduled to 
London Heathrow, but no aggregate increase in departures scheduled.  Moreover, no addition of intra-European 
service has been announced by U.S. carriers. 
 
Conclusion: Although years of data will be required for this retrospective approach, initial metrics indicate 
service level growth for Ireland and Spain, with little change identified elsewhere. 
 
 
 
4.3 Antitrust Immunity and Alliances 
 
As demand for international travel has increased, U.S. carriers have built alliances with their 
foreign counterparts in order to carry “behind” and “beyond” traffic through their hub-and-spoke 
networks.  Without the cabotage rights discussed in Chapter 2, carriers are unable to build extensive 
networks inside foreign territory and must therefore rely on partner carriers to provide service beyond 
those large cities served directly from their domestic hubs.  Alliances with foreign carriers can be limited 
to marketing partnerships and extend to joint ventures.  The most common types are “codesharing” 
alliances and “antitrust immunized” alliances.  Approval of both alliance arrangements requires careful 
examination of their impact on competition in both domestic and international markets.  The U.S. DOT’s 
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Office of International Aviation processes codeshare applications while the U.S. DOT’s Office of 
Aviation Analysis processes antitrust immunity applications.24 
Codesharing agreements allow carriers to designate a flight number on partner flights, which 
allows both carriers to sell and ticket one another’s flights.  Generally, codeshare partners will negotiate a 
percentage of a flight’s capacity available to the partner at a prorated price.  Codeshare partners are also 
able to coordinate their flight schedules to optimize connectivity, but they are not able to fully integrate 
their schedules as immunized carriers can. 
Antitrust immunity (AI) grants partner carriers exemption from prosecution under antitrust laws, 
allowing them to fully coordinate schedules, prices and operations.  Joint ventures are immunized 
partnerships in which carriers integrate some of their operations and share profits.  The U.S. DOT is 
responsible for granting AI to U.S. carriers and their partners (whether U.S. or foreign).  The agency has 
established a precedent of only granting antitrust immunity to partner carriers of Open Skies signatories.  
Therefore any benefits that come as a result of immunized alliances or joint ventures rely upon the 
establishment of an Open Skies agreement. 
A study by U.S. Department of Justice economist W. Tom Whalen (2005) found that codesharing 
results in fare decreases of 5-10% and passenger volume increases of 22-45%.  Antitrust immunity results 
in fare decreases of 14-22% and passenger volume increases of 51-88%.  According to the study, “this 
result is consistent with the hypothesis that the primary effect of the alliance is an internalization of [the 
double marginalization] demand externality.”  That is to say that under an immunized alliance, the 
additional cost of transfer prices are not passed on to the consumer, as they are in a purely codesharing 
agreement. 
Whalen goes on to suggest that capacity changes on transatlantic segments following Open Skies 
treaties are actually a result of AI alliances rather than the treaties themselves.  The study claims that the 
expectation that Open Skies should result in lower fares on connecting routes is incorrect.  Instead, “all of 
the capacity expansion associated with Open Skies treaties is due to expansion by carriers with 
immunized alliances on routes between their hubs” and not the actual agreement.  This conclusion is 
supported by evidence that in the past, “Open Skies agreements did not lead to capacity increases from a 
variety of carriers,” but rather immunized carriers flying to their hubs.  As seen in Section 4.2, our 
findings are consistent with this conclusion. 
A U.S. DOT (2000) study confirmed that “alliance-based networks are the principal driving force 
behind transatlantic price reductions and traffic gains.”  In other words, the data suggests that 
                                                 
 
24 Full list of codeshare alliances available here: http://ostpxweb.dot.gov/aviation/X-40%20Role_Files/coderpt.pdf 
A complete list of immunized alliances is included in Appendix II. 
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deregulation alone has not consistently led to service level increases or fare decreases.  Instead 
deregulation, as a prerequisite for immunization of alliances, has ultimately led to the service benefits we 
enjoy today.  Indeed, even non-alliance carriers have experienced traffic growth as a result of economic 
growth, but this growth “is certainly modest relative to alliance carriers.” In Chapter 5 we evaluate the 
explanatory power of immunized carrier hubs on transatlantic service levels. 
 
4.4 Summary of Results 
 
 The results of our country-by-country analysis are summarized in Table 17Table 20.  To review, 
we draw a conclusion about service level trends when a majority of statistically significant changes in the 
four metrics (city pairs, competitors, departures and enplanements) indicate an increase or decrease in 
service levels.  The four cases of Slovak Republic, Malta, Albania, and Bosnia-Herzegovina are labeled 
“No Service” because they lacked consistent transatlantic service before and after the signing of their 
agreements.  Although this represents neither a conclusive increase nor decrease in service, it supports the 
hypothesis that liberalization alone does not oblige service level increases. 
 
 
Table 17: Pre and Post Open Skies Change in City Pairs 
Country Date Signed 
5-Year Pre 
Avg: City 
Pairs 
5-Year Post
Avg: City 
Pairs 
Service 
Changes 
Wilcoxon 
Significance 
Netherlands 10/14/1992 9.67 11.20 Increase Not Applicable
Belgium 3/1/1995 4.40 7.20 Increase 95% 
Finland 3/24/1995 2.20 2.20 No Change <80% 
Denmark 4/26/1995 4.80 3.00 Decrease 99.5% 
Norway 4/26/1995 1.00 1.20 Increase <80% 
Sweden 4/26/1995 2.20 2.00 Decrease <80% 
Luxembourg 6/6/1995 0.20 0.20 No Change <80% 
Austria 6/14/1995 1.40 2.00 Increase 80% 
Iceland 6/14/1995 2.40 4.00 Increase 99% 
Switzerland 6/15/1995 7.60 9.60 Increase 97.5% 
Czech Republic 12/8/1995 1.60 1.00 Decrease 90% 
Germany 2/29/1996 29.20 35.20 Increase 99.5% 
Romania 7/15/1998 2.40 2.60 Increase <80% 
Italy 11/11/1998 9.20 13.00 Increase 99% 
Portugal 12/22/1999 2.00 1.60 Decrease <80% 
Slovak Republic 1/7/2000 0.00 0.00 No Service No Service 
Turkey 3/22/2000 2.00 2.40 Increase <80% 
Malta 10/12/2000 0.20 0.00 Decrease No Service 
Poland 5/31/2001 3.20 4.00 Increase <80% 
France 10/19/2001 16.40 14.40 Decrease 97.5% 
Albania 9/24/2003 0.00 0.00 No Service No Service 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 11/22/2005 0.00 0.00 No Service No Service 
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Table 18: Pre and Post Open Skies Change in Competitors 
Country Date Signed 
5-Year Pre  
Avg: 
Competitors
5-Year Post 
Avg: 
Competitors
Service 
Changes 
Wilcoxon 
Significance 
Netherlands 10/14/1992 7.67 9.00 Increase Not Applicable 
Belgium 3/1/1995 5.60 5.60 No Change <80% 
Finland 3/24/1995 2.00 1.20 Decrease 95% 
Denmark 4/26/1995 3.60 1.60 Decrease 99.5% 
Norway 4/26/1995 2.00 1.20 Decrease 95% 
Sweden 4/26/1995 3.40 2.40 Decrease 95% 
Luxembourg 6/6/1995 0.20 0.20 No Change <80% 
Austria 6/14/1995 2.80 2.00 Decrease 80% 
Iceland 6/14/1995 1.00 1.00 No Change <80% 
Switzerland 6/15/1995 3.60 5.20 Increase 97.5% 
Czech Republic 12/8/1995 1.00 1.00 No Change <80% 
Germany 2/29/1996 13.40 14.20 Increase 80% 
Romania 7/15/1998 1.00 1.00 No Change <80% 
Italy 11/11/1998 6.20 7.80 Increase 90% 
Portugal 12/22/1999 2.80 2.20 Decrease 90% 
Slovak Republic 1/7/2000 0.00 0.00 No Service No Service 
Turkey 3/22/2000 1.60 2.00 Increase <80% 
Malta 10/12/2000 0.20 0.00 Decrease No Service 
Poland 5/31/2001 1.20 1.00 Decrease <80% 
France 10/19/2001 10.00 8.80 Decrease 95% 
Albania 9/24/2003 0.00 0.00 No Service No Service 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 11/22/2005 0.00 0.00 No Service No Service 
 
Table 19: Pre and Post Open Skies Change in Departures 
Country Date Signed 
5-Year Pre 
Avg: Annual 
Dep. Growth
5-Year Post Avg:
Annual Dep. 
Growth 
Service 
Changes 
Wilcoxon 
Significance 
Netherlands 10/14/1992 11.08% 10.20% Decrease Not Applicable 
Belgium 3/1/1995 2.60% 9.91% Increase 90% 
Finland 3/24/1995 9.93% -7.02% Decrease 80% 
Denmark 4/26/1995 0.04% -6.29% Decrease 90% 
Norway 4/26/1995 0.90% -0.11% Decrease 80% 
Sweden 4/26/1995 1.14% 9.67% Increase 90% 
Luxembourg 6/6/1995 -- -- No Service 95% 
Austria 6/14/1995 2.45% 24.04% Increase 90% 
Iceland 6/14/1995 6.16% 12.41% Increase 99% 
Switzerland 6/15/1995 3.83% 6.88% Increase 97.5% 
Czech Republic 12/8/1995 19.61% 0.00% Decrease 99.5% 
Germany 2/29/1996 1.69% 4.08% Increase 90% 
Romania 7/15/1998 18.69% 1.75% Decrease 80% 
Italy 11/11/1998 3.93% -0.90% Decrease <80% 
Portugal 12/22/1999 4.85% -8.51% Decrease <80% 
Slovak Republic 1/7/2000 -- -- No Service No Service 
Turkey 3/22/2000 35.61% -2.54% Decrease <80% 
Malta 10/12/2000 -- -- No Service No Service 
Poland 5/31/2001 5.80% 4.58% Decrease <80% 
France 10/19/2001 8.62% -0.73% Decrease 95% 
Albania 9/24/2003 -- -- No Service No Service 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 11/22/2005 -- -- No Service No Service 
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Table 20: Pre and Post Open Skies Change in Passenger Enplanements 
Country Date Signed 
5-Year Pre 
Avg: Annual 
Pax Growth 
5-Year Post 
Avg: Annual 
Pax Growth 
Service 
Changes 
Wilcoxon 
Significance 
Netherlands 10/14/1992 5.55% 13.69% Increase Not Applicable 
Belgium 3/1/1995 -3.09% 15.48% Increase 99% 
Finland 3/24/1995 12.96% -5.73% Decrease 95% 
Denmark 4/26/1995 -3.45% -8.72% Decrease 80% 
Norway 4/26/1995 -2.52% 15.24% Increase 80% 
Sweden 4/26/1995 1.73% 9.16% Increase 97.5% 
Luxembourg 6/6/1995 -- -- No Service 95% 
Austria 6/14/1995 4.38% 25.76% Increase 95% 
Iceland 6/14/1995 5.72% 13.89% Increase 99.5% 
Switzerland 6/15/1995 2.55% 6.47% Increase 80% 
Czech Republic 12/8/1995 22.46% 0.06% Decrease 99% 
Germany 2/29/1996 1.88% 6.26% Increase <80% 
Romania 7/15/1998 26.40% 0.33% Decrease <80% 
Italy 11/11/1998 1.35% 0.82% Decrease <80% 
Portugal 12/22/1999 0.41% -3.88% Decrease <80% 
Slovak Republic 1/7/2000 -- -- No Service No Service 
Turkey 3/22/2000 33.51% 0.14% Decrease 97.5% 
Malta 10/12/2000 -- -- No Service No Service 
Poland 5/31/2001 5.70% 2.86% Decrease <80% 
France 10/19/2001 10.70% 1.77% Decrease 80% 
Albania 9/24/2003 -- -- No Service No Service 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 11/22/2005 -- -- No Service No Service 
 
 
The results of our Open Skies analysis are summarized in Table 21.  Of the 22 countries with 
U.S. Open Skies agreements in place by 2007, only seven demonstrated overall increases in service 
levels while six demonstrated overall reductions.  The seven which experienced gains are the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Iceland, Switzerland, Germany and Italy.  The six countries experiencing 
decreases in service levels are Finland, Denmark, Norway, the Czech Republic, Turkey and France.  We 
have deemed five cases inconclusive due to mixed evidence or a lack of statistically significant indicators.  
Given a lack of data for 2008 Open Skies signatories, the impacts of EU-U.S. Open Skies are still 
uncertain. 
One limitation of the data is that for countries signing an agreement with the U.S. after 1997, 
post-agreement data includes the effects of 9/11 on service levels.  More generally, the data includes 
impacts from individual economic and political events, as well as periods of armed conflict.  
Unfortunately, the impacts of these events cannot be separated from those of the Open Skies agreements.  
Additionally, countries with no service to the U.S. before or after the signing of Open Skies cannot be 
evaluated using the same statistical tests as those with service, yet they are not inconclusive.  Instead, they 
fail to demonstrate a conclusive increase in service levels as a result of Open Skies, as we have defined it. 
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Our findings are consistent with those of InterVISTAS (2006), which concluded that 
“liberalization is a necessary but not sufficient condition for traffic growth.”  Of course, “no new services 
can result if there is no underlying demand to support them.”  Yet to presuppose that city pairs without 
service will receive nonstop service in a liberalized regime is incorrect.  It is equally incorrect to assume 
that city pairs with existing service will not see reduction in service levels in a liberalized regime.  In the 
next chapter we build an econometric model to validate the conclusion that the existence of Open Skies is 
not a dominant explanatory factor of transatlantic service levels. 
 
Table 21: Final Results of Open Skies Analysis of 22 European Countries 
Country Date Signed 
City 
Pairs Departures 
Passengers 
Enplaned Competitors 
Overall Change 
Following Open 
Skies? 
Netherlands1 10/14/1992 ▲ ▼ ▲ ▲ Increase 
Belgium 3/1/1995 ▲ ▬ ▲ ▬ Increase 
Finland 3/24/1995 ▬ ▬ ▼ ▼ Decrease 
Denmark 4/26/1995 ▼ ▬ ▬ ▼ Decrease 
Norway 4/26/1995 ▬ ▬ ▬ ▼ Decrease 
Sweden 4/26/1995 ▬ ▬ ▲ ▼ Inconclusive 
Luxembourg 6/6/1995 ▬ ▬ ▬ ▬ Inconclusive 
Austria 6/14/1995 ▬ ▬ ▲ ▬ Increase 
Iceland 6/14/1995 ▲ ▲ ▲ ▬ Increase 
Switzerland 6/15/1995 ▲ ▲ ▬ ▲ Increase 
Czech Republic 12/8/1995 ▬ ▼ ▼ ▬ Decrease 
Germany 2/29/1996 ▲ ▬ ▬ ▬ Increase 
Romania 7/15/1998 ▬ ▬ ▬ ▬ Inconclusive 
Italy 11/11/1998 ▲ ▬ ▬ ▬ Increase 
Portugal 12/22/1999 ▬ ▬ ▬ ▬ Inconclusive 
Slovak Republic2 1/7/2000 ▬ ▬ ▬ ▬ No Service 
Turkey 3/22/2000 ▬ ▬ ▼ ▬ Decrease 
Malta2 10/12/2000 ▬ ▬ ▬ ▬ No Service 
Poland 5/31/2001 ▬ ▬ ▬ ▬ Inconclusive 
France 10/19/2001 ▼ ▼ ▬ ▼ Decrease 
Albania2 9/24/2003 ▬ ▬ ▬ ▬ No Service 
Bosnia & Herzegovina2 11/22/2005 ▬ ▬ ▬ ▬ No Service 
1 Wilcoxon Rank Sum test could not be performed on the Netherlands due to a lack of available data prior to 1990 
2 Country had no service after signing of agreement 
▬ Indicates no statistically significant change 
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Chapter 5 
 
5  
Econometric Market Analysis 
 
 
In previous chapters, we analyzed transatlantic aviation markets since 1990 in the face of 
liberalization and increasing competition.  In Chapter 3 we identified movement towards the use of 
concentrated hubs as transatlantic gateways as well as the disproportionate growth of U.S. carriers over 
the Atlantic.  In Chapter 4 we saw that Open Skies has resulted in both increases and decreases in 
transatlantic service levels, and that growth resulting from immunized alliance expansion has relied upon 
liberalized regulatory regimes. 
In this chapter we perform several regression analyses to validate the conclusions drawn in 
previous chapters.  The chapter is separated into three sections.  The first contains a review of literature in 
the field of air transportation econometric analysis.  The focus here is to identify common explanatory 
variables used to describe service levels for a given market.  The second section summarizes the market 
characteristics of U.S. and European cities with transatlantic service.  These characteristics are used as 
explanatory variables in the subsequent econometric model.  In the third section we specify the model and 
discuss the findings. 
 
5.1 Background and Literature Review 
 
In our final analysis we seek to identify what factors explain transatlantic service levels in a 
particular market.  Regression analysis allows us to estimate the relationship between service levels and a 
set of explanatory variables.  We recall, however, that regression is a test of correlation and not causation.  
Therefore, we will test the null hypothesis that certain explanatory variables fail to explain service levels 
since we cannot, with certainty, determine that they explain them.  One such null hypothesis is that the 
signing of an Open Skies agreement has no significant impact on service levels.  We also test how well 
certain geographic and socioeconomic indicators predict service levels. 
An econometric or regression model will never provide an exact fit, but some models provide a 
closer fit than others.  The R2 (r-square) value measures a model’s “goodness of fit” to the actual 
dependent variable data.  It is possible to build a model with high R2 (close to one) whose explanatory 
variables clearly have no relationship to the dependent variable.  For example, Japan’s annual fish exports 
 100 
may correlate very well with air traffic demand between New York and Miami, but the model does not 
make a sensible prediction about how changes in the explanatory variable will lead to changes in traffic.  
In other words, R2 alone is not the only measure of the quality of a model.  A good model must use 
variables that make intuitive sense.   
Furthermore, a model with a high R2 may be poor if its explanatory variables are not statistically 
significant.  Significance is tested using the t-statistic, which is calculated by dividing a regression 
coefficient by its standard error.  A t-statistic larger than some critical value indicates that the coefficient 
was able to be estimated with a fair amount of accuracy and is therefore deemed significant.  However, 
variables with extremely large t-statistics might be serially correlated with the dependent variable and 
should be avoided.  Lastly, a good model’s variable coefficients should have signs that meet our a priori 
hypotheses.  In our analysis we will rely on an “adjusted R2” which applies negative weight as an 
increasing number of explanatory variables are incorporated into the model. 
Since we are ultimately interested in identifying those variables with the greatest explanatory 
power, we begin with a review of the literature in transportation demand modeling.  Most of the theory in 
the field surrounds the forecasting of passenger demand between two points of interest.  These so-called 
“gravity models” describe the attraction between two cities, regions, or countries in an attempt to quantify 
passenger or cargo traffic between the two.   
Gravity models are derived from economic or social supply variables that can be categorized into 
two groups: geo-economic and service-related factors (Rengaraju and Thamizh Arasan, 1992; Kanafani, 
1983).  Geo-economic factors describe the economic activities and geographical characteristics of the 
areas around the airports and the routes involved (Jorge-Calderón, 1997) whereas service-related factors 
are characteristics of the air transport system that are under the control of the airlines (Grosche et al., 
2007).  In our analysis we seek to explain service levels across all carriers to all transatlantic destinations, 
so we will ignore service-related factors (e.g. frequency, price, service quality) that seek to explain 
passenger preference for a particular carrier over another. 
Virtually all gravity models incorporate distance between cities as an important geographical 
factor affecting their air travel demand.  Indeed, we expect that increasing distance leads to reduced 
demand because of increased flying time (and in some extreme cases, limits in aircraft range) and cost of 
operations, as well as lower social and commercial interactions.  However, Jorge-Calderón (1997) points 
out that, all else being equal, longer distances increase the attractiveness of air transport relative to other 
transportation modes.  However, since there are no pragmatic mode alternatives for transatlantic travel, 
we ignore the role that competing service (train, car, etc.) that is common to gravity models. 
The other most commonly used geo-economic factors are income and the population of the 
metropolitan area served (Grosche et al., 2007).  We incorporate these factors, which intuitively impact 
 101 
transatlantic demand, into our regression analysis.  We use the population of the airport catchment region 
first used by Moore and Soliman (1981) as opposed to simple city populations.  Doganis (1966) was the 
first to observe passenger numbers at each airport as an indication of the demand between the two.  Since 
our analysis seeks to explain service levels of one city (often a multi-airport system) or country to a host 
of cities, this metric has less meaning and is therefore not used.   
Other factors used in gravity models include income distribution and a competition index (Brown 
and Watkins, 1968), number of phone calls and flying time (Verleger, 1972), percentage of university 
degree holders, number of full-time employees, type of city and big-city proximity factor (Rengaraju and 
Thamizh Arasan, 1992), political and cultural relationships between two countries (Russon and Riley, 
1993), and many others.  Although some of these variables, particularly the city type, competition index 
and relationships between two countries, are intuitively correlated to transatlantic service levels, a lack of 
accurate data across our sample prevents their use in the model. 
Our research explores the impact that liberalization, particularly Open Skies, has on transatlantic 
service levels.  As a result, we incorporate an Open Skies variable in our European model to determine 
whether cities in Open Skies countries experience higher-than-expected service levels relative to their 
non-Open Skies counterparts.  In addition, we incorporate a hub variable as proposed by Jorge-Calderón 
(1997) for both the U.S. and European models.  The model is specified and described in Section 5.3. 
Again, gravity models describe the attraction between two cities, regions, or countries in the 
attempt to quantify passenger or cargo traffic between the two.  Our model differs in that we seek to 
explain service levels to all transatlantic destinations for a particular city or country.  For example, we 
seek to explain transatlantic service levels from a particular U.S. city to all European destinations, and 
vice versa.  Again, we have defined service levels to refer to four metrics: number of city pairs, 
competitors, destinations and passenger enplanements.  We therefore run four separate regressions for the 
U.S. and another four for Europe.   
Once again the primary data source is the Air Carrier Statistics database, also known as the T-100 
data bank, of the U.S. Department of Transportation.  The database contains all international nonstop 
segment data for certificated U.S. air carriers and foreign carriers having at least one point of service in 
the U.S. or one of its territories.  Our sample includes all 32 U.S. cities and 59 European cities with any 
transatlantic service between 2000 and 2007 (including those that lost service) and the 37 European 
countries with either transatlantic service between 2000 and 2007 or an Open Skies agreement with the 
U.S.  The socio-geographic characteristics of these markets are presented in the next section. 
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5.2 U.S. and European Cities with Transatlantic Service 
 
In Chapter 3 we presented the 32 U.S. and 59 European cities that had transatlantic service at any 
point between 2000 and 2007.  In this section, we provide additional socio-geographic indicators that we 
incorporate into the econometric model.  As identified in the previous section, our model uses the 
following factors to describe transatlantic service levels: 
• Population of greater metropolitan area 
• GDP per capita 
• Distance 
• Hub dummy 
• Open Skies dummy 
 Our dependent variables are the measures of service levels defined earlier: number of city pairs, 
competitors, destinations and passenger enplanements.  A separate regression is run for each measure.  
We use 2007 data in order to capture the largest set of countries with an Open Skies agreement in place, 
to ensure that post-9/11 demand was fully recovered, and to best match the 2007/2008 socio-economic 
statistics we were able to obtain.  Our data is presented in Table 22, Table 23, and Table 24. 
Our U.S. data sample includes all 32 U.S. cities that had transatlantic service at any point between 
2000 and 2007.  Population data reflects that of the Combined Statistical Area (CSA), defined by the U.S. 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to include residents of cities, adjacent metropolitan and 
micropolitan statistical areas.  CSA population and income figures were obtained through the U.S. Census 
Bureau. 
An initial review of the data would suggest that there indeed is a negative impact of distance to 
service levels.  Some of the largest cities on the list, such as Los Angeles and San Francisco, have lower 
service levels than cities of similar size in the East.  Similarly, cities with low income per capita, such as 
San Juan, Pittsburgh, Miami, Memphis and Fairbanks, have lower aggregate service levels than cities 
with high income per capita.  However, these cities are also smaller, on average, than those with high per 
capita income (Boston, New York, Washington DC, San Francisco) so we will explore the combined 
effect of income and population in our model.  We also see that cities which serve as hubs for 
transatlantic carriers experience higher service levels than their non-hub counterparts.  This may be due to 
the hub status itself, but also that airlines tend to locate their hubs in major population and economic 
regions of the country. 
Our European analysis includes both a city-level and country-level data set.  For the city-level 
analysis, our data includes all 59 European cities that had transatlantic service at some point between 
2000 and 2007.  For the country-level analysis, our data includes all countries with either transatlantic 
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service between 2000 and 2007 or an Open Skies agreement with the U.S. by July 2007.  Urban Area 
Population reflects the population of a city and its surrounding metropolitan area, and was estimated in 
2008 by World Gazetteer.  Unfortunately, reliable income or GDP data could only be found for half of 
our dataset so we elected to leave it out of the city-level analysis.  The Open Skies dummy variable 
reflects whether a given city is located in a country with a U.S. Open Skies agreement.  The Big-3 hub 
dummy variable indicates whether an airport in a given market serves as a major hub to one of the Big-3 
European carriers: Air France-KLM, British Airways, or Lufthansa-Swiss.  A simple hub variable as in 
the U.S. dataset was meaningless in the European dataset since most cities serve as a hub to a national 
carrier. 
An initial review of the European data also confirms our a priori hypothesis that there is a 
negative correlation between distance and service levels, as was the case with U.S. cities.  Some of the 
largest cities on the list, such as Moscow and Istanbul, have lower service levels than cities of similar size 
in Western Europe (see Table 23).  We also see that some of the largest cities in Europe – such as 
Düsseldorf/Cologne, Istanbul, Moscow, Barcelona and Berlin – have relatively low service levels.  It is 
difficult to develop an initial sense of the service levels of Open Skies countries relative to the others.  
These factors play a non-intuitive role in determining service levels in Europe, and we hope to develop 
further insights through our econometric model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This section intentionally left blank. 
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Table 22: U.S. Cities with Transatlantic Service 2000-2007 and Related Data 
U.S. Metropolitan Area25 CSA Population 200726 
Per Capita 
Income26 
Distance 
(miles)27 
Big-6 
Hub28 
Destinations 
2007 
Competitors 
2007 
Departures 
July 2007 
Passengers 
July 2007 
Anchorage, AK 359,180 $25,287 4,470 0 1 1 14 2,801
Atlanta, GA 5,626,400 $25,033 4,200 1 23 5 921 168,633
Boston, MA 7,476,689 $26,856 3,250 0 15 12 695 135,704
Charlotte, NC 2,277,074 $23,417 3,980 1 3 2 91 20,422
Chicago, IL 9,745,165 $24,581 3,940 1 20 19 1,328 268,499
Cincinnati, OH 2,176,749 $22,947 3,950 1 5 1 140 22,254
Cleveland, OH 2,896,968 $22,319 3,730 1 1 1 31 3,493
Dallas/Ft.Worth, TX 6,498,410 $23,616 4,740 1 4 3 216 40,567
Denver, CO 2,998,878 $26,011 4,660 1 3 2 92 22,519
Detroit, MI 5,405,918 $24,275 3,730 1 6 4 449 87,950
Fairbanks, AK 51,926 $19,814 4,210 0 1 1 4 812
Ft. Myers, FL 623,724 $24,542 4,440 0 2 1 21 4,205
Hartford, CT 1,306,151 $25,874 3,340 0 1 1 31 3,290
Houston, TX 5,729,027 $21,701 4,840 1 4 6 352 66,510
Las Vegas, NV 1,880,449 $21,210 5,210 0 4 5 79 17,645
Los Angeles, CA 17,755,322 $21,170 5,440 0 9 14 657 170,604
Memphis, TN 1,280,533 $20,327 4,350 1 1 1 31 6,729
Miami, FL 5,413,212 $20,454 4,410 1 9 10 401 92,884
Minneapolis/St. Paul, MN 3,538,781 $26,219 4,000 1 3 2 155 38,185
New York, NY 21,961,994 $26,604 3,440 1 51 38 4,599 834,257
Orlando, FL 2,693,552 $21,232 4,330 0 7 6 204 55,073
                                                 
 
25 As before, multi-airport systems within a Combined Statistical Area (CSA) are listed as one city.  For our analysis, Ft. Lauderdale is considered to be part of 
the Miami market, Sanford part of the Orlando market, Oakland part of the San Francisco market and Baltimore part of the Washington, DC market.  In addition, 
Newark Liberty International (EWR) and John F. Kennedy International (JFK) together comprise the New York City market. 
26 U.S. Census Bureau 
27 All cities must be measured from a common point.  Rather than selecting the geographic center of Europe, which may bias the impact of distance, we instead 
use London, which is both the most served European destination and one of the closest to the U.S. 
28 Refers to a primary hub for a Big-6 transatlantic carrier.  In this case, these are hubs for the six U.S. legacy carriers (see Table 11). 
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U.S. Metropolitan Area CSA Population 2007 
Per Capita 
Income 
Distance 
(miles) 
Big-6 
Hub 
Destinations 
2007 
Competitors 
2007 
Departures 
July 2007 
Passengers 
July 2007 
Philadelphia, PA 6,385,461 $23,699 3,530 1 19 4 736 128,538
Phoenix, AZ 4,179,427 $21,907 5,260 1 1 1 25 6,535
Pittsburgh, PA 2,446,703 $20,935 3,710 0 0 0 0 0
Portland, OR 2,159,720 $22,592 4,900 0 1 1 31 7,674
Raleigh/Durham, NC 1,635,974 $24,698 3,860 0 1 1 30 4,391
San Francisco, CA 7,264,887 $30,769 5,350 1 6 7 345 105,358
San Juan, PR29 2,509,007 $9,140 4,180 0 1 1 13 2,862
Seattle, WA 4,038,741 $25,744 4,780 0 4 4 134 29,334
St. Louis, MO 2,866,517 $22,698 4,190 0 0 0 0 0
Tampa, FL 2,697,731 $21,784 4,400 0 1 1 22 3,959
Washington, DC 8,241,912 $28,175 3,650 1 13 12 932 187,254
 
Table 23: European Cities with Transatlantic Service 2000-2007 and Related Data 
European City30 Urban Area Population31 
Distance32 
(miles) 
Open Skies 
with U.S.33 
Big-3 
Hub34 
Destinations 
2007 
Competitors 
2007 
Departures 
July 2007 
Passengers 
July 2007 
Amsterdam, Netherlands 6,579,720 3,630 1 1 17 8 1,035 216,422
Athens, Greece 3,829,018 4,920 0 0 3 4 161 32,343
Barcelona, Spain 4,959,864 3,820 0 0 3 3 123 20,084
Belfast, United Kingdom 645,536 3,160 0 0 2 2 36 6,029
Belgrade, Serbia and Montenegro 1,766,534 4,500 0 0 0 0 0 0
Berlin, Germany 4,040,690 3,960 1 0 1 2 60 8,112
                                                 
 
29 Puerto Rico is included since U.S. territories are covered by U.S. aviation bilateral agreements. 
30 Note here that multi-airport systems within an urban area are listed as one city.  For our analysis, London is composed of Heathrow (LHR), Gatwick (LGW), 
Stansted (STN) and Luton (LTN) airports.  Paris is composed of both Charles de Gaulle (CDG) and Orly (ORY) airports. 
31 2008 World Gazetteer data from Eurostat. 2007 data not available. 
32 All cities must be measured from a common point.  Rather than selecting the geographic center of the U.S., which may bias the impact of distance, we instead 
use New York, which is both the most served U.S. destination and one of the closest to Europe. 
33 Indicates whether city is located in country that had an Open Skies agreement with the U.S. in 2007. 
34 Indicates whether city serves as a major hub to a Big-3 European carrier: Air France-KLM, British Airways, or Lufthansa-Swiss (see Table 10). 
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European City Urban Area Population 
Distance 
(miles) 
Open Skies 
with U.S. 
Big-3 
Hub 
Destinations 
2007 
Competitors 
2007 
Departures 
July 2007 
Passengers 
July 2007 
Birmingham, United Kingdom 3,704,574 3,370 0 0 1 1 31 4,498
Bologna, Italy 385,813 4,130 1 0 1 1 9 2,199
Bristol, United Kingdom 551,066 3,350 0 0 1 1 31 3,883
Brussels, Belgium 2,175,008 3,360 1 0 6 6 244 36,907
Bucharest, Romania 2,192,372 4,740 1 0 1 1 16 2,651
Budapest, Hungary 2,578,731 4,360 0 0 1 2 52 9,007
Connaught, Ireland 503,083 3,060 0 0 2 1 21 2,956
Copenhagen, Denmark 2,387,192 3,840 1 0 5 3 203 42,379
Dublin, Ireland 1,058,265 3,170 0 0 6 5 339 69,780
Dusseldorf, Germany35 11,817,132 3,740 1 0 8 4 201 27,906
Edinburgh, United Kingdom 1,250,000 3,250 0 0 2 2 91 14,119
Frankfurt, Germany 3,133,739 3,850 1 1 20 10 1,392 318,166
Geneva, Switzerland 470,000 3,860 1 0 1 2 62 10,985
Glasgow, United Kingdom 1,633,187 3,210 0 0 4 4 131 20,626
Hamburg, Germany 3,266,896 3,800 1 0 1 1 31 4,177
Helsinki, Finland 1,262,805 4,100 1 0 1 1 31 7,029
Istanbul, Turkey 13,179,865 5,000 1 0 2 2 87 17,439
Kiev, Ukraine 2,989,638 4,680 0 0 1 2 45 8,817
Koeln/Bonn (Cologne), Germany35 11,817,132 3,760 1 0 1 1 31 4,516
Krakow, Poland 756,757 4,290 1 0 2 1 35 7,439
Lisbon, Portugal 2,634,878 3,360 1 0 2 3 133 22,092
Liverpool, United Kingdom36 5,019,446 3,310 0 0 1 1 12 1,071
London, United Kingdom 13,063,441 3,340 0 1 23 14 3,285 671,737
Lyon, France 1,798,395 3,830 1 0 0 0 0 0
Madrid, Spain 6,270,551 3,580 0 0 8 5 383 82,016
Malaga, Spain 561,250 3,650 0 0 0 0 0 0
Manchester, United Kingdom36 5,019,446 3,330 0 0 7 8 347 61,903
                                                 
 
35 Given overlapping catchment areas for Düsseldorf and Cologne, whose airports are 45 miles apart, we aggregate their service levels for the regression analysis. 
36 Given overlapping catchment areas for Liverpool and Manchester, with airports 30 miles apart, we aggregate their service levels for the regression analysis. 
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European City Urban Area Population 
Distance 
(miles) 
Open Skies 
with U.S. 
Big-3 
Hub 
Destinations 
2007 
Competitors 
2007 
Departures 
July 2007 
Passengers 
July 2007 
Milan, Italy 4,308,403 3,990 1 0 6 4 279 47,121
Moscow, Russia (European) 14,744,150 4,650 0 0 4 2 118 21,201
Munich, Germany 2,312,477 4,030 1 1 12 6 413 84,957
Naples, Italy 3,817,076 4,390 1 0 1 1 14 3,738
Nice, France 915,000 3,980 1 0 1 1 31 4,883
Oslo, Norway 568,809 3,670 1 0 1 1 31 4,894
Palermo, Italy 1,000,820 4,440 1 0 1 1 9 2,359
Paris, France 11,818,503 3,630 1 1 14 10 1,381 296,504
Pisa, Italy 90,482 4,120 1 0 1 1 18 2,430
Porto, Portugal 1,299,713 3,320 1 0 1 1 13 2,370
Prague, Czech Republic 1,406,142 4,070 1 0 2 2 53 7,836
Reykjavik, Iceland 201,000 2,580 1 0 5 1 163 26,197
Riga, Latvia 727,578 4,190 0 0 1 1 9 1,510
Rome, Italy 3,858,111 4,270 1 0 7 7 463 90,450
Rzeszow, Poland 740,000 4,490 1 0 1 1 8 1,741
Santiago De Compostela, Spain 92,919 3,280 0 0 0 0 0 0
Satu Mare, Romania 130,059 4,710 1 0 0 0 0 0
Shannon, Ireland 9,222 3,070 0 0 5 5 250 48,255
Stockholm, Sweden 1,964,805 3,910 1 0 3 4 137 27,352
Stuttgart, Germany 2,334,683 3,910 1 0 1 1 30 4,495
Terceira, Portugal 54,996 2,460 1 0 0 0 0 0
Timisoara, Romania 359,132 4,500 1 0 0 0 0 0
Venice, Italy 297,743 4,140 1 0 3 2 80 11,376
Vienna, Austria 2,113,619 4,230 1 0 4 2 109 23,187
Warsaw, Poland 2,251,474 4,250 1 0 2 1 118 25,453
Zurich, Switzerland 1,025,499 3,920 1 1 10 8 394 63,344
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Table 24: European Countries with Service To or Open Skies With U.S. 2000-2007 
European Country37 Population
38 
2007 
Income Per39 
Capita (USD) 
Nominal GDP40 
2007 ($millions) 
Big-3 
Hub41 
City Pairs 
2007 
Competitors 
2007 
Departures 
July 2007 
Passengers 
July 2007 
Albania 3,130,000 $3,290 $10,619 0 0 0 0 0
Austria 8,206,524 $42,700 $373,943 0 4 2 109 23,187
Belgium 10,445,852 $40,710 $453,636 0 6 6 244 36,907
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3,907,000 $3,790 $14,780 0 0 0 0 0
Bulgaria* 7,761,000 $4,590 $39,609 0 0 0 0 0
Croatia* 4,551,000 $10,460 $51,356 0 0 0 0 0
Cyprus* 818,200 $24,940 $21,303 0 0 0 0 0
Czech Republic 10,241,138 $14,450 $175,309 0 2 2 53 7,836
Denmark 5,415,978 $54,910 $311,905 0 5 3 203 42,379
Estonia* 1,332,893 $13,200 $21,278 0 0 0 0 0
Finland 5,261,008 $44,400 $245,013 0 1 1 31 7,029
France 64,473,140 $38,500 $2,560,255 1 15 10 1,412 301,387
Germany 82,210,000 $38,860 $3,322,147 1 44 12 2,157 452,035
Greece* 11,147,000 $29,630 $314,615 0 3 4 161 32,343
Hungary* 10,076,000 $11,570 $138,388 0 1 2 52 9,007
Iceland 304,334 $54,100 $20,003 0 5 1 163 26,197
Ireland* 4,234,925 $48,140 $258,574 0 13 6 610 120,991
Italy 59,337,888 $33,540 $2,104,666 0 20 7 872 159,673
Latvia* 2,290,237 $9,930 $27,341 0 1 1 9 1,510
Lithuania* 3,596,617 $9,920 $38,345 0 0 0 0 0
Luxembourg 468,571 $75,880 $50,160 0 0 0 0 0
Malta 402,668 $15,310 $7,419 0 0 0 0 0
Netherlands 16,402,414 $45,820 $768,704 1 17 8 1,035 216,422
                                                 
 
37 Thirty-seven European nations with either transatlantic service at any point between 2000 and 2007 or an Open Skies agreement with the U.S. 
38 2007 data from Eurostat available at www.ec.europa.eu/eurostat 
39 World Bank data statistics for 2007, Atlas methodology in US dollars 
40 International Monetary Fund data produced April 2008 
41 Indicates home country of a Big-3 European carrier: Air France-KLM, British Airways, or Lufthansa-Swiss (see Table 10). 
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European Country Population 2007 
Income Per 
Capita (USD) 
Nominal GDP 
2007 ($millions) 
Big-3 
Hub 
City Pairs 
2007 
Competitors 
2007 
Departures 
July 2007 
Passengers 
July 2007 
Norway 4,671,700 $76,450 $391,498 0 1 1 31 4,894
Poland 38,115,967 $9,840 $420,284 0 5 1 161 34,633
Portugal 10,605,870 $18,950 $223,303 0 3 3 146 24,462
Romania 22,329,977 $6,150 $165,983 0 1 1 16 2,651
Russia (European)* 141,950,000 $7,560 $1,289,582 0 4 2 118 21,201
Serbia and Montenegro* 7,780,000 $4,730 $44,653 0 0 0 0 0
Slovakia 5,431,363 $11,730 $74,988 0 0 0 0 0
Slovenia* 2,011,070 $20,960 $46,084 0 0 0 0 0
Spain* 45,200,737 $29,450 $1,438,959 0 11 5 506 102,100
Sweden 3,047,752 $46,060 $455,319 0 3 4 137 27,352
Switzerland 7,252,000 $59,880 $423,938 1 11 8 456 74,329
Turkey 70,586,256 $8,020 $663,419 0 2 2 87 17,439
Ukraine* 46,398,114 $2,550 $140,484 0 1 2 45 8,817
United Kingdom* 60,587,300 $42,740 $2,772,570 1 41 17 3,963 783,708
* Country did not have Open Skies agreement with the U.S. by July 2007.
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5.3 Specification of Model 
 
All regressions performed in this chapter are linear models that take the form of the following 
equation:42 
0 1 1 2 2 ... n ny x x xβ β β β= + + + +  
where y is the dependent or endogenous variable, and x1…xn represent the independent, explanatory or 
exogenous variables.  Coefficients β0… βn are approximated by the method of ordinary least squares 
(OLS) estimation and represent the strength of the relationship of each explanatory variable to y. 
 For each of the three data sets (U.S. city, European city, and European country), a series of 
regressions is performed for each of the four service level measures.  For each regression, we perform 
significance tests on the coefficient of each explanatory variable β0… βn to test whether each is 
significantly different from 0.  A coefficient that is not significantly different from 0 indicates that the 
explanatory variable has no statistically significant impact on the dependent variable.  To do this we 
formulate a null hypothesis that coefficient βn is equal to 0 and test it using the t-statistic. 
 
H0: βn = 0 
H1: βn ≠ 0 
The test statistic is then: 
n
n
nt
sβ β
β=  
where sβn is the standard error of the coefficient βn. 
 If tβn > tcr, where tcr is a critical value obtained from a t-stat table for a given number of degrees of 
freedom and a level of significance α (usually α = 0.05), we reject the null hypothesis with a confidence 
1- α.  For α = 0.05 and a large number of observations, tcr ≈ 1.96, so a t-stat greater than 1.96 (or less than 
-1.96) indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from zero with 95% confidence.  The t-stat 
percentiles for each of our regressions vary with our sample size and are therefore presented with the 
results in Section 5.4. 
 The sample data used throughout this research consists of T-100 International Segment data from 
1990 through 2007.  A single observation in the sample includes service level metrics aggregated across 
all destinations for a particular market (whether it be a U.S. or European city, or European country) in a 
particular year.  Therefore the total data sample contains both cross-sectional and time series data.  We 
                                                 
 
42 Nonlinear regressions were also performed but resulted in an inferior fit relative to the linear models presented. 
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have used the time series data in the analyses presented in Chapters 3 and 4.  However, the regressions 
presented here are performed only on 2007 cross-sectional data in order to investigate how service levels 
depend on different factors while capturing the largest set of countries with an Open Skies agreement in 
place. 
 
5.3.1 U.S. City Analysis 
 
 We begin first with our model of the 32 U.S. cities with transatlantic service at any point between 
2000 and 2007.  The following variables are used for our regression: 
 
Dependent Variables: 
DESTINATIONS represents the number of distinct European destinations served from each 
observed city in 2007. 
DEPARTURES represents the number of total departures to Europe from each observed city for 
the month of July 2007. 
COMPETITORS represents the number of unique carriers (both U.S. and foreign) that provided 
service to Europe in 2007. 
PASSENGERS represents the number of total nonstop passenger enplanements to Europe 
departing from each observed city in July 2007. 
 
Independent Variables: 
CSA GDP  represents the total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the Combined Statistical 
Area (CSA) calculated as product of GDP per capita and CSA population. 
 
DISTANCE represents the distance in nonstop miles between each observed city and 
London.27 
 
HUB is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the observed origin city is a hub of a Big-6 
American carrier and 0 otherwise. 
 
Separate regressions were run using population and income per capita separately and independently, but 
the resulting R2 and adjusted R2 values were substantially lower than when they were combined into the 
CSA GDP variable. 
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Multicollinearity 
Before performing our regressions we first test for multicollinearity between the independent 
variables.  Multicollinearity occurs when two or more independent variables are highly correlated, a 
condition which may lead to inaccurate estimates of coefficients.  Additionally, a high degree of 
collinearity will increase the standard errors of the coefficients, which moves the t-ratios closer to 0 (or 
insignificance).  Significant variables may appear to be insignificant in a model with high 
multicollinearity.  One way to test for multicollinearity is to construct a correlation matrix, as seen in 
Table 25. 
 
Table 25: Correlation Matrix for U.S. City Data 
  DISTANCE HUB CSA GDP 
DISTANCE 1.000   
HUB -0.080 1.000  
CSA GDP -0.074 0.319 1.000 
 
 The closer a correlation is to 1 or -1, the more correlated two variables are.  Here we observe that 
the HUB variable is correlated with the CSA GDP variable.  The larger the economic presence (a function 
of size and average wealth) of a particular city, the more likely that it serves as a hub to one of the six 
U.S. legacy carriers.  We expect that carriers choose to situate their hubs in large population and 
economic centers of the U.S.  Similarly, the abundant availability of air transportation may entice people 
and companies to locate near a particular city, further growing CSA GDP. 
 Despite the indication of correlation between HUB and CSA GDP, both variables are important 
for comparisons against the European city analysis.  The goal of our regression analyses is not only to 
determine which factors describe service levels, but to identify which factors explain differences in 
service levels between the U.S. and Europe.  We therefore include both the HUB and CSA GDP variables 
in the model. 
 
The final regression models for the U.S. city analysis are as follows: 
 
0 CSA GDP CSA GDP DISTANCE DISTANCE HUB HUB
DESTINATIONS
DEPARTURES
x x x
COMPETITORS
PASSENGERS
β β β β
⎫⎪⎪ = + + +⎬⎪⎪⎭
 
 
Results are presented in Section 5.4. 
 113 
5.3.2 European City Analysis 
 
 Next we model service levels for the 59 European cities with transatlantic service at any time 
between 2000 and 2007.  Given overlapping catchment areas for Düsseldorf and Cologne/Bonn, whose 
airports are 45 miles apart, we aggregate their service levels for the regression analysis.  We do the same 
for Manchester and Liverpool, whose airports are 30 miles apart.  We therefore have 57, rather than 59, 
observations for our European city analysis.  Indeed, the model’s fit improves relative to the case where 
the service levels are left separated for these four markets.  The following variables are used for our 
regression: 
 
Dependent Variables: 
 
DESTINATIONS represents the number of distinct U.S. destinations served from each observed 
city in 2007. 
DEPARTURES represents the number of total departures to the U.S. from each observed city for 
the month of July 2007. 
COMPETITORS represents the number of unique carriers (both U.S. and foreign) that provided 
service to the U.S. in 2007. 
PASSENGERS represents the number of total nonstop passenger enplanements to the U.S. 
departing from each observed city in July 2007. 
 
Independent Variables: 
 
POPULATION  represents the total urban area and metropolitan population of each observed city. 
 
DISTANCE represents the distance in nonstop miles between each observed city and New 
York City.32 
 
OPEN SKIES is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the observed origin city is located in a 
country that signed an Open Skies agreement with the U.S. by July 2007, 0 
otherwise. 
 
HUB is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the observed origin city is a hub of a Big-3 
transatlantic carrier and 0 otherwise. 
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Multicollinearity 
To test for multicollinearity, we once again construct a correlation matrix, Table 26. 
 
Table 26: Correlation Matrix for European City Data 
  POPULATION DISTANCE OPEN SKIES HUB 
POPULATION 1.000    
DISTANCE 0.176 1.000   
OPEN SKIES -0.085 0.226 1.000  
HUB 0.337 -0.083 0.132 1.000 
  
Here again we observe that the HUB variable is correlated with the POPULATION variable.  In 
other words, the larger a particular city the more likely that it serves as a hub to one of the Big-3 
European carriers.  We expect that carriers choose to situate their hubs in large population centers of 
Europe.  Similarly, a sizeable local O-D market is a precondition for the development and sustenance of a 
major international carrier, particularly in Europe where the market is highly fragmented. 
 Although the data suggests that HUB and POPULATION are correlated, both variables are 
important for comparisons against the U.S. city analysis.  Once again, we not only wish to identify which 
factors describe service levels, but also to compare the explanatory factors between the U.S. and Europe.  
We therefore include both the HUB and POPULATION variables in the model. 
 We also observe small correlation between DISTANCE and OPEN SKIES.  This is likely a result 
of what Jorge-Calderón (1997) describes as lower social and commercial interactions between nations 
separated by greater distances.  However, there are notable exceptions to this relationship – UK, Ireland 
and Spain without Open Skies, Turkey, Romania and Albania with – so it would not be sufficient to 
include only one of the two variables in the model.  In addition, we seek to compare the impact of 
DISTANCE directly to the U.S. city model and to determine the specific impact that OPEN SKIES has on 
service levels.  We therefore include both variables in the model. 
 
The final regression models for the European city analysis are as follows: 
 
0 POPULATION POPULATION DISTANCE DISTANCE OPEN SKIES OPEN SKIES HUB HUB
DESTINATIONS
DEPARTURES
x x x x
COMPETITORS
PASSENGERS
β β β β β
⎫⎪⎪ = + + + +⎬⎪⎪⎭
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5.3.3 European Country Analysis 
 
 Next we model service levels for the 37 European countries with either transatlantic service at 
any point between 2000 and 2007 or an Open Skies agreement with the U.S. by July 2007.  The following 
variables are used for our regression: 
 
Dependent Variables: 
 
CITY PAIRS represents the number of city pairs to the U.S. in July 2007 served from all cities 
in the observed country. 
DEPARTURES represents the number of total departures to the U.S. from each observed country 
for the month of July 2007. 
COMPETITORS represents the number of unique carriers (both U.S. and foreign) that provided 
service to the U.S. from the observed country in 2007. 
PASSENGERS represents the number of total nonstop passenger enplanements to the U.S. 
departing from the observed country in July 2007. 
 
Independent Variables: 
 
POPULATION  represents the total population of the observed country. 
 
GDP  represents the nominal 2007 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the observed 
country. 
 
DISTANCE represents the distance in nonstop miles between each observed capital city or 
primary aviation gateway and New York City.32 
 
OPEN SKIES is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the observed country had an Open Skies 
agreement with the U.S. by July 2007, and 0 otherwise. 
 
HUB is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the observed origin country serves as the 
home to a Big-3 transatlantic carrier and 0 otherwise. 
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Multicollinearity 
Table 27: Correlation Matrix for European Country Data 
  POPULATION DISTANCE OPEN SKIES HUB GDP 
POPULATION 1.000     
DISTANCE 0.078 1.000    
OPEN SKIES -0.059 -0.269 1.000   
HUB 0.326 -0.314 0.165 1.000  
GDP 0.724 -0.274 0.094 0.684 1.000 
 
 From the correlation matrix we observe that the POPULATION variable is highly correlated to 
the GDP variable.  This is expected, since Gross Domestic Product is a function of the population and 
GDP per capita (or average personal wealth) of a country.  In the U.S. city analysis, a series of regressions 
demonstrated that including both variables did not provide additional explanatory power.  Similar tests 
demonstrate the same for the European country analysis, so we leave POPULATION, which is one of two 
inputs to GDP, out of the regression models. 
We also once again observe that the HUB variable is highly correlated with the GDP variable.  As 
already mentioned, the Big-3 European carriers’ hubs tend to be located in Europe’s large economic 
centers to leverage their large O-D populations.  Despite this correlation, both variables are important for 
comparisons against the U.S. and European city analyses, and so we include both in the model. 
Although we observe a correlation between HUB and DISTANCE, this is due to the fact that the 
Big-3 European carriers are situated in Western Europe.  However, we cannot make the assumption that 
all Western European nations benefit from the hub effect or that Eastern European nations cannot benefit 
from HUB status, and so we include both variables in the model.  There is also a negative correlation 
between DISTANCE and GDP, mainly because the larger, wealthier set of countries is in Western and 
Northern Europe.  Countries of Eastern and Southern Europe are both further from the U.S. and tend to be 
smaller and less wealthy, as reflected in their GDP’s.  However, there are exceptions to this phenomenon 
and we are interested in their direct impacts, so we include both variables in the model. 
 As in the European City analysis, we observe a small correlation between DISTANCE and OPEN 
SKIES.  However, because of notable outliers and the importance of the OPEN SKIES variable in our 
analysis, we include both variables in the model. 
 
The final regression models for the European country analysis are as follows: 
0 GDP GDP DISTANCE DISTANCE OPEN SKIES OPEN SKIES HUB HUB
CITY PAIRS
DEPARTURES
x x x x
COMPETITORS
PASSENGERS
β β β β β
⎫⎪⎪ = + + + +⎬⎪⎪⎭
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5.4 Results and Conclusions 
 
In our regression analysis we seek to identify what factors explain transatlantic service levels in 
U.S. and European markets.  The explanatory power of a particular variable is best understood by 
comparing the model’s “fit” with and without the variable.  An increase in the adjusted R2 value indicates 
that the variable added more explanatory power to the model than it detracted by making the model less 
simple.  We must also ensure that a coefficient is statistically different from zero with 95% confidence. 
 
5.4.1 U.S. City Analysis 
 
We recall that the regression models for the U.S. city analysis are as follows: 
 
0 CSA GDP CSA GDP DISTANCE DISTANCE HUB HUB
DESTINATIONS
DEPARTURES
x x x
COMPETITORS
PASSENGERS
β β β β
⎫⎪⎪ = + + +⎬⎪⎪⎭
 
 
We first perform a regression without the HUB dummy variable in order to determine the specific 
impact of adding it to the model.  We believe that the explanatory power of the CSA GDP and DISTANCE 
variables will be high based on plots of the observed data as a function of the two variables (separately), 
seen in Figure 39 Figure 39.   
The regression results before and after the addition of the HUB variable are summarized in Table 
28.  For our U.S. city analysis, we have 32 data points and 2-3 independent variables, and so we have 29 
and 30 degrees of freedom, respectively.  Our critical t-statistic for this regression is 2.04 at the 95% 
confidence interval.   
For the first regression set (without HUB), CSA GDP and DISTANCE explain over 75% of the 
variation in the four service level measures.  Both CSA GDP and DISTANCE are significantly different 
from 0 with 95% confidence with the exception of DISTANCE in explaining COMPETITORS, which is 
significantly different from 0 with 85% confidence.   
The addition of the HUB dummy variable reduces the overall fit of the model, in part due to the 
multicollinearity in the model described in Section 5.3.1.  Given that the HUB variable is not statistically 
different from zero even at 40% confidence, we conclude that a majority of the explanatory power is a 
result of the most significant variable, CSA GDP.  It is interesting to note the negative HUB coefficient 
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Destinations as a Function of CSA GDP and Distance (not plotted)
U.S. cities, 2007
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Destinations as a Function of Distance to Europe
U.S. cities, 2007
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Figure 36: U.S. City Destinations versus CSA GDP and Distance 
 
Departures as a Function of CSA GDP and Distance (not plotted)
U.S. cities, 2007
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Departures as a Function of Distance to Europe
U.S. cities, 2007
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Figure 37: U.S. City Departures versus CSA GDP and Distance 
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# of Carriers as a Function of CSA GDP and Distance (not plotted)
U.S. cities, 2007
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# of Carriers as a Function of Distance to Europe
U.S. cities, 2007
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Figure 38: Number of Transatlantic Carriers at U.S. Cities versus CSA GDP and Distance 
 
# of Passengers as a Function of CSA GDP and Distance (not plotted)
U.S. cities, 2007
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# of Passengers as a Function of Distance to Europe
U.S. cities, 2007
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Figure 39: Number of Transatlantic Passengers at U.S. Cities versus CSA GDP and Distance 
for the COMPETITORS regression, which indicates that hub cities draw fewer transatlantic competitors 
than their non-hub counterparts. 
In summary, transatlantic service levels of U.S. cities are mostly explained by their respective 
population size and economic presence.  Secondly, service levels are inversely proportional to a city’s 
proximity to Europe.  And perhaps most interestingly, a city’s status as a hub does little to explain 
transatlantic service levels to Europe. 
 
Table 28: U.S. City Regression Results 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat Coefficients Standard Error t Stat
Intercept 19.2501 6.5089 2.9575 Intercept 18.4392 6.6446 2.7751
CSA GDP 0.0698 0.0074 9.4557 Distance -0.0047 0.0015 -3.1441
Distance -0.0048 0.0015 -3.2183 Hub Dummy 1.3915 1.8403 0.7561
Adjusted R2 0.7684 CSA GDP 0.0679 0.0078 8.6694
Adjusted R2 0.7649
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat Coefficients Standard Error t Stat
Intercept 1188.4941 477.1924 2.4906 Intercept 1173.1870 491.7648 2.3857
CSA GDP 6.0470 0.5410 11.1766 Distance -0.3465 0.1109 -3.1236
Distance -0.3477 0.1089 -3.1940 Hub Dummy 26.2656 136.1997 0.1928
Adjusted R2 0.8178 CSA GDP 6.0118 0.5798 10.3691
Adjusted R2 0.8116
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat Coefficients Standard Error t Stat
Intercept 4.8525 3.9255 1.2361 Intercept 5.3683 4.0028 1.3411
CSA GDP 0.0578 0.0045 12.9848 Distance -0.0015 0.0009 -1.6744
Distance -0.0015 0.0009 -1.6403 Hub Dummy -0.8850 1.1086 -0.7983
Adjusted R2 0.8483 CSA GDP 0.0590 0.0047 12.4977
Adjusted R2 0.8464
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat Coefficients Standard Error t Stat
Intercept 175053.5120 78762.8499 2.2225 Intercept 173056.8953 81188.3287 2.1315
CSA GDP 1151.9397 89.3009 12.8995 Distance -53.2723 18.3128 -2.9090
Distance -53.4373 17.9702 -2.9737 Hub Dummy 3426.0326 22486.0120 0.1524
Adjusted R2 0.8530 CSA GDP 1147.3449 95.7187 11.9866
Adjusted R2 0.8479
U.S. Cities: 2007 Number of Transatlantic Carriers U.S. Cities: 2007 Number of Transatlantic Carriers
U.S. Cities: 2007 Transatlantic Passengers U.S. Cities: 2007 Transatlantic Passengers
U.S. Cities: 2007 European Destinations U.S. Cities: 2007 European Destinations
U.S. Cities: 2007 Transatlantic Departures U.S. Cities: 2007 Transatlantic Departures
 
 
5.4.2 European City Analysis 
 
We recall that the regression models for the European city analysis are as follows: 
0 POPULATION POPULATION DISTANCE DISTANCE OPEN SKIES OPEN SKIES HUB HUB
DESTINATIONS
DEPARTURES
x x x x
COMPETITORS
PASSENGERS
β β β β β
⎫⎪⎪ = + + + +⎬⎪⎪⎭
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We first perform a regression without the HUB and OPEN SKIES dummy variables in order to 
determine the specific impact of adding them to the model.  In contrast with the U.S. city analysis, we 
believe that the explanatory power of the POPULATION and DISTANCE variables will be low based on 
plots of the observed data as a function of the two variables (separately), seen in Figure 40.  The data does 
not appear to conform to a trend in either population or distance. 
 
Destinations as a Function of Population and Distance (not plotted)
European Cities, 2007
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Destinations as a Function of Distance to U.S.
European Cities, 2007
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Figure 40: European City Destinations versus Population and Distance 
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The regression results before and after the addition of the OPEN SKIES dummy variable are 
summarized in Table 29.  For our European city analysis, we have 57 data points and 2-4 independent 
variables, and so we have 55, 54 and 53 degrees of freedom, respectively.  Our critical t-statistic for this 
regression is 2.01 at the 95% confidence interval. 
For the first regression set (without OPEN SKIES and HUB), POPULATION and DISTANCE 
explain less than 25% of the variation in the four service level measures.  Although both POPULATION 
and DISTANCE are significant with 95% confidence, more than 75% of the variation of service levels is 
explained by variables that are not yet included in the model.  In other words, transatlantic service levels 
of European cities are explained less by their respective size and proximity to the U.S. than for their 
American counterparts.  We next test how much of this variation is explained by the existence of an Open 
Skies agreement with the U.S. 
 
Table 29: European City Regression Results 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat Coefficients Standard Error t Stat
Intercept 11.6297 3.8063 3.0554 Intercept 11.8161 3.7886 3.1189
POPULATION 0.0000 0.0000 5.0311 POPULATION 0.0000 0.0000 5.1797
DISTANCE -0.0026 0.0010 -2.6402 DISTANCE -0.0029 0.0010 -2.8829
Adjusted R2 0.3211 OPEN SKIES 1.4674 1.1640 1.2606
Adjusted R2 0.3284
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat Coefficients Standard Error t Stat
Intercept 961.5524 384.9908 2.4976 Intercept 967.3634 388.3644 2.4909
POPULATION 0.0001 0.0000 5.2408 POPULATION 0.0001 0.0000 5.2048
DISTANCE -0.2529 0.0999 -2.5303 DISTANCE -0.2627 0.1039 -2.5275
Adjusted R2 0.3344 OPEN SKIES 45.7350 119.3203 0.3833
Adjusted R2 0.3237
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat Coefficients Standard Error t Stat
Intercept 7.5682 2.3196 3.2626 Intercept 7.6081 2.3390 3.2527
POPULATION 0.0000 0.0000 5.0410 POPULATION 0.0000 0.0000 5.0174
DISTANCE -0.0016 0.0006 -2.6132 DISTANCE -0.0016 0.0006 -2.6216
Adjusted R2 0.3210 OPEN SKIES 0.3144 0.7186 0.4375
Adjusted R2 0.3107
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat Coefficients Standard Error t Stat
Intercept 190128.5543 81557.8741 2.3312 Intercept 191396.5135 82265.5967 2.3266
POPULATION 0.0171 0.0034 5.0733 POPULATION 0.0172 0.0034 5.0420
DISTANCE -50.4049 21.1720 -2.3807 DISTANCE -52.5394 22.0136 -2.3867
Adjusted R2 0.3172 OPEN SKIES 9979.3035 25275.1272 0.3948
Adjusted R2 0.3064
European Cities: 2007 U.S. Destinations European Cities: 2007 U.S. Destinations
European Cities: 2007 Transatlantic Departures European Cities: 2007 Transatlantic Departures
European Cities: 2007 Number of Transatlantic Carriers European Cities: 2007 Number of Transatlantic Carriers
European Cities: 2007 Transatlantic Passengers European Cities: 2007 Transatlantic Passengers
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The addition of the OPEN SKIES dummy variable reduces the overall fit of the model and results 
in statistically insignificant coefficients.  In other words, whether a city is located in an Open Skies 
country is statistically insignificant in explaining transatlantic service levels from that city.  This is 
counter to proponents’ arguments that Open Skies leads to increased service for a given country.  We will 
further test this hypothesis in our European country analysis to follow. 
 
Table 30: European City Regression Results for Modified Model 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat Coefficients Standard Error t Stat
Intercept 11.8161 3.7886 3.1189 Intercept 7.7448 2.0879 3.7093
POPULATION 0.0000 0.0000 5.1797 POPULATION 0.0000 0.0000 4.4306
DISTANCE -0.0029 0.0010 -2.8829 DISTANCE -0.0016 0.0006 -2.8813
OPEN SKIES 1.4674 1.1640 1.2606 OPEN SKIES -0.1332 0.6475 -0.2057
Adjusted R2 0.3284 HUB 11.8194 1.0453 11.3070
Adjusted R2 0.8021
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat Coefficients Standard Error t Stat
Intercept 967.3634 388.3644 2.4909 Intercept 612.0220 277.1159 2.2085
POPULATION 0.0001 0.0000 5.2048 POPULATION 0.0000 0.0000 3.9565
DISTANCE -0.2627 0.1039 -2.5275 DISTANCE -0.1490 0.0746 -1.9964
OPEN SKIES 45.7350 119.3203 0.3833 OPEN SKIES -93.9580 85.9435 -1.0933
Adjusted R2 0.3237 HUB 1031.5738 138.7368 7.4355
Adjusted R2 0.6659
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat Coefficients Standard Error t Stat
Intercept 7.6081 2.3390 3.2527 Intercept 5.5036 1.6980 3.2413
POPULATION 0.0000 0.0000 5.0174 POPULATION 0.0000 0.0000 3.6942
DISTANCE -0.0016 0.0006 -2.6216 DISTANCE -0.0010 0.0005 -2.1160
OPEN SKIES 0.3144 0.7186 0.4375 OPEN SKIES -0.5129 0.5266 -0.9740
Adjusted R2 0.3107 HUB 6.1097 0.8501 7.1872
Adjusted R2 0.6476
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat Coefficients Standard Error t Stat
Intercept 191396.5135 82265.5967 2.3266 Intercept 115424.8178 58113.2359 1.9862
POPULATION 0.0172 0.0034 5.0420 POPULATION 0.0097 0.0026 3.7536
DISTANCE -52.5394 22.0136 -2.3867 DISTANCE -28.2340 15.6496 -1.8041
OPEN SKIES 9979.3035 25275.1272 0.3948 OPEN SKIES -19886.9624 18022.9930 -1.1034
Adjusted R2 0.3064 HUB 220549.6312 29094.1327 7.5806
Adjusted R2 0.6642
European Cities: 2007 U.S. Destinations
European Cities: 2007 Transatlantic Departures
European Cities: 2007 Number of Transatlantic Carriers
European Cities: 2007 Transatlantic Passengers
European Cities: 2007 U.S. Destinations
European Cities: 2007 Transatlantic Departures
European Cities: 2007 Number of Transatlantic Carriers
European Cities: 2007 Transatlantic Passengers
 
 
Interestingly, the addition of the HUB dummy variable significantly increases the overall fit of 
the model.  HUB becomes the most significant variable of the regression and provides the majority of the 
explanatory power of our final European city model.  According to the model, cities which serve as hubs 
for Big-3 European carriers have, on average, 12 additional U.S. destinations served by six additional 
competitors, over 1,000 additional monthly transatlantic departures and 220,000 additional monthly 
enplanements.  Also interesting is that, unlike in the U.S. model, European hubs tend to draw a larger 
number of transatlantic competitors. 
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Contrary to U.S. cities, transatlantic service to European cities are explained less by size and 
distance than by their status as a Big-3 carrier hub.  Perhaps most surprising is that the existence of an 
Open Skies agreement is statistically insignificant in determining service levels to European cities. 
 
5.4.3 European Country Analysis 
 
We recall that the regression models for the European country analysis are as follows: 
0 GDP GDP DISTANCE DISTANCE OPEN SKIES OPEN SKIES HUB HUB
CITY PAIRS
DEPARTURES
x x x x
COMPETITORS
PASSENGERS
β β β β β
⎫⎪⎪ = + + + +⎬⎪⎪⎭
 
City Pairs as a Function of Distance to the U.S.
European Countries, 2007
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Figure 41: European Country City Pairs versus GDP and Distance 
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Table 31: European Country Regression Results 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat Coefficients Standard Error t Stat
Intercept 14.0121 5.6507 2.4797 Intercept 15.7846 6.1484 2.5673
DISTANCE -0.0033 0.0013 -2.4992 DISTANCE -0.0036 0.0014 -2.5946
GDP 0.0103 0.0009 11.4603 GDP 0.0104 0.0009 11.4024
Adjusted R2 0.8198 OPEN SKIES -1.1597 1.5299 -0.7580
Adjusted R2 0.8175
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat Coefficients Standard Error t Stat
Intercept 904.3292 524.4183 1.7244 Intercept 1261.8781 551.8000 2.2868
DISTANCE -0.2292 0.1227 -1.8678 DISTANCE -0.2826 0.1235 -2.2889
GDP 0.7186 0.0838 8.5747 GDP 0.7217 0.0816 8.8470
Adjusted R2 0.7160 OPEN SKIES -233.9260 137.3034 -1.7037
Adjusted R2 0.7310
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat Coefficients Standard Error t Stat
Intercept 8.0192 2.4922 3.2178 Intercept 8.7254 2.7160 3.2126
DISTANCE -0.0017 0.0006 -2.9001 DISTANCE -0.0018 0.0006 -2.9566
GDP 0.0036 0.0004 9.1341 GDP 0.0036 0.0004 9.0752
Adjusted R2 0.7584 OPEN SKIES -0.4620 0.6758 -0.6836
Adjusted R2 0.7545
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat Coefficients Standard Error t Stat
Intercept 169614.0371 103751.1188 1.6348 Intercept 239584.8664 109271.7907 2.1926
DISTANCE -43.6106 24.2825 -1.7960 DISTANCE -54.0590 24.4533 -2.2107
GDP 146.6333 16.5805 8.8437 GDP 147.2368 16.1544 9.1143
Adjusted R2 0.7262 OPEN SKIES -45778.3474 27189.9032 -1.6837
Adjusted R2 0.7402
European Countries: 2007 # of Transatlantic Carriers European Countries: 2007 # of Transatlantic Carriers
European Countries: 2007 Transatlantic Passengers European Countries: 2007 Transatlantic Passengers
European Countries: 2007 City Pairs European Countries: 2007 City Pairs
European Countries: 2007 Transatlantic Departures European Countries: 2007 Transatlantic Departures
 
 
We first perform a regression without the HUB and OPEN SKIES dummy variables in order to 
determine the specific impact of adding them to the model.  Similarly to the U.S. city analysis but in 
contrast with the European city analysis, we believe that the explanatory power of the GDP and 
DISTANCE variables will be high based on initial plots of the observed data as a function of the two 
variables, seen in Figure 41.  The data appears to conform reasonably to a linear trendline with the 
exception of a few outliers. 
The regression results before and after the addition of the OPEN SKIES dummy variable are 
summarized in Table 31.  For our European country analysis, we have 37 data points and 2-4 independent 
variables, and so we have 35, 34 and 33 degrees of freedom, respectively.  Our t-stat for this regression is 
2.03 at the 95% confidence interval and 1.69 at the 90% confidence interval. 
For the first regression set (without OPEN SKIES and HUB), GDP and DISTANCE explain 
approximately 75% of the variation in the four service level measures.  Both GDP and DISTANCE are 
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significant with 90% confidence.  GDP is the more significant variable and DISTANCE has a negative 
effect on service levels, as expected.  As discussed in Section 5.3.3, there is some correlation between 
GDP and DISTANCE given the demographics of Western and Northern Europe relative to Eastern and 
Southern Europe.  This likely explains some of the weaker significance and higher standard error of the 
DISTANCE variable.  Since the model is already a good fit of the observed data, we want next to 
determine how much additional explanatory power is provided by the Open Skies dummy variable. 
The addition of the OPEN SKIES dummy variable reduces the overall fit of the model and results 
in negative coefficients that are not statistically significant.  In other words, countries with a U.S. Open 
Skies agreement statistically have lower transatlantic service levels than their non-Open Skies 
counterparts.  This is counter to proponents’ arguments that Open Skies leads to increased service to a 
particular country and is consistent with both our European city analysis and our policy impact analysis 
presented in Chapter 4. 
 
Table 32: European Country Regression Results for Modified Model 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat Coefficients Standard Error t Stat
Intercept 15.7846 6.1484 2.5673 Intercept 13.7935 5.5883 2.4683
DISTANCE -0.0036 0.0014 -2.5946 DISTANCE -0.0030 0.0013 -2.4007
GDP 0.0104 0.0009 11.4024 GDP 0.0083 0.0011 7.6259
OPEN SKIES -1.1597 1.5299 -0.7580 OPEN SKIES -1.5571 1.3868 -1.1228
Adjusted R2 0.8175 HUB 7.8156 2.6730 2.9239
Adjusted R2 0.8515
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat Coefficients Standard Error t Stat
Intercept 1261.8781 551.8000 2.2868 Intercept 1061.4914 483.9671 2.1933
DISTANCE -0.2826 0.1235 -2.2889 DISTANCE -0.2267 0.1087 -2.0850
GDP 0.7217 0.0816 8.8470 GDP 0.5122 0.0941 5.4451
OPEN SKIES -233.9260 137.3034 -1.7037 OPEN SKIES -273.9251 120.1055 -2.2807
Adjusted R2 0.7310 HUB 786.5863 231.4947 3.3979
Adjusted R2 0.7962
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat Coefficients Standard Error t Stat
Intercept 8.7254 2.7160 3.2126 Intercept 7.5297 2.1710 3.4683
DISTANCE -0.0018 0.0006 -2.9566 DISTANCE -0.0015 0.0005 -2.9999
GDP 0.0036 0.0004 9.0752 GDP 0.0024 0.0004 5.6730
OPEN SKIES -0.4620 0.6758 -0.6836 OPEN SKIES -0.7007 0.5388 -1.3005
Adjusted R2 0.7545 HUB 4.6934 1.0384 4.5197
Adjusted R2 0.8455
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat Coefficients Standard Error t Stat
Intercept 239584.8664 109271.7907 2.1926 Intercept 198428.2166 94521.2249 2.0993
DISTANCE -54.0590 24.4533 -2.2107 DISTANCE -42.5773 21.2392 -2.0047
GDP 147.2368 16.1544 9.1143 GDP 104.1968 18.3698 5.6722
OPEN SKIES -45778.3474 27189.9032 -1.6837 OPEN SKIES -53993.6003 23457.2154 -2.3018
Adjusted R2 0.7402 HUB 161553.8800 45212.0765 3.5732
Adjusted R2 0.8085
European Countries: 2007 # of Transatlantic Carriers European Countries: 2007 # of Transatlantic Carriers
European Countries: 2007 Transatlantic Passengers European Countries: 2007 Transatlantic Passengers
European Countries: 2007 City Pairs European Countries: 2007 City Pairs
European Countries: 2007 Transatlantic Departures European Countries: 2007 Transatlantic Departures
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Although our original 2-variable model has strong explanatory power, the addition of the HUB 
dummy variable still increases the overall fit of the model.  In this multivariate model, GDP remains the 
most significant variable, but HUB is highly significant as in the European city model.  Again in this 
European model, unlike in the U.S. model, European hubs tend to draw a larger number of transatlantic 
competitors.  Unlike U.S. cities, European cities receive transatlantic service less as a function of distance 
and Open Skies status and more as a function of GDP and status as a Big-3 carrier hub.  Most surprising 
once again is that the existence of an Open Skies agreement is statistically insignificant and bears a 
negative correlation to transatlantic service levels to European countries. 
 
5.5 Summary 
 
In this chapter we performed a series of regression analyses on the transatlantic service levels of 
32 U.S. cities, 59 European cities and 37 European countries.  The goal was to determine which factors 
play the biggest role in determining transatlantic service levels to a given market and to investigate the 
specific impact of Open Skies.  Our econometric models demonstrated the following: 
 
• Of all the factors investigated, the total economic activity of a city or country (as measured by GDP) 
is the dominant factor in determining service levels to U.S. cities and European countries. 
• Because of the tendency of hubs to exist in or near major economic centers, status as a Big-3 
European carrier hub is the dominant factor in determining service levels to European cities. 
• Unlike in Europe, whether a U.S. city serves as a hub has insignificant explanatory power. 
• In both U.S. and European markets, distance across the Atlantic Ocean is negatively correlated to 
service levels 
• The existence of an Open Skies agreement does not have a significant relationship to transatlantic 
service levels and, in fact, is negatively correlated to service levels across European countries. 
 
We remind the reader that service level measures used in our regressions reflect nonstop segment 
data as opposed to O-D traffic data.  The absolute number of passengers flown between the U.S. and a 
particular European city or country can be higher or lower than those enplaned on nonstop flights to that 
city or country.  This limitation in our data will tend to inflate demand (and service levels) to or from 
cities with substantial connecting traffic.  However, as with our Chapter 4 analysis, we believe that traffic 
is a difficult measure to determine causation from Open Skies because we expect a natural growth in 
traffic year over year, regardless of other service level changes. 
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This econometric analysis supplements the stakeholder, competitive, market and policy impact 
analyses conducted as part of this thesis.  The results are consistent with these analyses in confirming that 
liberalization has yielded both increases and decreases in service since 1990.  There is no statistically 
significant correlation between the existence of an Open Skies agreement and transatlantic service levels 
to that country.  The regression also confirms European carriers’ reliance on the network effects of their 
hubs, increasingly being adopted by U.S. carriers.  In the next chapter we summarize the findings across 
all of our analyses and formalize our conclusions about the impacts of regulatory liberalization. 
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Chapter 6 
 
6  
Summary of Results and Conclusions 
 
 
 In this age of globalization, the once heavily regulated international aviation market is 
increasingly being liberalized.  This movement from the status quo has proven contentious among air 
transportation stakeholders.  Our research contributes to the debate over regulatory liberalization with an 
analysis of its effects in the transatlantic market.43  In this thesis we have evaluated how competition in 
transatlantic aviation markets has evolved over the last decade and how regulatory liberalization has 
impacted service levels and competition in specific U.S. and European markets.  In addition, we have 
explored the extent to which various market characteristics impact transatlantic service levels.  This 
research was conducted in four parts: (1) a stakeholder analysis, (2) a competition and market analysis of 
transatlantic aviation, (3) a review of the policy impacts since 1990, and (4) an econometric market 
analysis.  The results of each part are summarized below, followed by our research conclusions and 
suggested future work. 
 
6.1 Summary of Results 
 
Historically, air service agreements between nations have been negotiated by governments.  A 
nation’s air transportation rights have often been granted or restricted as a foreign policy tool and an 
economic vehicle seeking to protect national interests.  International routes, city pairs, frequencies, fares 
and operating carriers have been determined by the governments negotiating a particular bilateral 
agreement.  Significant research has been conducted of deregulation’s impact on airfares and service.  
Studies have consistently found that since U.S. domestic deregulation in 1978, fares have declined 
overall, most communities have more commercial air service than they did under regulation, and the rate 
of accidents has continued its historic decline (GAO, 1996).  As U.S. airlines focus increasingly on 
expanding their international networks in response to the globalized marketplace, many have sought the 
same operational freedoms internationally that they now enjoy domestically. 
                                                 
 
43 Again, in our research we use the term “transatlantic” to refer to the air transportation market between the United 
States and Europe.  The latter includes both European Union member states and those not covered by EU aviation 
agreements. 
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Stakeholder Analysis 
In our stakeholder analysis presented in Chapter 2, we outlined the core arguments in the debate 
over regulatory liberalization.  Concerns over impacts on employment, safety and national security are 
most often cited by aviation stakeholders opposed to further international liberalization.  Proponents, on 
the other hand, maintain that domestic and international competition will increase through the 
deregulation of aviation markets, and that increased competition benefits consumers.  They often cite 
examples of liberalization policies that have resulted in service level increases, such as U.S. Open Skies 
agreements with the Netherlands and Germany.  Although few dispute that increases in competition and 
service levels have benefited consumers, our research indicates that the signing of Open Skies agreements 
have led to both gains and reductions in service levels across the Atlantic. 
Perhaps more fundamentally, liberalization takes many forms (e.g., operational, ownership, 
control, safety), and it is not clear that the demonstrated benefits of one form of deregulation can be used 
to predict the effects of other forms.  In our stakeholder analysis we have identified a number of 
arguments made for or against liberalized foreign ownership of airlines that rely upon the consequences 
of U.S. domestic deregulation in 1978.  Yet one cannot draw the immediate conclusion that changing 
foreign ownership laws would provide aggregate benefit on the basis that other forms of deregulation 
have provided benefit.  Nor can the opposite argument be made.  An assessment of the impacts of 
liberalization must be made case-by-case in order to capture the intricacies of individual cases of 
liberalization.  And any such assessment must incorporate the indirect consequences of action as well as 
the opportunity costs of inaction. 
We learned from our stakeholder analysis that, apart from uncovering operational inefficiencies, 
regulatory liberalization would grant U.S. carriers access to cheap capital to retire debt, consolidate, and 
invest in their product, enhancing their competitive position globally.  Further immunization, joint 
ventures and cross-border consolidation allow carriers to develop their global networks to better serve the 
traveling public.  Expanded global networks from financially stronger carriers will better connect U.S. 
businesses to the world while delivering economic synergies for investors.  And numerous studies have 
shown that, with the appropriate legislative safeguards, removing regulations generates a social benefit 
that far outweighs any negative impacts. 
 
Market and Competition Analysis 
In our market and competitive analysis presented in Chapter 3 we see that, in aggregate since 
2000, transatlantic markets have been served by an increasing number of competitors.  However, we also 
identified fifteen cities (two in the U.S., thirteen in Europe) that have lost all direct transatlantic service 
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since 1990.  A majority of transatlantic service lost in Europe has come from European carriers canceling 
service.  Similarly, losses in U.S. cities have come from American carriers stopping service. 
Since 2000, nineteen cities (three in the U.S., sixteen in Europe) have received their first 
transatlantic service.  A majority of service gained in Europe has come from U.S. carriers whereas a 
majority of new U.S. service has come from European carriers.  As this would suggest, U.S. carriers have 
indeed gained a disproportionate share of new transatlantic service.  Both the trends in service losses and 
gains suggest that U.S. and European carriers are increasingly flying from their primary hubs to new 
markets across the Atlantic in an effort to leverage the network effect of connections behind their hubs. 
In addition, we identify a trend towards reduction in aircraft size, with U.S. carriers on average 
utilizing aircraft with 50 fewer seats across the Atlantic than their foreign counterparts.  As transatlantic 
competition between larger cities becomes saturated, the demand for air service to smaller cities may 
increase, prompting the use of smaller aircraft.  This phenomenon may disproportionally benefit those 
carriers with long-range fleets composed of smaller aircraft. 
We also discover that although European gateways are highly concentrated to the largest four 
hubs, overall U.S. gateways are more concentrated than those of Europe, where a greater proportion of 
traffic is fed through smaller gateways.  Part of this difference is that in Europe, historically, it was very 
much the responsibility of the national government to preserve a “flag carrier” not only to provide air 
transportation to its residents, but also to represent the nation’s interests abroad.44  The top ten European 
gateways serve as hub airports to nine major European carriers.  But perhaps more telling is the number 
of carriers whose hubs exist at the remaining 42 European gateway cities.  Here are the hub cities of other 
national carriers, like Austrian, SAS, Brussels Airlines, Icelandair, Olympic, Turkish Airways, Tarom, 
LOT Polish Airlines, Czech Airlines, Aeroflot, Finnair, TAP Portugal and Air Malta, all with incentive 
(and in a few cases, government assistance) to serve major international centers like New York.  
Conversely, the list of top ten U.S. gateways already includes hub cities of all six legacy U.S. carriers.  
There are no other U.S. carriers with transatlantic capabilities, so there are fewer forces fragmenting the 
U.S. gateways than those in Europe. 
 The market and competition analysis demonstrates a clear reliance on hubs as transatlantic 
gateways in both the U.S. and Europe.  Since 2000, U.S. carriers have gained a disproportionate share of 
transatlantic departures, destinations and passengers.  This has occurred through the addition of new 
service from major U.S. gateways.  Our next step is to understand whether liberalization policy events 
have driven this new service. 
 
                                                 
 
44 This phenomenon is being alluded to in the opening quotation of this thesis on Page 5. 
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Impacts of Transatlantic Open Skies 
In Chapter 4 we discover that of the 22 European countries with a U.S. Open Skies agreement 
prior to 2007, only seven experienced overall increases in transatlantic service levels following the 
signing of their agreements.  Another six countries experienced overall reductions in service levels, and 
four without any service prior to the agreement remain without service today.  This data supports the 
notion that liberalization alone is not sufficient to achieve increases in service levels. 
Our analysis begins with a review the Open Skies Agreements in place between the U.S. and 
European counties.  It is worth noting that over one third of the U.S.’ Open Skies agreements have been 
established with European countries, which mirrors the tendency for air transportation between the two 
regions to be less regulated than in other parts of the world.  Indeed, transatlantic service levels have been 
the subject of numerous studies that explore the benefits resulting from liberalization.  Our findings from 
the analyses presented in Chapters 4 and 5 are that the impacts of Open Skies are less conclusive than 
those held by previous studies.  The discrepancies are discussed in Section 6.2. 
For each of the European Open Skies signatories, we evaluate the changes in service level metrics 
following the signing of the agreement.  We define transatlantic “service levels” between two countries to 
comprise four metrics: passenger enplanements, number of city pairs, total departures and the number of 
carriers providing transatlantic service.  The latter is one indicator of the level of competition in the 
market.  Most studies have considered traffic growth as the most robust indicator of the “benefits” of 
Open Skies.  However, it is also important to consider whether certain communities have lost transatlantic 
service (i.e. reduction in city pairs).  We also evaluate whether liberalization does, as proponents predict, 
result in an increase in the number of competitors by reducing the barriers to entry into a given market. 
Our analysis evaluates changes in four service level measures in the five years prior and post the 
signing of an Open Skies agreement with the U.S.  For the number of departures and passenger 
enplanements, annualized growth rates are averaged over the five-year period before and after the 
agreement.  For number of city pairs and competitors, the absolute number is averaged over the same 
periods.  The pre- and post-agreement values are compared to gain insight into the impact of Open Skies.  
We perform a statistical significance test to determine whether a significant change in service levels 
occurred following the signing of an Open Skies agreement.  Given the small size of each of our samples 
(five data points prior- and five post-agreement) and that the data fails to conform to a specific 
distribution (e.g. normal, uniform, triangular), we must employ a nonparametric test.  We perform the 
Wilcoxon Rank Sum test which is well-suited for two-sample problems with independent samples. 
We define an increase in service levels to be conclusive if, of those service metrics experiencing a 
statistically significant change, a simple majority increased following the establishment of Open Skies.  
Similarly, a decrease is conclusive if a majority of statistically significant changes were negative.  To 
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reiterate, of the 22 countries with U.S. Open Skies agreements in place by 2007, only seven demonstrated 
overall increases in service levels while six demonstrated overall reductions.  The four countries which 
signed Open Skies treaties with the U.S. but have not received service support the hypothesis that 
liberalization alone does not oblige service level increases. 
We then discuss the impacts of antitrust immunity and partnerships, particularly the extent to 
which alliances in deregulated markets have led to the benefits often credited to liberalization.  We 
highlight studies that have demonstrated the service level increases and fare reductions that leverage the 
required linkage between alliances and liberalization.  For example, a U.S. DOT (2000) study confirms 
that “alliance-based networks are the principal driving force behind transatlantic price reductions and 
traffic gains.”  In other words, the data suggests that deregulation alone has not consistently led to service 
level increases or fare decreases.  Instead deregulation in the form of Open Skies, as a prerequisite for 
immunization of alliances, has ultimately led to the service benefits we enjoy today.  In our final analysis, 
we build an econometric model to validate Chapter 4’s conclusion that the existence of Open Skies is not 
a dominant explanatory factor of transatlantic service levels. 
 
Econometric Market Analysis 
In Chapter 5 we determine that Open Skies agreements demonstrate no statistically significant 
correlation to transatlantic service levels by performing an econometric analysis of U.S. and European 
markets.  Our regression analysis evaluates transatlantic service levels of 32 U.S. cities, 59 European 
cities and 37 European countries, with the goal of determining which factors play the largest role in 
explaining transatlantic service levels to a particular market. 
Of all the factors investigated, the total economic activity of a city or country (as measured by 
GDP) is the dominant factor in determining service levels to U.S. cities and European countries.  
Additionally, because of the tendency of hubs to exist in or near major economic centers, status as a Big-3 
European carrier hub is the dominant factor in determining service levels to European cities.  However 
unlike in Europe, whether a U.S. city serves as a hub has insignificant explanatory power.   
Perhaps most notably, the existence of an Open Skies agreement does not have a significant 
relationship to transatlantic service levels and, in fact, is negatively correlated to service levels across 
European countries. 
We recall from Chapter 3 that recent growth in transatlantic service has come from the Big-3 
European and Big-6 American carriers.  They continue to leverage their transatlantic hubs and the 
expanded networks that result from their participation in alliances.  Due to statutory precedent, alliance 
growth is reliant upon the liberalization of bilaterals between the U.S. and respective European nations.  
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Therefore, the results of these analyses support the hypothesis that liberalization is a necessary, but not 
sufficient, step in achieving transatlantic service level growth. 
 
6.2 Contrast with Other Studies 
 
Our findings are consistent with those of InterVISTAS (2006), which concluded that 
“liberalization is a necessary but not sufficient condition for traffic growth.”  InterVISTAS builds a 
comprehensive econometric model to describe air traffic levels between country-pairs using various 
geographical, socioeconomic and regulatory variables.  They evaluate current flight levels and determine 
whether traffic levels could support additional (or in some cases initial) service.  Furthermore, if 5th 
freedom rights are available, InterVISTAS arbitrarily allocates half of the capacity to the fifth freedom 
market.  In their model, if the country-pair can meet a 70% load factor and pre-established frequency 
requirements, they assume it will obtain new direct service.  Otherwise, no nonstop traffic increases will 
occur.  Yet in our analysis we found that over two thirds of cities that lost all transatlantic service since 
1990 were served by direct flights with average load factors above 70%.  The InterVISTAS model would 
have predicted that service, yet other factors deemed them unsustainable in the real world. 
The InterVISTAS study also differs from our own in that it uses a regression analysis to explain 
traffic levels between two countries.  In our research we use regression analysis to explain transatlantic 
service levels for a particular city because we are interested in service levels rather than traffic levels to 
Open Skies countries.  As a result, our econometric analysis is able to produce specific results for 
different cities in the same country.  Despite these discrepancies, the InterVISTAS study was original and 
comprehensive, and our conclusions align. 
The Brattle Group (2002) estimates a 9-24% increase in international passenger demand between 
the U.S. and EU resulting from establishment of an Open Aviation Area (OAA) between the two.  In 
calculating this number, Brattle makes three primary assumptions about an OAA environment, namely 
that (1) all cost savings are passed on to consumers, (2) the frequency of the number of flights increase by 
10%, and (3) fares decrease by 18-28% thereby stimulating additional demand.  However, the Brattle 
estimates reflect a regulation-free OAA as defined in Chapter 2 rather than the more pragmatic Open 
Skies treaty between the U.S. and EU.  The effects of EU-U.S. Open Skies will admittedly be far less 
given restrictions on cabotage and foreign ownership. 
To test their conclusions, Brattle uses evidence from previous liberalization events and evaluates 
the change in annual growth rates of traffic volume.  The Brattle methodology differs from our own in a 
few ways.  First, we examine all 34 European Open Skies signatories, whereas Brattle considers only the 
original fourteen EU member states, four of which lacked Open Skies agreements with the U.S.  Next, the 
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study’s conclusion that liberalization is the basis for the observed transatlantic traffic growth appears 
inconclusive since three of four countries without Open Skies experienced increases in traffic growth 
rates over the test period.  Similarly, two of ten Open Skies countries saw negative or insignificant 
changes in traffic growth rate over the same period.  These conflicting cases are consistent with our 
findings presented in Chapter 4 that liberalization has led to both increases and decreases in service 
levels. 
Booz Allen Hamilton (2007) updated the Brattle Group report and estimated an increase of 26 
million passengers over five years following the establishment of a U.S.-EU OAA.  Again, the expected 
effects will not be as great under EU-U.S. Open Skies.  Booz Allen appropriately incorporates the effects 
of 9/11 and examines a larger subset of twenty EU and EFTA member states.  However, Booz Allen’s 
regression analysis only considers traffic increases as a measure of increased service levels whereas our 
study evaluates three additional service metrics. 
The Brattle, Booz Allen and InterVISTAS studies all confirm our hypothesis that, regardless of 
artificial restrictions, traffic will grow because of economic growth.  In addition, all three studies identify 
the importance of evaluating changes to transatlantic airfares in determining the effects of liberalization, 
yet the lack of high quality fare information precludes any detailed analysis of price impacts.  As a result, 
all three studies rely on passenger volume as a more reliable measure of economic impact.  They explore 
city pairs only as a secondary measure and do not evaluate competition or departures.  As we have 
already discussed, our research explores four measures to determine changes in service levels: number of 
city pairs, competitors, departures and enplanements.  We evaluate changes in service levels in the five 
years prior and post the signing of an Open Skies agreement. 
The three above reports consider the total economic impacts of air transportation liberalization, 
whereas our research considers only service level impacts.  Although the “benefits” of liberalization are 
indeed far-reaching, their calculation is based on assumptions that are beyond the scope of this research. 
 
6.3 Conclusions and Future Research 
 
Throughout our research, a few common themes prevail.  First, as new entrant airlines have 
appeared and incumbent airlines expand their footprints, competition has increased both domestically and 
internationally.  Although its consequences are still debated, increased competition brought about through 
the expansion of incumbent networks as well as new entrants in the U.S. relied upon the deregulation of 
the airline industry in 1978. 
Second, as domestic markets have become increasingly saturated, carriers have emphasized 
international long-haul flying to capture higher yields and leverage proportionally lower unit costs.  
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Again, the flexibility to efficiently manage international capacity has become easier as global aviation 
markets become deregulated. 
Third, carriers have long leveraged their hubs and focus cities when adding international capacity.  
New direct service to Europe has overwhelmingly been added by U.S. carriers flying from their hubs.  
Similarly, U.S. cities receiving new transatlantic service have received this service from non-U.S. carriers 
flying to their hubs. 
Finally, our research has demonstrated that the liberalization of air transportation has resulted in 
service level gains in some markets and losses in others.  While some Open Skies agreements have led to 
increases in service levels and/or competition, others have been followed by decreases in service or 
competition.  The effects of liberalization depend on many factors not inherently common to all cases, 
and therefore must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.  Between the U.S. and Europe, liberalization 
alone has not consistently led to the increases in service or competition that proponents often cite. 
We contest the argument that regulatory liberalization obliges competition and service level 
increases.  However, we believe that those case studies that proponents most often cite (such as the 
Netherlands and Germany) could not have seen such favorable increases in service levels without the 
liberalization effects of Open Skies and antitrust immunity. 
In lieu of the promise of increased service levels, the best arguments for liberalization highlight 
the costs that regulation imposes upon the consumer by not allowing for the optimal allocation of capital 
resources across the global network.  For example, the cancelation of a route following an Open Skies 
agreement is one indication that the opportunity cost of that particular service is high given a deregulated 
set of alternatives.  These costs of regulation (operating inefficiencies, opportunity costs, etc.) must be 
weighed against any service level gains in determining net utility to individual stakeholders.  Since the 
costs and benefits of policy changes have been spread across many stakeholders at various points in time, 
movement from the status quo is understandably contentious.  However, regulated markets bear the costs 
of restricted output levels that have not successfully been captured in the debates over liberalization. 
Restrictions in time and data limited our ability to quantify the costs of operating inefficiencies 
and suboptimal resource allocation.  It is very difficult to estimate what output levels to a particular 
market would have been without the granting of antitrust immunity and the expansion of alliances.  
However, it would be useful to further study the impacts of regulation across a network to quantify the 
specific impacts on particular stakeholder groups.  This work would aid in developing vehicles for 
legislative change that incorporate protections and reparations for certain stakeholder groups. 
As already discussed in previous chapters, an important limitation of our approach is that given 
the data we have access to, our “passenger enplanements” metric reflects nonstop traffic only.  It 
considers all O-D traffic onboard a particular segment, including passengers who connect onward (in 
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Europe) to reach alternative destinations, or those who ultimately arrive in cities which they did not fly to 
directly from the U.S.  For example, traffic reported between Philadelphia and Paris includes not only 
Philadelphia-Paris local passengers but all passengers on board that originate “behind” Philadelphia or 
terminate “beyond” Paris.  These passengers comprise varying fractions of the total traffic and do not 
reflect demand in the Philadelphia-Paris local market.  Due to limitations in data, our analysis considers 
segment traffic rather than O-D traffic.  This will tend to inflate demand (and service levels) to or from 
cities with substantial connecting traffic.  We believe that traffic alone is a difficult measure to determine 
causation from Open Skies because we expect a natural growth in traffic year over year, regardless of 
other service level changes.  Therefore equal emphasis is placed on number of city pairs, departures and 
carriers.  It would be very interesting to investigate how liberalization has impacted traffic to individual 
city pairs across nonstop and connecting itineraries. 
Similarly, our study does not include a detailed analysis of the price impacts of liberalization.  It 
is worthwhile to evaluate changes to transatlantic airfares as an additional measure of the effects of 
liberalization, yet the lack of high quality fare information makes such an analysis difficult.  Although 
output volume is a useful measure of impact on consumers, further work could explore fare changes 
across a full set of origin-destination pairs following liberalization. 
The regression analysis performed in this thesis is insufficient to identify those markets that could 
maintain profitable (or should expect to receive additional) transatlantic service.  Many variables not 
captured in our model are used by airlines for market analysis.  A more extensive econometric analysis, 
such as that developed by InterVISTAS (2006), might help forecast changes in service levels between the 
U.S. and Europe and elsewhere. 
From our research we conclude that liberalization is a necessary, but not sufficient, step in 
achieving the optimal application of air transportation resources to serve the public.  Traditional aviation 
bilaterals, while effective as foreign policy vehicles, have proven more costly in an increasingly 
globalized world.  Without liberalization, many operating inefficiencies are never uncovered, resulting in 
a suboptimal allocation of limited capital resources.  Many studies have shown that regulatory 
liberalization has resulted in traffic growth at unprecedented levels.  Our research has shown that, while 
the service level growth phenomenon cannot be guaranteed, the potential for output growth is artificially 
constrained in regulated markets. 
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Appendix I: List of U.S. Open Skies Agreements 
Source: U.S. Department of State Bureau of Economic, Energy and Business Affairs 
Updated November 25, 2008  
Partner Application Date Concluded All-cargo 7th‘s MALIAT Membership 
1. *Netherlands In Force 10/14/92 -- -- 
2. *Belgium Provisional 3/1/95 -- -- 
3. *Finland In Force 3/24/95 -- -- 
4. *Denmark In Force 4/26/95 -- -- 
5. Norway In Force 4/26/95 -- -- 
6. *Sweden In Force 4/26/95 -- -- 
7. *Luxembourg In Force 6/6/95 Yes -- 
8. *Austria In Force 6/14/95 -- -- 
9. Iceland In Force 6/14/95 Yes -- 
10. Switzerland In Force 6/15/95 -- -- 
11. *Czech Republic In Force 12/8/95 Yes -- 
12. *Germany Provisional 2/29/96 Yes -- 
13. Jordan In Force 11/10/96 -- -- 
14. Singapore In Force 1/22/97 Yes Yes 
15. Taiwan In Force 2/28/97 -- -- 
16. Costa Rica In Force 5/8/97 -- -- 
17. El Salvador In Force 5/8/97 Yes -- 
18. Guatemala In Force 5/8/97 Yes -- 
19. Honduras Provisional 5/8/97 Yes -- 
20. Nicaragua In Force 5/8/97 Chart Only -- 
21. Panama In Force 5/8/97 Yes -- 
22. New Zealand In Force 5/29/97 Yes Yes 
23. Brunei In Force 6/20/97 Yes Yes 
24. Malaysia In Force 6/21/97 Yes -- 
25. Aruba In Force 9/18/97 Yes -- 
26. Chile In Force 10/28/97 Yes Yes 
27. Uzbekistan In Force 2/27/98 Yes -- 
28. Korea In Force 4/23/98 -- -- 
29. Peru In Force 6/10/98 Yes -- 
30. Netherland Antilles In Force 7/14/98 Yes -- 
31. *Romania In Force 7/15/98 -- -- 
32. *Italy C&R 11/11/98 -- -- 
33. U.A.E. In Force 4/13/99 Yes -- 
34. Pakistan In Force 4/29/99 Yes -- 
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Partner Application Date Concluded All-cargo 7th‘s MALIAT Membership 
35. Bahrain In Force 5/24/99 Yes -- 
36. Tanzania Provisional 11/3/99 Yes -- 
37. *Portugal In Force 12/22/99 Yes -- 
38. *Slovak Republic In Force 1/7/00 Yes -- 
39. Namibia C&R 2/4/00 -- -- 
40. Burkina Faso In Force 2/9/00 Yes -- 
41. Ghana In Force 3/16/00 Yes -- 
42. Turkey In Force 3/22/00 -- -- 
43. Gambia In Force 5/2/00 Yes -- 
44. Nigeria Provisional 8/26/00 Yes -- 
45. Morocco In Force 10/5/00 Yes -- 
46. Rwanda N/A 10/11/00 Yes -- 
47. *Malta In Force 10/12/00 Yes -- 
48. Benin N/A 11/28/00 Yes -- 
49. Senegal C&R 12/15/00 Yes -- 
50. *Poland In Force 5/31/01 Yes -- 
51. Oman C&R 9/16/01 Yes -- 
52. Qatar Provisional 10/3/01 Yes -- 
53. *France In Force 10/19/01 Yes -- 
54. Sri Lanka In Force 11/1/01 -- -- 
55. Uganda C&R 6/04/02 Yes -- 
56. Cape Verde In Force 6/21/02 Yes -- 
57. Samoa In Force 7/4/02 Yes Yes 
58. Jamaica In Force 10/30/08 -- -- 
59. Tonga In Force 9/19/03 Yes Yes 
60. Albania In Force 9/24/03 Yes -- 
61. Madagascar Provisional 3/10/04 Yes -- 
62. Gabon In Force 5/26/04 Yes -- 
63. Indonesia C&R 7/26/04 Yes -- 
64. Uruguay Provisional 10/20/04 Yes -- 
65. India In Force 1/15/05 Yes -- 
66. Paraguay In Force 5/2/05 Yes -- 
67. Maldives In Force 5/5/05 Yes -- 
68. Ethiopia Provisional 5/17/05 Yes -- 
69. Thailand In Force 9/19/05 Yes -- 
70. Mali In Force 10/17/05 Yes -- 
71. Canada In Force 3/12/07 Yes -- 
72. Bosnia and Herzegovina In Force 11/22/05 Yes -- 
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Partner Application Date Concluded All-cargo 7th‘s MALIAT Membership 
73. Cameroon In Force 2/16/06 Yes -- 
74. Chad Provisional 5/31/06 Yes -- 
75. Cook Islands In Force 2/28/06 Yes Yes 
76. Kuwait In Force 5/27/07 Yes -- 
77. Liberia In Force 2/15/07 Yes -- 
78. *Bulgaria Provisional 3/30/08 4/30/07 Yes -- 
79. *Cyprus Provisional 3/30/08 4/30/07 Yes -- 
80. *Estonia Provisional 3/30/08 4/30/07 Yes -- 
81. *Greece Provisional 3/30/08 4/30/07 Yes -- 
82. *Hungary Provisional 3/30/08 4/30/07 Yes -- 
83. *Ireland Provisional 3/30/08 4/30/07 Yes -- 
84. *Latvia Provisional 3/30/08 4/30/07 Yes -- 
85. *Lithuania Provisional 3/30/08 4/30/07 Yes -- 
86. *Slovenia Provisional 3/30/08 4/30/07 Yes -- 
87. *Spain Provisional 3/30/08 4/30/07 Yes -- 
88. *United Kingdom Provisional 3/30/08 4/30/07 Yes -- 
89. Georgia In Force 12/6/07 Yes -- 
90. Australia C&R 2/14/08 Yes -- 
91. Croatia N/A 3/13/08 Yes -- 
92. Kenya C&R 5/30/08 -- -- 
93. Laos C&R 10/3/08 Yes -- 
94. Armenia C&R 10/7/08 Yes -- 
__________ 
*The U.S.-EU Air Transport Agreement, signed April 30, 2007, has been provisionally applied since 
March 30, 2008, for all 27 European Union member countries. 
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Appendix II: List of Immunized Alliances with U.S. Carriers 
 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Transportation Office of Aviation Analysis 
 
 
ALLIANCE NOTE DATE FILED 
DOCKET 
NUMBER  FINAL ORDER  
American-CAI  (Alliance Ended on 6/1/00) 11/3/95 OST-1995-792 7/15/96:Order 96-7-21 
American-British Airways (Dismissed) 8/10/01 OST-2001-10387 OST-2001-11029 
4/4/02:Order 2002-4-4 
(Granted AA-BA motion to 
dismiss) 
American-Finnair   4/4/02 OST-2002-12063 7/30/02:Order 2002-7-39 
American-LAN Chile  12/23/97 OST-1997-3285 9/13/99:Order 99-9-9 
American-Sabena-Swissair 
(Effective 8/6/00) 
(AA-SR 
Terminated on 
11/8/01; AA-SN 
Terminated on 
3/21/02) 
11/19/99 OST-1999-6528 5/11/00:Order 2000-5-13 
American-TACA Group 
(Request to 
Dismiss filed on 
3/4/02)  
3/17/00 OST-2000-7088 Pending 
American-Swiss Int’l Air 
Lines  6/28/02 OST-2002-12688 11/22/02:Order 2002-11-12 
Continental-COPA  12/22/00 OST-2000-8577 5/3/01:Order 2001-5-1 
Delta-Austrian-Sabena-
Swissair 
(Alliance Ended 
on 8/6/00) 9/8/95 OST-1995-618 6/14/96:Order 96-6-33 
Delta-Air France-Alitalia-
Czech Airlines  8/15/01 OST-2001-10429 1/18/02:Order 2002-1-6 
Delta-Korean Air Lines-
Air France-Alitalia-Czech 
Airlines 
 3/13/02 OST-2002-11842 6/27/02:Order 2002-6-18 
Northwest-KLM  9/9/92 OST-1992-46371 1/11/93:Order 93-1-11 
Northwest-KLM-Alitalia 
(AZ Terminated 
Relationship on 
10/28/01) 
5/11/99 OST-1999-5674 12/3/99:Order 99-12-5 
Northwest-Malaysia  1/13/00 OST-2000-6791 10/13/00:Order 2000-10-12 
United-Asiana Airlines   1/3/03 OST-2003-14202 5/14/03:Order 2003-5-18 
United-Lufthansa  2/29/96 OST-1996-1116 5/20/96:Order 96-5-27 
United-Lufthansa-SAS  5/28/96 OST-1996-1411 11/1/96:Order 96-11-1 
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United-Austrian-Lauda-
Lufthansa-SAS  8/18/00 OST-2000-7828 1/26/01:Order 2001-1-19 
United-British Midland-
Austrian-Lauda-
Lufthansa-SAS 
 9/5/01 OST-2001-10575
OST-2001-11029 
4/4/02:Order 2002-4-4 
(Subject to achieving US-UK 
open skies within six months 
of issue date of order) 
10/3/02:Order 2002-10-6 
(Subject to achieving US-UK 
open skies by 12/31/02) 
12/31/02:Order 2002-12-22 
(Subject to achieving US-UK 
open skies by 6/30/03) 
United-Air Canada  6/4/96 OST-1996-1434 9/19/97:Order 97-9-21 
United-Air New Zealand  12/17/99 OST-1999-6680 4/3/01:Order 2001-4-2 
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Appendix III: Wilcoxon Rank Sum Table 
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